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Abstract
In this thesis I present a theoretical and empirical investigation of the eﬀects
and propagation mechanisms of a government spending shock with Learning-
By-Doing (LBD). A positive government spending shock increases hours worked.
By the LBD mechanism the increase in hours yields an increase in productivity
and hence a decline in inﬂation and interest rates. The fall in the long-term
real interest rate generates an inter-temporal eﬀect leading my model results
closer in line with the data.
In chapter 1 I ﬁrst provide a literature review on the eﬀects of a change
in government spending. I then present a DSGE new Keynesian model with
LBD and comment its main features. I show that, by including LBD, the
model generates an increase in productivity and consumption in line with the
empirical evidences.
Chapter 2 analysis the eﬀect of a government spending shock on the real
exchange rate. I show that including LBD makes the model able to reproduce
the real exchange rate depreciation observed in the data. This result derives
from the increase in consumption and the assumption of international risk
sharing condition.
Chapter 3 investigates the eﬀect of a government spending shock on hous-
ing market. I ﬁnd Vector autoregression (VAR) evidence that house prices
increase after a government spending shock. In a model where housing can be
used by credit constrained households as collateral to borrow, the increase in
housing wealth introduces an additional propagation mechanism for a govern-
ment spending shock. I present a model with two sectors, heterogeneity in the
households' discount factor, and credit constrained agents. I show that intro-
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ducing the LBD mechanism, by contrast with a model where LBD is absent,
makes the model able to replicate the observed increase of real house prices.
The model is estimated by matching DSGE and VAR impulses responses.
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Introduction
In this thesis I present a theoretical and empirical investigation of the ef-
fects and propagation mechanisms of a government spending shock with skill
accumulation of workers through past work experience or Learning-by-Doing
(LBD). This thesis is made up of three chapters.
In chapter 1, I ﬁrst present a review of the empirical evidences on the ef-
fects of a change in government spending on a set of selected variables. The
correct identiﬁcation of a government spending shock is a challenging econo-
metrics task and the most appropriate identiﬁcation strategy is still debated. I
conclude that, despite the empirical literature has not yet provided a deﬁnitive
answer, the most inﬂuential literature shows that an increment in government
spending delivers Keynesian eﬀects by generating an increase in output, hours,
real wages and private consumption. Furthermore, positive changes in govern-
ment spending are likely to be associated with a decrease in inﬂation and
interest rate, and an increase in productivity. Yet, most of the theoretical
models based on an inﬁnite horizon representative agent deliver results at odd
with the empirical evidences. In particular, in the last two decades there has
been a growing interest in DSGE models. However, standard version of both
Real Business Cycle (RBC) and New-Keynesian (NK) models, while success-
ful in matching the observed increase in output and hours, fail to generate the
increase in productivity and deliver a response of consumption of the wrong
sign. Diﬀerent solutions have been proposed to bring theoretical results closer
in line with data. A general overview of these proposals is presented.
In the ﬁrst chapter I present and discuss the solution proposed in this
thesis to reconcile theoretical results and empirical evidences. I rely on New
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Keynesian DSGE models. However, I depart from a standard model, like the
one presented in Smets and Wouters (2007), by assuming that workers' skills
are not constant but evolve according to a Learning-By-Doing mechanism as
in Chang et al. (2002). I show that introducing LBD in an otherwise stand-
ard new-Keynesian DSGE model have important eﬀects on the propagation
mechanism of a government spending shock and enables the model to generate
a response of consumption and productivity in line with empirical ﬁndings.
In new Keynesian models, because of price frictions, those ﬁrms that cannot
change price increase production and labour demand to meet the rise in ag-
gregate demand caused by the increase in government spending. However, for
the government budget constraint to hold, the increase in government spend-
ing must be matched with an equal increase in the discounted value of taxes
which reduces the ﬂow of available resources for the private sector. Rational
agents, hit by this negative wealth eﬀect, increase labour supply. Both with and
without LBD the new equilibrium in the labour market is associated to an in-
crease in hours worked and, under some circumstances, to a rise in real wages.1
As the real wage rises, households increase labour supply and substitute con-
sumption for leisure. Without LBD, this intra-temporal substitution eﬀect is
not strong enough to compensate for the negative wealth eﬀect. Furthermore,
in absence of LBD, the increase in the real wage raises marginal costs. The
fraction of ﬁrms able to re-optimize their price will respond to the increase in
marginal costs by setting a higher price. The gradual increase in the price level
increments the expected path of inﬂation. The monetary authority reacts to
changes in inﬂation by increasing the nominal interest rate. This translates
into an increase in the real interest rate which brings about an inter-temporal
eﬀect that induces households to reduces current consumption and postpone
it. In fact, despite the increase in hours, the output increase is not suﬃciently
large, hence private consumption have to fall to compensate the increase in
government spending. With LBD, the increase in hours worked triggers an
1As shown in Linnemann and Schabert (2003), in a model without LBD, if the central
bank sets the nominal interest rate following a Taylor rule, wages can increase if there is no
capital accumulation, or in a model with capital accumulation, the increase in real wage is
still feasible if the nominal interest rate rule puts not too much weight on output.
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increase in the workers skills level and hence in the level of productivity. The
negative wealth eﬀect is milder because the increase in productivity generates
an higher level of resources available in the future. The LBD mechanism, by
the increase in productivity, reduces ﬁrms marginal costs. This results in a
fall of inﬂation and the real interest rate. The lower real interest rate reduces
the return to saving and induces agents to increase current consumption. Fur-
thermore, the boost in real wages, generated by the increase in productivity,
incentives households to substitute consumption for leisure. Thus, the combin-
ation of inter and intra-temporal eﬀects, based on the increase in productivity
generated by the LBD mechanism, oﬀset the negative wealth eﬀect and the
ﬁnal result is an increase in consumption. I also show the crucial role played
by nominal rigidities. Without wage frictions households are on their perfectly
competitive labour supply and are less willing to substitute consumption for
leisure. In addition, in absence of price frictions, ﬁrms can immediately change
their price. The increase in productivity cannot exert any deﬂationary eﬀect
and the key propagation mechanism proposed is switched oﬀ.2
In the second chapter, I use the mechanism proposed in the ﬁrst chapter
to analyse the eﬀect of a government spending shock on the external sector of
the economy. First I use a VAR model estimated using US data to show that
an increase in government spending, not only is associated to an increase in
consumption and productivity, but also generates a depreciation of the real ex-
change rate. Under the assumption of complete market, the international risk
sharing condition determines a strong correlation between domestic consump-
tion and the real exchange rate. In a standard DSGE model the reduction in
consumption necessarily leads to a counterfactual appreciation of the real ex-
change rate. I show that LBD provides a valid solution to make consumption
and the real exchange rate move in the right direction.
In the third chapter, I study the eﬀect of a government spending shock
on housing market. The 2008 recession has registered a collapse in house
2Chang et al. (2002) show that LBD provides an additional propagation channel in a
standard RBC. This thesis demonstrates that, in the presence of nominal rigidities, it has
crucial qualitative implications for the response of consumption and many other variables to
government expenditure shocks.
15
Introduction
prices. Restoring a sound housing market seems to be a keystone through
the economic recovery. Using US data, I ﬁrst provide empirical evidence that
an increase in government spending is associated to a boost in real house
prices. In a model where housing can be used as collateral to borrow by credit
constrained households, the increase in housing wealth introduce an additional
propagation mechanism for a government spending shock. I present a model
with two sectors, heterogeneity in the households' discount factor, and credit
constrained agents that can use housing as collateral. I show that introducing
the LBD mechanism described in the ﬁrst chapter, makes the model able to
replicate the observed response of real house prices, whereas the model without
skills accumulation cannot account for the empirical ﬁndings. The collateral
channel ampliﬁes the response of consumption to a government shock. The
model is estimated by matching VAR and DSGE impulses responses.
16
CHAPTER 1
Fiscal stimulus with Learning-By-Doing
1.1 Introduction
What are the eﬀects of a change in government spending on the private sector
of the economy? The question has been a central issue in the macroeconomic
policy debate for a long time. The 2008 global recession has renewed interest
and has fuel the research in this topics.
The empirical and theoretical literature has extensively investigated the ef-
fects of a government spending shock on domestic economic activity. Despite
the eﬀort, is still diﬃcult to reconcile the evidences provided by the empir-
ical literature with the result of a fully speciﬁed Dynamic Stochastic General
Equilibrium (DSGE) model. Most of the empirical literature provides evid-
ences that support some stylized facts: an exogenous increase in government
spending leads to an increase in output, private consumption, productivity,
hours worked and real wages.
The DSGE literature has not yet found a shared solution to account for all
these empirical ﬁndings, and therefore has failed to provide insights into the
key propagation mechanism of a government spending shock.
In this chapter I propose a mechanism based on an endogenous increase in
total factor productivity trigger out by a positive government spending shock.
This chapter shows how introducing a Learning-by-Doing (LBD) mechanism
à la Chang et al. (2002) in an otherwise standard DSGE model featuring
nominal rigidities, generates a response of consumption that is consistent with
the empirical evidences.
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As in Chang et al. (2002) the level of output produced depends on the
workers' skills with the latter evolving according to a LBD mechanism, so that
past work experience aﬀects the current level of skills. In contrast with the
standard model, a positive government spending shock produces an increase
in consumption.
This result stems from the fact that in my model the increase in government
spending leads to an endogenous increase in total factor productivity. In fact,
even if spending is completely wasteful, a positive government shock increases
the level of hours worked. By the LBD mechanism, the increase in hours
results in a higher level of skills in the following periods. Since standard
accounting techniques ignore workers' skills, a change in the level of skills
would be considered an increase in total factor productivity.
If the increase in productivity is large enough, marginal costs fall and cause
a reduction in the expected path of inﬂation. In the attempt to stabilize the
price level, the central bank cuts the nominal interest rate more than inﬂation.
The resulting decline in the long term real interest rate increases consumption.
I also show that nominal rigidities play a crucial role in determining these
results.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follow. Section 1.2 presents
an empirical and theoretical literature review. Section 1.3 presents a DSGE
model with LBD. Section 1.4 uses a simpliﬁed model to illustrate the mechan-
ism through which LBD aﬀects the propagation mechanism of a government
spending shock. Section 1.5 presents the econometric approach and discusses
the simulation results for the complete model. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Literature review
In this section I propose a brief literature review on the eﬀects of a government
spending shock. I start from empirical evidences and then I turn to the results
provided by theoretical models.1
1For a more comprehensive and extended literature review see Hebous (2011)
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1.2.1 Empirical literature
Researchers have largely employed Vector autoregression (VAR) models to
study the eﬀect of a change in government spending. One of the most chal-
lenging task is the correct identiﬁcation of structural shocks. This aim has
been accomplished in the literature by four diﬀerent methods: the recursive
approach, the structural identiﬁcation approach, the narrative approach and
the sign restriction approach.
First of all, consider that a structural VAR model can be written as:
AZt =
p∑
j=1
BjZt−j + εt (1.1)
where Zt is a vector of observable variables, p is the chosen lag length and εt
is a vector of structural shocks. A and Bj are matrix of coeﬃcients. In order
to recover structural shocks, restrictions have to be imposed on the matrices
A and B. Each approach is based on a diﬀerent identiﬁcation strategy and
imposes a diﬀerent set of restrictions on the two matrices.
In the recursive approach the ﬁrst variable is assumed to respond only to
its own exogenous shock. Thus, with the recursive approach the identiﬁcation
of a structural government spending shock is reached by ordering government
spending ﬁrst. Under this assumption, the residual from a regression of gov-
ernment spending on its own lag and on the lags of all other variables can
be interpreted as structural government spending shocks. This assumption
implies that government spending is allowed to respond to other variables in-
cluded in the VAR model only with one lag.
The structural identiﬁcation approach imposes the identiﬁcation restric-
tions using external information in order to estimate the elasticity of the gov-
ernment variables of interest to other variables in the VAR. This identiﬁcation
scheme, which is mainly employed when also a tax shock is considered, produce
results similar to those obtained using the recursive approach.
The narrative approach includes in the VAR a dummy variable (so that
this approach is also deﬁned dummy variable approach) that captures date
of exogenous increase in government spending such as war events. Ramey
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(2011b) shows that the narrative approach performs better in capturing the
anticipated eﬀects of a policy change. In fact, she shows that shifting forward
the original event dates enables the narrative approach to reproduce results
in line with the structural identiﬁcation or recursive approaches. However, as
noted in Perotti (2008) the dummy variable approach has diﬀerent drawbacks.
First this approach ignores the role that other shocks can have during the
chosen event date. Second, it assumes that the dynamic of ﬁscal variables is
the same across all the episodes, and therefore it does not consider that each
episode can be characterized by diﬀerent ﬁscal instruments mix.
Diﬀerently from the previous approaches, the sign restriction approach does
not impose any restriction on the matrices of the VAR model but instead
imposes restrictions on the sign of impulse responses. The main issue is how
to correctly impose the restrictions required to identify a government spending
shock.
The correct identiﬁcation of a government spending shock is not trivial
and, as noted before, each method presents its drawbacks. The choice of iden-
tiﬁcation strategy is also complicated by the fact that the diﬀerent approaches
discussed above can lead to diﬀerent results, not only regarding the size but
also the qualitative eﬀects of government spending on macroeconomic vari-
ables. In what follow I try to provide a very general review of the eﬀect of a
government spending shock on several variables.
Output. The response of output to a government spending shock is in
general found positive, regardless of identiﬁcation assumption used. However,
the quantitative eﬀect can be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. Ramey (2011a) concludes
that the ﬁscal multiplier for the US ranges from 0.8 to 1.5. The size of ﬁscal
multipliers can be aﬀected by several elements. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko
(2012) demonstrate the magnitude of the multiplier is aﬀected by economic
conditions and that there exists signiﬁcant non-linear eﬀects. They found that
during recessions the multiplier is considerably larger than expansion periods.
They also show that each components of spending deliver diﬀerent multipliers.
The size of the multiplier also seems to change over time. Perotti (2005) ﬁnds
that in the US only for the sub-sample pre-1980 the government spending
multiplier is larger than one.
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Consumption. The response of private consumption to a government spend-
ing shock is not unique and depends on the identiﬁcation strategy applied.
The recursive and the structural identiﬁcation assumptions deliver a signiﬁc-
ant, persistent and hump-shaped increase in consumption (see among many
others Fatás and Mihov (2001), Blanchard and Perotti (2002), and Galí et al.
(2007)). Results obtained from sign restriction are more ambiguous. For ex-
ample, Mountford and Uhlig (2009) ﬁnd an insigniﬁcant, small and short-lived
increase in consumption. Ramey and Shapiro (1998) and Edelberg et al. (1999)
using a narrative approach based on military build-ups, ﬁnd evidences of a fall
in consumption. Ramey (2011b) using a revised series of government spend-
ing shocks based on Ramey and Shapiro (1998) concludes that while durable
and non-durable goods consumption decreases, services consumption increases.
Caldara and Kamps (2008) show that, controlling for diﬀerences in the speciﬁc-
ation of reduced-form models, private consumption signiﬁcantly increase after
a government spending shock, regardless of identiﬁcation approach employed.2
Hours. The increase in hours worked after a government spending shock is
a quite robust result. Evidences supporting the increase in hours worked have
been found in Fatás and Mihov (2001), Ramey and Shapiro (1998), Burnside
et al. (2004). Monacelli et al. (2010) document an increase in hours worked
both on the extensive and on the intensive margin, although the increase in
hours worked for employed person is not statistically signiﬁcant.
Interest rate and inﬂation. Evidences of a drop of interest rates and in-
ﬂation have been found in Fatás and Mihov (2001), Perotti (2005), Favero
and Giavazzi (2007), Mountford and Uhlig (2009), Ramey (2011b) and Cor-
setti et al. (2012). These results do not seems to depend on the identiﬁcation
strategy used neither on the measure of interest rate and inﬂation chosen.
However, the dynamic of inﬂation and interest rates responses to a govern-
ment spending increase varies across studies. In fact, while some studies ﬁnd
an initial increase in the two variables followed by a steady fall below their pre-
2Recently the empirical literature has started to use microeconometric techniques to
investigate the eﬀects of a government spending shock. For, example, Giavazzi and McMahon
(2012) using household-level data show that the response of consumption exhibits a high
level of heterogeneity among households.
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shock periods level, other studies provide evidences supporting the opposite
dynamic.
Productivity. Early work by Evans (1992) ﬁnds a positive correlation
between government spending and Solow residuals. Ramey and Shapiro (1998)
show that an increase in military government spending raises labour productiv-
ity. Bachmann and Sims (2012) use a VAR approach to document the increase
in TFP and to show that the increase is larger during recession. Nekarda and
Ramey (2011) show a positive response of productivity to a government spend-
ing shock, although only at aggregate level and not at industry level.
1.2.2 Theoretical literature
In the previous part I have shown that most of the empirical literature provide
evidences supporting the crowding-in eﬀect of private consumption after a
government spending shock. The aim of this section is to brieﬂy discuss the
predictions of standard DSGE models and provide an overview of the solutions
proposed to improve the ability of theoretical models to produce results in line
with the empirical literature evidences.
The classical nomenclature employed in the literature distinguishes between
Real Business Cycle an New Keynesian DSGE models. The main diﬀerences
is that the former class of model does not include nominal frictions. However,
although the magnitude can be diﬀerent, the eﬀects of a change in government
spending in a standard version of both models are qualitatively very similar.
The main diﬀerence is that, at least under some circumstances, NK models
and RBC models predict a response of real wages of diﬀerent sign.
Baxter and King (1993) provide useful insights to understand the key
propagation mechanism of a government spending shock. The government
budget constraint requires that an increase in government spending have to
be associated with an equivalent increase in taxes present value. An inﬁnitely
lived, rational and forward looking representative agent understands that an
increase in government spending implies an increase in tax liabilities burden
which will reduce his available wealth. In this economy the Ricardian equival-
ence holds and consumers react to this negative wealth eﬀect by reducing both
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consumption and leisure. Despite the increase in hours worked, the burst in
output is not suﬃcient to meet the increased aggregate demand related to the
increase in government spending. Hence interest rate have to rise to induce
a decline in consumption and other components of gross domestic product to
make up for the diﬀerence.
In a NK model the mechanism is similar. However, the presence of nom-
inal rigidities have important eﬀects on the labour market. Since ﬁrms cannot
change their prices, they are willing to increase the desired level of goods sup-
ply. Therefore, the presence of nominal frictions leads to an increase in labour
demand larger than in the RBC models. If the increase in labour demand
in suﬃciently high real wages increase. As real wage rises, households work
harder and substitute consumption for leisure. However, this intra-temporal
eﬀect is dumped by a stronger inter-temporal eﬀects. The increase in wages
causes an increase in marginal costs and in the expected path of inﬂation. A
standard Taylor rule prescribes, in the attempt to stabilize inﬂation, to increase
nominal interest rate more than inﬂation, causing a raise in the long-term real
interest rate and hence a fall in the current level of consumption.
Both NK and RBC models therefore predict a counter-factual decrease in
consumption. The literature has proposed diﬀerent solutions in order to bring
the simulated responses of DSGE models closer to the empirical evidences.
Because virtually all DSGE models predict an increase of hours worked, a
proposed solution is based on assuming the non-separability between consump-
tion and leisure. Linnemann (2006) show that if the degree of complementarity
is strong enough a non-additively separable utility function can deliver the in-
crease in consumption found in the data. However, as noted in Bilbiie (2009),
these results can be achieved only if either consumption or leisure are inferior
goods. Whereas, Monacelli and Perotti (2008) show that the form of non separ-
ability proposed in Greenwood et al. (1988) can be successful in matching the
empirical response of private consumption.
The deep-habit mechanism introduced in Ravn et al. (2006) enables the
model to capture the increase in consumption by generating counter-cyclical
mark-ups. In their model, consumers form habit consumption on a good-by-
good basis. Hence, the current level of demand faced by goods producers aﬀects
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their demand in the future. A government spending shock increases aggregate
demand. In order to capture this increase and secure a higher level of sales in
the future, in setting their prices, ﬁrms are willing to reduce their mark-up and
increase their output and labour demand. As result of the increased level of
labour demand, real wages increase, triggering a strong substitution eﬀect from
leisure into consumption which delivers a positive response of consumption to
a government spending increase.
Galí et al. (2007) investigate the eﬀect of incomplete asset market. In their
model they distinguish between Ricardian and rule-of-thumb consumers. The
latter have no access to ﬁnancial market and therefore consume all their dis-
posal income. If the increase in government spending leads to a rise in real
wages, non-Ricardian agents increase consumption. If the share of these indi-
viduals in the economy is suﬃciently large the eﬀect on aggregate consumption
can be positive since the decline in the level of consumption of Ricardian agents
is more than oﬀset by the increase of consumption of non-Ricardian agents.
Corsetti et al. (2012) analyse the eﬀect of an endogenous and systematic
adjustment of government spending to public debt. This spending reversal
mechanism implies that a deﬁcit ﬁnanced increase in government spending is
expected to bring a reduction in the government spending level in the future
and hence in the aggregate level of demand and in the expected path of in-
ﬂation. The resulting fall in long-term real interest rate causes an immediate
increase in consumption.
The literature has also analysed the impact of government spending on
total factor productivity within the framework of general equilibrium models.
Baxter and King (1993) show that if government spending is productive
the growth in resources available in the future leads to an increase in consump-
tion. Within the same framework Glomm and Ravikumar (1997) consider the
eﬀect of government spending on education. Linnemann and Schabert (2006)
extend the analysis to a New Keynesian model. However, these papers require
government spending to enter in the production function directly and fail to
explain the observed increase in TFP when government spending is entirely
wasteful.
By contrast, Devereux et al. (1996) develop a model where TFP endo-
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genously increases after a government spending shock, independently of the
government spending composition. In their model the increase in total factor
productivity derives from the presence of increasing return to specialization
coupled with a free-entry condition that generate a pro-cyclical variation in the
number of intermediate ﬁrms. However, their model has the counter-intuitive
implication of generating an upward sloping labour demand.
1.3 The model
In this section I present a new-Keynesian DSGE model including LBD. The
model is based on Smets and Wouters (2007) and incorporate the LBD mech-
anism proposed in Chang et al. (2002).
Intermediate goods ﬁrms are monopolistic competitors that produce inter-
mediate goods using labour and capital as input. The level of workers' skills
depend on the hours worked in the previous period. Final goods producers ag-
gregate intermediate goods to obtain an homogeneous goods that can be used
for private and public consumption and investment. Households consume and
provide labour and capital services to intermediate ﬁrms. Nominal frictions
imply prices and wages can adjust only infrequently.
1.3.1 Final goods producers
The ﬁnal goods producer is a perfect competitive ﬁrm that aggregates a con-
tinuum of intermediate goods Y (j) to obtain a ﬁnal good Yt using the following
aggregation technology:
Yt =
[ 1
0
Yt (j)
1
1+λf dj
]1+λf
(1.2)
where λf is a positive parameter that depends on price elasticity and determ-
ines the level of price mark-up.
Final good is sold to households and government and can be used for both
consumption and investment. Combing ﬁrst order conditions for the ﬁnal
producer maximization proﬁt problem with the zero proﬁt condition yields
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the following demand for intermediate goods:
Yt (j) =
(
Pt (j)
Pt
)− 1+λf
λf
Yt (1.3)
where Pt =
[ 1
0
Pt (j)
− 1
λf dj
]−λf
is the aggregate price index for the ﬁnal good
and Pt (j) is the price of the intermediate good of type j.
1.3.2 Intermediate goods producers
Intermediate goods producers are monopolistic competitors in their product
market. The intermediate good j is produced using the technology:
Y (j) = At (Kt (j))
α (Nt(j)Xt)
(1−α) (1.4)
where 0 < α < 1, Kt (j) and Nt (j) denote the physical capital and the ho-
mogeneous labour services used to produce the jth good. At is a productivity
shock that evolves according to:
lnAt = (1− ρa) lnA+ ρa lnAt−1 + εat (1.5)
where εat ∼ (0, σ2a) .
Xt denotes the average level of skills of labour suppliers which depends on
total hours worked in the past. Following Chang et al. (2002), skill accumula-
tion is assumed to evolve according to:
Xt = X
ρx
t−1N
µn
t−1 (1.6)
where 0 < ρx < 1 and µn ≥ 0.
This formulation of LBD assumes that workers and ﬁrms perceive skill
accumulation as external. In this sense the deﬁnition of LBD employed in the
present thesis is akin to the LBD mechanism included in Arrow (1962). LBD is
a side eﬀect of production and does not require any decision about the amount
of time or resources to allocate to human capital accumulation.
Cooper and Johri (2002) consider an alternative formulation in which the
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accumulation of what they call organizational capital is internal to ﬁrms and
results from purposeful investment. In response to a positive aggregate demand
shock, ﬁrms have an additional incentive to increase hours worked in their
organization to beneﬁt from a higher level of ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity.
The mechanism introduced in Cooper and Johri (2002) is likely to produce
results similar to the deep habit model in Ravn et al. (2006) described earlier.
Consider for example a government expenditure increase. In order to attain
a higher level of productivity, ﬁrms try to increment hours worked in their
organization. It follows a larger shift in the labour demand which could lead
to an increase in the real wage and eventually generate an intra-temporal
substitution eﬀect between leisure and consumption strong enough to oﬀset
the negative wealth eﬀect related to the increase in taxes. The large shift in
hours worked and the increased productivity could yield an increment in the
level of output suﬃciently large to meet the increase in government spending
without crowding out private consumption.
The approach to LBD used in this thesis also generate a substitution ef-
fect similar to the one generated by introducing deep habit in consumption.
The increase in productivity leads to an increase in real wages that incentives
household to substitute consumption for leisure. However, as I show in section
1.4.2, this intra-temporal eﬀect is not suﬃciently strong to yield an increase
in private consumption. Nominal frictions, absent in Ravn et al. (2006), play
a crucial role in determining the increase in private consumption in response
to an increase in government expenditure.
As noted in Chang et al. (2002), the fact that skills are embodied in work-
ers oﬀers several advantages. In particular, because the beneﬁts of LBD are
included in workers' wages, it make easier to use macroeconomic variables to
measure the eﬀect of LBD and estimate the model. The model proposed in
Cooper and Johri (2002) would require observations at plant level to estimate
the parameters controlling the organizational capital accumulation process.
Moreover, introducing LBD as pure externality to both ﬁrms and house-
holds has the advantage of making the model easily tractable and represents
the simplest way to model a LBD mechanism that is able to capture the en-
dogenous change in the level of productivity through the eﬀect of past hours
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worked. I leave the analysis of the eﬀects and implications of the internaliza-
tion of LBD as areas of further research.
The nominal wage Wt and the rental cost of capital R
K
t are given for the
intermediate goods producers. Hence, cost minimization implies the same
capital-to-labour ratio for all ﬁrms
Kt
Nt
=
α
1− α
Wt
RKt
(1.7)
The marginal cost, common to all ﬁrms, is:
MCt =
W
(1−α)
t R
K α
t
αα (1− α)(1−α)X(1−α)t At
(1.8)
Following Calvo (1983) I assume that in every period a fraction of ﬁrms
ζp cannot re-optimize their prices Pt (j). In this case ﬁrms adjust their prices
mechanically according to the rule:
Pt (j) = (pit−1)
ιp (pi)1−ιp (1.9)
where pit = Pt/Pt−1 and pi is the steady-state inﬂation rate.
The fraction (1− ζp) of ﬁrms able to re-optimize their price chose the new
price to solve:
max
Pt(j)
new
Et
[ ∞∑
s=0
(ζpβ)
s Ξt+s
(
P (j)new
(
s∏
l=1
(pit−1+l)
ιp (pi)1−ιp
)
−MCt+s
)
Yt+s (j)
]
(1.10)
subject to the demand function (1.3). The term βsΞt+s is the current value of
a future dollar expressed in consumption units.
Considering only a symmetric equilibrium where all ﬁrms choose the same
price, the law of motion for the aggregate price is:
Pt =
[
(1− ζp) (P newt )
− 1
λf + ζp
(
(pit−1)
ιp (pi)1−ιp Pt−1
)− 1
λf
]λf
(1.11)
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1.3.3 Households
The objective function for the households i ∈ [0, 1] is given by:
Et
∞∑
s=0
βs
{
log (Ct+s (i)− hCt+s−1 (i))− N
1+ϕ
t+s (i)
1 + ϕ
}
(1.12)
where Ct (i) is consumption, Nt (i) denotes the quantity of the i
th type of labour
service supplied; h measures household's habit persistence in consumption and
ϕ > 0 is the inverse of labour supply elasticity.
The household's budget constraint is:
Pt+sCt+s (i) + Pt+sIt+s (i) +Bt+s (i) ≤ Rt+s−1Bt+s−1 (i) +Wt+s (i)Nt+s (i)
+
[
RKt+sut+s (i)− Pt+sa (ut+s (i))
]
Kt+s−1 (i) + Πt+s (i)− Tt+s (i) (1.13)
The right-hand side of the expression (1.13) corresponds to the household
income net of the lump-sum taxes (or transfers) Tt (i). Total income consists
of diﬀerent components. The net cash inﬂow from holding a one-period gov-
ernment bond is denoted by RtBt (i). Labour income isWt (i)Nt (i). The term[
RKt ut (i)− Pta (ut (i))
]
Kt−1 (i) indicates the income from renting physical
capital to intermediate ﬁrms. Following Smets and Wouters (2003) the eﬀect-
ive capital rent to intermediate goods producer ﬁrms is Kt (i) = ut (i)Kt−1 (i),
where ut (i) is the utilization rate of installed capital chosen by households.
Households receive RKt for each unit of capital service supplied. However, they
must pay a cost of utilization a (ut (i)), expressed in term of the consumption
good. As Christiano et al. (2005) I assume u = 1, a(1) = 0 and a′′(1) > 0.
Households also receive dividends Πt from the imperfect competitive interme-
diate ﬁrms. Income can be used for consumption Ct (i) and investment in both
physical capital It (i) and government bond Bt (i) .
As in Christiano et al. (2005) the capital accumulation evolves according
to:
Kt (i) = (1− δ)Kt−1 (i) +
[
1− S
(
It (i)
It−1 (i)
)]
It (i) (1.14)
where δ is the depreciation rate, and S (·) is the cost of adjusting investment
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with S (1) = S ′ (1) = 0 and S ′′ (1) > 0.
1.3.4 Labour contractors and wage setting
Each household is a monopolistic supplier of a diﬀerentiated labour service
Nt (i) to labour contractors. Labour contractors are perfect competitive ﬁrms.
They aggregate the diﬀerentiated labour services into an homogeneous labour
service Nt hired by intermediate goods producers. The aggregation function
is:
Nt =
[ 1
0
Nt (i)
1
1+λw di
]1+λw
(1.15)
where λw > 0 is a ﬁxed parameter.
Proﬁt maximization for the labour contractors yields the i-type labour
demand:
Nt (i) =
(
Wt (i)
Wt
)− 1+λw
λw
Nt (1.16)
where Wt =
[ 1
0
Wt (i)
− 1
λw di
]−λw
.
Households face à la Calvo-style wage setting frictions. In each period
the fraction ζw of households are unable to readjust their wage. In this case
households set their wage according to:
Wt (i) = (pit−1)
ιw (pi)1−ιw Wt−1 (i) (1.17)
Those households able to re-optimize their wage solve:
max
Wnewt
Et
∞∑
s=0
ζswβ
s
{
−(Nt+s(i))
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
}
(1.18)
subject to (1.13), (1.16) and
Wt+s (i) =
s∏
l=1
(pi)(1−iw) (pit+l−1)
iw W newt (1.19)
Considering a symmetric equilibrium in which all households able to set a
new wage chose the same level, wage evolution is deﬁned as:
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Wt =
{
(1− ζw) (W newt )−
1
λw + ζw
[
(pi)(1−iw) (pit−1)
iw Wt−1
]− 1
λw
}−λw
(1.20)
1.3.5 Government policies
The central bank sets the nominal interest rate Rt according to a Taylor rule
that responds to inﬂation and GDP growth:
Rt
R
=
(
Rt−1
R
)ρr [(pit
pi
)φpi (( GDPt
GDPt−1
)φgdp)](1−ρr)
exp(εrt ) (1.21)
where variables without time subscript denote steady state values. εrt is an
independently and identically distributed monetary shock with standard de-
viation σr. Following Christiano et al. (2010), GDPt denotes real per capita
GDP and it is deﬁned as:
GDPt = Ct + It +Gt (1.22)
Government spending is ﬁnanced either by issuing a bond or by a lump-sum
tax. Therefore, the government budget constraint is:
PtGt +Rt−1Bt−1 = PtTt +Bt (1.23)
Government sets the lump-sum tax following a simple feedback rule in order
to prevent an explosive government debt.3
3As shown in Leeper (1991) the interaction between monetary and ﬁscal policy leads
to two stable solutions where one policy is active and the other one is passive. Fiscal
policy is passive when government takes monetary rule as given and passively adjusts taxes
to balance the budget constraint. If the change in taxes is not suﬃciently large to bring
debt back to its target level, ﬁscal policy is deﬁned as active. Monetary policy is active
when monetary authority pursues its inﬂation target by strongly responding to inﬂation.
Whereas, monetary policy is passive when is constrained to balance the government budget
constraint. In this case, debt becomes sustainable only through changes in the level of real
interest rate.
Following the basic assumption of the mainstream DSGE models, I only consider the
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Finally, government spending is deﬁned by:
lnGt = (1− ρg) lnG+ ρglnGt−1 + εgt (1.24)
where εgt ∼
(
0, σ2g
)
.
Following most of the DSGE literature, in the model proposed in this thesis
government spending is an exogenous process and does not enter into the pro-
duction function. The eﬀects of government spending on productivity occurs
only indirectly through the LBD mechanism.
In order to account for the observed eﬀect of government spending on pro-
ductivity, the literature has explored alternative modelling choices. Baxter and
King (1993) and Pappa (2009) introduce government spending into the pro-
duction function. While these models can successfully account for the increase
in productivity and generate a positive response of consumption, the empirical
relevance of this mechanism is open to question. For example, while Aschauer
(1989) ﬁnd the elasticity of output with respect to public capital to be 0.24 for
core infrastructures, Evans and Karras (1994) and Kamps (2004) ﬁnd that in
many case public capital has no eﬀect or even a negative eﬀect on output. Fur-
thermore, Leeper, Walker and Yang (2010) show that implementation delays
to build public capital and the mix of tax instruments can interfere with the
eﬀects of the government investment expenditure and eventually revert the
positive eﬀect on private consumption.
In search of mechanisms that can account for the increase in productivity
associated to a government expenditure boost, Glomm and Ravikumar (1997)
consider skills accumulation through education. However, as noted in Chang
et al. (2002), most education takes place in several years. Therefore, while
case of active monetary policy and passive ﬁscal policy. The monetary rule speciﬁed in
(1.21) ensures the monetary authority actively pursues price stability provided that φpi is
suﬃciently large. On the other hand, ﬁscal policy authority passively adjusts lump sum
taxes to balance the budget constraint (1.23). Since in the model presented in this chapter
Ricardian equivalence holds, including a tax rule for lump sum taxes and the evolution
of government debt in the set of equations that deﬁne the model equilibrium would be
redundant. In fact, in this model the distribution of taxes across time is irrelevant and
neither aﬀects the decisions of agents nor alters the dynamics of economy.
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government spending in education would be successful in explaining long-run
growth in productivity, it would be hard to explain short run ﬂuctuation in
the level of skills by appealing to this mechanism.
1.3.6 Goods market clearing
Aggregating the budget constraint (1.13) across households and combing with
the government budget constraint (1.23) yields the goods market clearing con-
dition:
Yt = Ct + It + a (ut)Kt−1 +Gt (1.25)
Equation (1.25) states that ﬁnal output is absorbed by private consump-
tion, investment and government spending. In addition, a part of ﬁnal output
is used to cover the capital utilization cost.
1.4 How LBD works? A simpliﬁed model
Before turning to model simulation, in this section I illustrate the mechanisms
through which introducing LBD can bring the responses of consumption and
TFP to a government spending shock closer in line with the data. To illustrate
this mechanism I consider a simpliﬁed version of the model presented in section
1.3.
1.4.1 Parameterization
This section illustrates the parameter values employed for the simulation of the
simpliﬁed model. In what follows I consider a log-linearized approximation of
the model around the deterministic steady state in which inﬂation is zero.
The model is solved using the algorithm proposed in Ireland (2004). Each
period corresponds to a quarter. The responses of the nominal interest rate
and inﬂation are measured as annualized percentage points deviation from
the steady state level. The remaining variables are expressed in quarterly
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percentage deviation from the steady state levels. Where appropriate, variables
are measured in real terms. In what follows `̂' denotes variables expressed in
log-deviation from steady state.
The simpliﬁed model diﬀers from the model presented in section 1.3 in
the following ways. First, there is no capital dynamic and intermediate goods
producers have a linear production function (α = 0 in equation (1.4)). Con-
sumption habit formation is switched oﬀ (h = 0). I exclude wages and prices
indexation to past inﬂation (ιw = ιp = 0). I assume monetary authority targets
only current inﬂation (ρr = φgdp = 0). To simplify the algebra and without
loss of generality I set the inverse of Frisch elasticity ϕ equal to 1. The discount
factor β is equal to 0.9925 and corresponds to a steady state nominal interest
of around 3% per year. λf and λw are both set equal to 0.05 implying that
price and wage mark-ups in steady state are equal to 5%. I set ζp = 0.75 and
ζw = 0.83 implying ﬁrms can change price on average once a year and that
the average wage duration is almost six quarters. The two parameters for the
Learning-By-Doing, µn and ρx, are taken from Chang et al. (2002) and are
equal to 0.111 and 0.798. The autocorrelation coeﬃcient for the government
spending ρg is set to 0.90 as in Galí et al. (2007). The steady-state share
of government spending is assumed to be 0.20 corresponding to the post-war
period average. I focus on the eﬀects of a positive government spending shock
and I neglect all remaining shocks.
1.4.2 Simulation results
In this simpliﬁed model, the optimal households behaviour yields the standard
Euler equation:
ĉt = Et [ĉt+1]− (r̂t − Et [pit+1]) (1.26)
Whereas, from ﬁrms ﬁrst order conditions is possible to derive the New
Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC):
pit = βEt [pit+1] +
(1− ζp) (1− βζp)
ζp
m̂ct (1.27)
where the real marginal cost is a function of the real wage and the stock of
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knowledge
m̂ct = ŵt − x̂t (1.28)
Integrating forward equations (1.26) and (1.27) yields:
ĉt = −Et
∞∑
s=0
(r̂t+s − pit+1+s) (1.29)
pit =
(1− ζp) (1− βζp)
ζp
Et
∞∑
s=0
βs [m̂ct+s] (1.30)
Equation (1.29) states that current consumption is negatively related to
the sum of current and future short-term real interest rates. Note that, up
to a ﬁrst order approximation, this sum is equal to the real rate of return
on a bond of inﬁnite duration. Thus, the consumption dynamics is driven by
the inter-temporal eﬀect working through the real interest rate. A positive
government shock can increase consumption only if it reduces the long-term
real rate. However, if monetary policy follows a Taylor rule the reduction can
occur only if inﬂation falls below the steady state level. By equation (1.30)
current inﬂation depends on the discounted sum of marginal costs which in turn
are a function of the relative size of real wages and the stock of knowledge.
Figure 1.1 shows impulse responses for the simpliﬁed model with LBD
(black solid line) and without LBD (red dashed line).
An increase in government spending triggers out both intra-temporal and
inter-temporal eﬀects. Because of price frictions, output is demand-driven.
As a result of the positive price mark-up, those ﬁrms that cannot change
price increase production and labour demand to meet the rise in aggregate
demand caused by the government's ﬁscal policy stance. Yet, for the gov-
ernment budget constraint to hold, the increase in government spending is
associated with an increment in households tax burden which in turn reduces
the resources available in the future for the private sector. The negative wealth
eﬀect leads agents to feel poorer, and to the extent leisure and consumption
are normal goods, they reduce both of them causing an outward shift in labour
supply.
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Both with and without LBD the new equilibrium in the labour market is
associated to an increase in hours and real wages. As the real wage rises, house-
holds increase labour supply and substitute consumption for leisure. Without
LBD, though, this intra-temporal substitution eﬀect is not strong enough to
compensate for the negative wealth eﬀect associated with the increase in future
taxes required for the government budget constraint to hold. Furthermore, in
absence of LBD, the increase in the real wage raises marginal costs. The frac-
tion of ﬁrms able to re-optimize their price will respond to the increase in
marginal costs by setting a higher price. The gradual increase in the price
level raises the expected path of inﬂation, to which the monetary authority
reacts by sharply increasing the nominal interest rate. This translates into an
increase in the real interest rate which, by equation (1.29), brings about an
inter-temporal eﬀect that induces households to reduce consumption.
With LBD, instead, the increase in hours worked triggers an increase in the
skill level. The negative wealth eﬀect is milder because the increase in future
labour productivity raises resources available in the future. Because of the
higher increase in the real wage the intra-temporal substitution eﬀect between
consumption and leisure is stronger. Furthermore, the LBD mechanism more
than oﬀsets the inter-temporal substitution eﬀect. With LBD, marginal costs
increase for a few periods but then fall below the steady state level. This res-
ults in a fall in inﬂation and the real interest rate. The lower real interest rate
reduces the return to saving and induces agents to increase current consump-
tion. Thus, the combination of intra and inter-temporal eﬀects, based on the
increase in productivity generated by the LBD mechanism, oﬀset the negative
wealth eﬀect and the ﬁnal result is an increase in consumption.
Consider now the eﬀect of the increased level of skill on labour market and
the role played by nominal rigidities.
First, note that ﬁrms with some market power set their prices applying a
mark-up over the marginal costs. The presence of price stickiness generates an
endogenously variable mark-up. Hence, considering a symmetric equilibrium
gives:
Pt = µ
P
t MCt (1.31)
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where µPt is the time-varying price mark-up.
Denoting the real wage by W˜t and substituting out for real marginal costs
using (1.31), the representative intermediate ﬁrm's ﬁrst order condition for
labour demand can be written as:
W˜t =
MPLt
µPt
(1.32)
where MPLt denotes the marginal product of labour.
Given the absence of capital in production, the marginal product of labour
coincides with the skill level and is constant in the absence of LBD.
The existence of price rigidities introduces a variable wedge between the
real wage and the marginal product of labour. Similarly, the presence of wage
frictions generates a non constant wedge between the wage and the intra-
temporal marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption:
W˜t = µ
W
t MRS
C,N
t (1.33)
where MRSC,Nt denotes the marginal rate of substitution and µ
w
t is the time-
varying wage mark-up.
By log-linearizing equations (1.32) and (1.33) the labour demand and the
labour supply can be written as:
ŵt = m̂plt − µ̂pt (1.34)
ŵt = m̂rst + µ̂
w
t (1.35)
Combining the last two equations, and using the deﬁnition of intra-temporal
marginal rate of substitution, yields the labour market equilibrium condition:
m̂plt = µ̂t + n̂t + ĉt (1.36)
where µ̂t ≡ µ̂wt + µ̂pt . The labour market equilibrium condition (1.36) allows
to highlight an important result. Given the increase in hours, consumption
can rise only if the marginal product increases or the sum of wage and price
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mark-ups falls.
Figure 1.2 shows a graphical representation of the labour market described
by equations (1.34)-(1.36) for the model with LBD (black solid line) and
without LBD (red dashed line). Figure 1.2.A plots the equilibrium response of
the labour market variables and ﬁgure 1.2.B plots labour demand and supply.
As shown in ﬁgure 1.2.B both for the model with and without LBD the
labour market is in steady state at the point ESS where the labour demand
is LDSS and the labour supply is LSSS. As discussed above, the government
shock produces an upward shift in the labour demand and a outward shift
in the labour supply. Thus, the labour demand and the labour supply move
respectively from LDSS and LSSS to LD1 and LS1 for the model without LBD
and to LDLBD1 and LS
LBD
1 for the model with LBD. The diﬀerent magnitude
of these shifts depends on the responses of price and wage mark-ups. Since
it takes one period to transform hours worked into new skills, at the time of
the spending shock, the marginal product of labour is unaﬀected for both the
model with and without LBD. However, the model with LBD displays a higher
increase in the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption
due to the increase in the latter variable determined by the inter-temporal
eﬀect operating trough the decrease in the long-term real interest rate. Thus,
labour market equilibrium requires that the decline in the wage and the price
mark-ups must be larger to make up for the diﬀerence (see equation (1.36)).
These results are shown in ﬁgure 1.2.A. The larger fall in mark-ups and the
increase in the marginal rate of substitution result in a larger shift in the labour
demand and the labour supply for the model with LBD. The new equilibrium
is E1 for the model without LBD and E
LBD
1 for the model with LBD. The
latter equilibrium exhibits an higher level of hours and wage than the case
without LBD.
Two periods after the shock, the labour supply starts to reverse to the
pre-shock level both with and without LBD and shift respectively to LS2 and
LSLBD2 . By contrast, the labour demand dynamics is completely diﬀerent.
For the model without LBD, as shown in ﬁgure 1.2.A, the marginal product of
labour is unchanged, and there is little variation in the price mark-up. These
facts are stylized by assuming LD2 = LD1. At the new equilibrium in E2
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hours are lower than the previous period and wage is constant. In the model
with LBD the increase in marginal product of labour shifts the labour demand
up to LDLBD2 and the resulting equilibrium is in E
LBD
2 .
Note that, because the knowledge accumulation depends only on the past
hours worked, the labour demand slope is unchanged. Thus, diﬀerently from
Devereux et al. (1996), the introduction of LBD does not generate an upward
sloping labour demand.
Summing up, with LBD, the marginal product of labour increase and the
initial decrease in wage and price mark-ups is larger. Around quarter 5 the
total gap µ̂t turns positive and the marginal productivity, after reaching its
peak, slowly decreases bringing a fall in consumption (see ﬁgure 1.1).
I now disentangle the contribution of LBD and nominal rigidities in determ-
ining the results of the model. As previously discussed, in the model without
LBD the marginal product of labour is constant and the fall in the mark-ups
is not suﬃcient to compensate the increase in hours worked and hence, by
equation (1.36), consumption falls.
By contrast, ﬁgure 1.3 explores the consequences of government spending
in a model that incorporates the LBD mechanism but with prices and wages
fully ﬂexible. The black solid line shows the responses for the baseline case
with nominal frictions and the red dashed line refers to model without nominal
frictions.
In latter case the model cannot generate the consumption increase. Indeed,
the fall in consumption is larger than in the model with nominal frictions but
without LBD. To see this point, consider that when nominal frictions are ab-
sent there is no shift in the labour demand at the time of the increase in
government spending because ﬁrm can immediately change their price and the
marginal product of labour is constant. Furthermore, without wage frictions
households are on their perfectly competitive labour supply, so that they are
less willing to increase labour supply. Thus, the new equilibrium in the labour
market is determined by the labour supply shift along the labour demand and
yields a lower increase in hours. The smaller increase in hours determines a
lower increase in output so that the decrease in consumption must be larger
to compensate for the increase in government spending. In addition, the lim-
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ited increase in hours worked results in a lower future increase in the marginal
product of labour, which in turns reduce the shift in the labour demand in
the following period. Furthermore, with ﬂexible prices, the increase in pro-
ductivity cannot exert any deﬂationary eﬀect. In fact, the increase in the
productivity corresponds to an equivalent rise in the real wage and hence the
key propagation mechanism proposed is switched oﬀ.
Finally, to see the eﬀect of the degree of price stickiness consider equation
(1.31) and assume that prices are extremely rigid (ζp → 1). In this case the
increase in price mark-up µ̂pt must be large enough to compensate for the
decrease in marginal cost associated to the model with LBD. From equation
(1.36) this has a negative eﬀect on consumption. For a lower degree of price
stickiness the increase in price mark-up is smaller and therefore enhances the
possibility of a consumption's increase.
The reverse occurs for the degree of wage rigidity. In this case if wage are
extremely rigid, (ζw → 1), given the increase in marginal rate of substitution,
the decrease in the wage mark-up µ̂wt must be large, and hence, by equation
(1.36), there is a positive eﬀect on consumption.
1.5 The complete medium size DSGE model
I now turn to the complete model presented in section 1.3. I ﬁrst describe the
econometric methodology employed and then I discuss the simulation results
and the model properties.
1.5.1 Econometric methodology
In this section I describe the econometric strategy employed to estimate the
model. The model is estimated using the two-step impulse responses matching
procedure described in Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Lindé (2011). I ﬁrst
describe the VAR step and then I provide details on the approach used to match
the DSGE and the VAR impulse responses.
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VAR step
I estimate the eﬀect of three structural shocks on a set of variables. The
three shocks considered are: a government spending, a monetary policy and a
productivity shock. The structural VAR model is of the form:
AZt = c+
p∑
j=1
BjZt−j + εt (1.37)
where Zt is a vector of observable variables, p is the lag length and εt is a
vector of structural shocks. A and Bj are matrix of coeﬃcients. My VAR
model has 8 variables, which appear in this order: government spending, GDP
per hours, inﬂation, GDP, government debt, private consumption, wages, and
nominal interest rate. Where appropriate, variables are expressed in logs of
real per capital terms. The VAR includes four lags, a constant and a linear
time trend. The sample runs from 1966:1 to 2006:4. The beginning of the
sample is dictated by data availability, in particularly with regard to the data
on government debt, while the end date falls before the 2008 recession. More
details about the data are provided in the appendix to this chapter.
The identiﬁcation strategy requires to impose restrictions on the contem-
poraneous relationships among the variables included in the VAR. I estimate
the model recursively. Given the variables order described above the restric-
tions imposed are the following.
First, following Blanchard and Perotti (2002), I assume that government
spending is predetermined within the quarter. Thus, the identiﬁcation strategy
implies that all the variables in Zt react immediately to government spending
shocks, whereas government spending is allowed to respond with one lag to
structural innovations other than government spending.
Second, following Christiano et al. (2005) I assume that a monetary policy
shock has no contemporaneous eﬀect on any variable other than the nominal
interest rate.
Finally, a shock to the output per hours ratio is used as a proxy for the
productivity shock described in section 1.3. The identiﬁcation strategy used
implies that the productivity shock has a contemporaneous eﬀect on all the
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variables except for government spending.
Impulse response matching step
The estimated parameters are chosen to minimize the distance between the
VAR-based impulse response functions to the three shocks considered and
the corresponding DSGE response functions.4 The impact responses of the
DSGE model are restricted to account for the restrictions imposed by the
VAR estimation strategy.
Let ζ denote the set of model parameters to be estimated and let Ψ (ζ)
denote the mapping from ζ to the model impulse response functions (i.e. the
DSGE impulses responses obtained using the set of parameter included in ζ).
Let Ψˆ be the corresponding impulses responses function obtained from the
VAR estimates. I consider the ﬁrst 20 elements of each response function
included the contemporaneous responses. The estimator of ζ is the solution
to:
ζ̂ = min
ζ
[(
Ψ (ζ)− Ψˆ
)′
V −1
(
Ψ (ζ)− Ψˆ
)]
(1.38)
where V is a diagonal matrix with the sample variances of Ψˆ along the diag-
onal.5 The matrix V can be interpreted as a weighting matrix ensuring that
more precise VAR impulse responses are given more weight. Standard errors
are calculated using the delta function method approach described in Iacoviello
4I do not consider government debt in the set of variables to match. Including gov-
ernment debt would require the estimation of the parameters regulating the tax rule. As
shown in section 1.3.5, including the evolution of government debt in the set of equations
that deﬁne the model equilibrium would be redundant, therefore there is no need to arti-
ﬁcially increase the number of parameters to estimate. However, government debt is still
included in the VAR model in order to consider the debt dynamics that arises from the
government spending increase and to take into account feedback from the debt level and
consider the possible endogenous response to debt of other variables included in the VAR.
For a discussion on this point see Favero and Giavazzi (2007).
5The minimum of the function above is calculated using the function lsqnonlin available
in Matlab. I use the Matlab version R2012b. Since the minimization routine employed can
only ﬁnd a local minimum, I performed several searches as a robustness analysis. The
results, reported in the appendix, show that the choice of the initial guess has no signiﬁcant
implications. I have also considered the eﬀect of changing the number of periods to match.
The estimates obtained were very similar to the ones I found for the baseline speciﬁcation.
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(2005).
I estimate the baseline model and a model where LBD is switched oﬀ by
imposing µn = ρx = 0.
1.5.2 Parameters set a priori
Few parameters are ﬁxed in the estimation procedure. For the households
preference parameters I choose conventional values and set the inverse of the
elasticity of labour supply ϕ equal to 3. The discount factor β is equal to 0.995
and corresponds to a quarterly value of capital to output equal to 9.5. The
capital depreciation rate δ is set to 0.025 to capture the investment-output
ratio of 24%. I set α = 0.30 to account for a labour share around 2/3. λf
and λw are both set equal to 0.05 implying that price and wage mark-ups at
steady state are equal to 5%. The steady-state share of government spending
is assumed to be 0.20 corresponding to the post-war period average. Following
Christiano et al. (2010) I exclude price indexation (ιp = 0). Finally, I set
the capital utilization adjustment cost to u′′ = 0.01 because when I tried
to estimate this parameters my algorithm pushed that estimate close to zero.6
Table 1.1 summarise the set of parameters ﬁxed a priori and the corresponding
values.
1.5.3 Estimated parameters
Table 1.2 reports the estimated values and the corresponding standard errors.
The parameters regulating the LBD mechanism µn and ρx are respectively
equal to 0.54 and 0.60. Respect to the values found in Chang et al. (2002), my
estimate implies an higher initial impact and a faster return to the steady state
level. For the model with LBD, the degree of wage and price stickiness ζw and
ζp are respectively equal to 0.60 and 0.66, corresponding to an average duration
of 2.5 and 3 quarters. The response of nominal interest rate to inﬂation φpi is
6The choice of a small parameter for the capital adjustment cost implies a relative small
cost for households to vary capital utilization. The corresponding elasticity of the utilization
rate is 3.25. The range of values reported in the literature is extremely large: for example
Smets and Wouters (2007) estimate this elasticity to be around to 0.85, whereas Christiano
et al. (2005) set the elasticity equal to 10.
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equal to 1.84 whereas the response to GDP growth φgdp is 0.65. The interest
rate smoothing is pretty high with ρr equal to 0.76. The remaining parameters
are in line with the previous literature. The estimation of the model without
LBD deliverers a higher price stickiness (ζp = 0.91) corresponding to an average
price duration of 2 years and half. The nominal interest rate smoothing is
larger than the model with LBD whereas monetary policy is less responsive
to inﬂation and GDP growth. The model without LBD also yields and higher
degree of habit in consumption and a larger wage indexation to past inﬂation.
Finally, the persistence of the technology shock ρa is smaller in the model
without LBD.
1.5.4 Impulse responses
I now turn to the simulation results for the complete model presented in section
1.3. To this end, ﬁgures 1.4-1.6 report the response to the three shocks for
the baseline DSGE model together with the VAR impulse responses and 95%
conﬁdence intervals. Overall the model is pretty successful in capturing the
main stylized facts emerging from the VAR model. Figure 1.4 shows that the
model is able the capture the increase in consumption, productivity and real
wage, and the fall of inﬂation and interest rate in response to an expansionary
government spending shock. However, the model is disappointing with regard
to the quantitative eﬀect. In particular, the response of consumption is quite
small in comparison to the VAR-based response.
The model performs better in matching the responses to a monetary policy
shock. As reported in ﬁgure 1.5 the model impulses responses are in general
within the conﬁdence intervals and very close to the the VAR point estimates.
Finally, ﬁgure 1.6 reports the responses to a technology shock. Overall,
the model deliver responses consistent with the data. The main failure is the
inability of the model to mimic the large initial increase of GDP.
It is useful to stress that including LBD in the model is crucial to deliver
responses to a government spending shock in line with the VAR based ones.
As ﬁgure 1.7 shows, absent LBD, by contrast with the empirical evidences,
a government spending increase would have no eﬀect on productivity and at
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the same time would cause a counter-factual decrease of private consumption
and an increase in inﬂation and interest rate.
The role played by LBD in mimic the response of monetary and productiv-
ity shocks is more limited. Figures 1.8 and 1.9 show that introducing LBD in
the model in some cases ampliﬁes the eﬀects, whereas qualitatively the results
are in general unaﬀected. The main diﬀerence is the response of inﬂation to
a monetary policy shock. The model with LBD provides a solution to the so
called price puzzle related to the initial increase of inﬂation in response to a
contractionary monetary policy shock.7
1.5.5 Model properties
Table 1.3 reports the present value multiplier of government spending on im-
pact and after 4, 16 and 20 quarters. The size of government spending multi-
pliers is calculated using the method proposed in Mountford and Uhlig (2009).8
The model with LBD generates a GDP multiplier on impact in line with
the data, whereas the model without LBD delivers a multiplier below 1. For
the following periods, the value of the multiplier generated by the model with
LBD is larger than the one found in the data.
The baseline model, diﬀerently from the model where LBD is switched
oﬀ, generates a positive consumption multiplier. However, its value is sensibly
smaller than the corresponding value observed in the data over all the horizons
considered.
Finally, I compare second moments of simulated models to the data to as-
sess their capability of accounting for some of the facts regarding the behaviour
7The price puzzle arises from the fact that most of the VAR literature ﬁnds an imme-
diate signiﬁcant increase in the price level in response to a contractionary monetary shock.
However, most monetary policy models cannot explain this fact. The label price puzzle
was introduced by Eichenbaum (1992).
8The present value government spending multiplier at horizon k (PVk) for each variable
is calculated using the following formula PVk =
sy
k∑
j=0
βjSj
gy
k∑
j=0
βjGj
, where S = GDP,C and sy is
the ratio to GDP (respectively 1 and CGDP )
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of several variables over the business cycle in the United States.9
Even with LBD, the model performs poorly. The volatility generated by
the model, measured in term of standard deviation, is quite small respect to
the corresponding moments observed in the data, whereas the auto-correlation
is larger. Table 1.4 reports the standard deviations calculated for the data
and for the models with and without LBD. In the data the GDP standard
deviation is 1.5% over the period considered. The model without LBD can
account for only one quarter of the volatility in the data. The model with
LBD generate a higher volatility than the model without LBD, however its
capability of accounting for the GDP ﬂuctuation observed in the data is still
limited. The statistics reported for the remaining variables are aﬀected by
the same problem. The standard deviation of each variable in terms of GDP
standard deviation (the number reported in parenthesis) is also smaller than
the corresponding value found in the data. Also in this case adding LBD
improves in many cases the model's performance.10
Figure 1.10 shows the cross correlation functions of current GDP with
lagged and leaded variables. The number of lags (leads) on the x-axis is meas-
ured in quarters. The model with LBD generates a cross correlation consistent
with the data. However, there are two main exceptions. First, the contempor-
aneous correlation between GDP and inﬂation is positive in the data, whereas
the model-based correlation is negative. Second, the correlation between the
real wage and GDP is substantially larger than the corresponding value in the
data.
Finally, ﬁgure 1.11 displays the auto correlation functions. Overall, the
model based functions are larger than the corresponding data moments. Apart
9Moments for the data are calculated on logged variables, except for inﬂation and interest
rate for which I consider the value in level. Variables are detrended by an Hodrick-Prescott
(HP) ﬁlter with smoothing parameter 1,600. To calculate the moments for the models, each
model is simulated over 264 periods. The ﬁrst 100 observations are discarded so that the
models and data have the same sample size. I generate 500 artiﬁcial samples. I report the
average value over the drawn samples.
10Results from an additional analysis, not reported here, show that one of the main
element that explains the low volatility in the models is the small value of the productivity
shock auto-correlation process ρa. Using a larger value (around 0.90), while keeping all the
other parameters at their baseline values, increases the volatility and make the model able
to account for much of the ﬂuctuation observed in the data.
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for the behaviour of inﬂation, the model with and without LBD generate very
similar values.
1.6 Conclusion
The ﬁrst part of this chapter has presented an empirical and theoretical literat-
ure review on the eﬀects of a government spending on several macroeconomic
variables, in particular on private consumption and total factor productivity.
Existing theoretical studies do not devote enough attention to the eﬀects of
government spending on productivity or require government spending to enter
as an input into production function.
The main result of the chapter is to show that including a Learning-By-
Doing mechanism in an otherwise standard new Keynesian DSGE model en-
ables the model to replicate the increase in consumption observed in the data.
I also show that with LBD even a completely wasteful government spending
endogenously raises productivity.
In my model knowledge capital accumulation depends on the past level
of hours worked. A positive government spending shock yields an increase
in hours which in turn raises knowledge capital. The resulting increase in
productivity increments the real wage and reduces marginal costs and hence
the expected inﬂation path. The model generates a suﬃcient level of intra
and inter-temporal eﬀects that oﬀset the negative wealth eﬀect created by the
expected increase in future taxes required for the government budget constraint
to hold. This chapter also shows the eﬀect of the increased productivity on
the labour market and the role played by nominal frictions.
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Table 1.1: Fixed parameters
Parameter Value Source/Target
ϕ
inverse of labour supply
elasticity
3 standard value
β
households discount
factor
0.995 capital-GDP ratio: 9.5
δ capital depreciation rate 0.025
investment-GDP ratio:
24%
α
capital
share
0.30 labour share: 2/3
λw steady state wage mark-up 0.05
steady-state wage mark-up:
5%
λf steady state price mark-up 0.05
steady-state price mark-up:
5%
G
GDP
government spending-GDP
ratio
0.20 sample average
ιp
price indexation to past
inﬂation
0 Christiano et al. (2010)
u′′ capital utilization cost 0.01
elasticity of capital
utilization: 3.25%
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Table 1.2: Estimated parameters and standard errors
Model
Parameter Baseline LBD oﬀ
Shocks process
σr monetary shock: standard deviation 0.21
(0.021)
0.20
(0.017)
σa productivity shock: standard deviation 0.47
(0.030)
0.48
(0.029)
σg government shock: standard deviation 0.84
(0.039)
0.87
(0.042)
ρg government spending: autocorrelation 0.95
(0.008)
0.93
(0.010)
ρa productivity shock: autocorrelation 0.77
(0.037)
0.66
(0.034)
Structural parameters
ρr monetary rule: interest smoothing 0.76
(0.025)
0.83
(0.026)
φpi monetary rule: inﬂation 1.84
(0.489)
1.37
(0.370)
φgdp monetary rule: GDP growth 0.65
(0.254)
0.34
(0.152)
ζw probability of wage ﬁxed 0.60
(0.037)
0.63
(0.035)
ιw wage indexation to past inﬂation 0.05
(0.209)
0.66
(0.520)
ζp probability of price ﬁxed 0.66
(0.028)
0.91
(0.011)
h consumption habit 0.64
(0.041)
0.77
(0.030)
S” investment adjustment cost 6.27
(1.393)
4.17
(0.945)
µn Learning-By-Doing (response to past hours) 0.54
(0.073)
-
ρx Learning-By-Doing (autocorrelation) 0.60
(0.061)
-
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Table 1.3: Present value government spending multipliers
Data Model: Baseline Model: LBD oﬀ
GDP C GDP C GDP C
impact 1.067 0.244 1.072 0.009 0.949 -0.034
after 4 quarters 0.728 0.264 1.230 0.059 0.888 -0.071
after 8 quarters 0.738 0.399 1.380 0.096 0.820 -0.106
after 20 quarters 0.742 0.553 1.387 0.056 0.644 -0.175
Table 1.4: Standard deviation (standard deviation relative to GDP)
Data Model with LBD Model w/o LBD
GDP 1.50 (1.00) 0.60 (1.00) 0.40 (1.00)
Consumption 0.83 (0.56) 0.19 (0.32) 0.18 (0.44)
Inﬂation 0.28 (0.19) 0.06 (0.10) 0.02 (0.06)
Nominal interest rate 0.42 (0.28) 0.06 (0.10) 0.05 (0.14)
Wages 0.92 (0.62) 0.36 (0.60) 0.19 (0.47)
Notes: Quarterly percentage points
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APPENDIX A
Appendix to chapter 1
A.1 Data
This section describes more in details data employed in the estimation of the
model presented in the main text.
Population: Civilian Noninstitutional Population (CNP16OV). Source: FRED,
Federal Reserve Bank of ST. Louise. Note: average of monthly ﬁgures.
Gross domestic product deﬂator: Price Index for Gross Domestic Product,
Table 1.1.4. line 1. Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Note:
Index numbers, 2009=100. Seasonally adjusted.
GDP: Gross Domestic Product, Table 1.1.5 line 1. Source: Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis (BEA). Note: Seasonally adjusted at annual rates.
Government spending: Government consumption expenditures and gross
investment, Table 1.1.5 line 21. Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA). Note: Seasonally adjusted at annual rates.
Consumption: non-durable goods+services, Table 1.1.5 lines 5 and 6. Source:
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Note: Seasonally adjusted at an-
nual rates.
Interest rate: Eﬀective Federal Funds Rate (FEDFUNDS). Source: FRED,
Federal Reserve Bank of ST. Louise. Note: average of monthly ﬁgures.
Not Seasonally Adjusted.
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Debt: Federal Debt: Total Public Debt (GFDEBTN). Source: FRED, Federal
Reserve Bank of ST. Louise. Note: not seasonally adjusted.
Wage: Nonfarm Business Sector: Compensation Per Hour (COMPNFB). Source:
FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of ST. Louise. Note: Index numbers
2005=100. Seasonally Adjusted.
Employment: civilian employment (CE16OV), thousands, persons 16 years
of age and older. Source: FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of ST. Louise.
Note: seasonally adjusted.
Average Hours: Nonfarm Business Sector: Average Weekly Hours
(PRS85006023). Source: FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of ST. Louise.
Note: Index numbers 2005=100. Seasonally Adjusted.
All quantity variables are expressed in log of real per capita amounts using
the GDP price index and the population measure described above. Per capita
total hours is obtained multiplying average hours by employment and dividing
by population. Inﬂation is the log diﬀerences in the GDP price index.
A.2 Model derivation
Apart from the inclusion of LBD, the model presented is a standard New
Keynesian DSGE model as employed in Smets and Wouters (2007). In this
part I list the ﬁrst order conditions, the steady state values and the set of log-
linearized equations. In what follow the symbol ˜ denotes variables expressed
in real term.
A.2.1 First order conditions
Households.
Since in equilibrium all households make the same decision, the i index can
be dropped. Households ﬁrst order conditions respect to bond holding Bt,
consumption Ct, investment It, capital Kt and capital utilization ut are:
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λItEt [pit+1] = βEt
[
λIt+1
]
Rt (A.1)
λIt =
1
(Ct − hCt−1) −
hβ
(Et [Ct+1]− hCt) (A.2)
λIt = λ
K
t
[
1− S
(
It
It−1
)
− S ′
(
It
It−1
)
It
It−1
]
+βEt
[
λKt+1
] [
S
′
(
Et [It+1]
It
)(
Et [It+1]
It
)2]
(A.3)
λKt = βEt
[
λIt+1
] (
Et
[
R˜kt+1ut+1
]
− a (Et [ut+1])
)
+ β (1− δ)Et
[
λKt+1
]
(A.4)
R˜kt = a
′
(ut) (A.5)
where λIt ≡ Ptλ¯It and λ¯It and λKt are the multipliers associated respectively to
the budget constraint (1.13) and the capital evolution constraint (1.14).
Wage setting
The ﬁrst order condition for the wage setting problem described in (1.18) can
be rearranged as:
Et
∞∑
s=0
ζswβ
s
(XWt,sW relt W˜t
W˜t+s
)− 1+λw
λw
Nt+s
λIt+s ×{
(1 + λw)
(
XWt,sW
rel
t
W˜t
W˜t+s
)− (1+λw)ϕ
λw N
ϕ
t+s
λIt+s
−XWt,sW relt W˜t
}
= 0 (A.6)
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where XWt,s ≡
s∏
l=1
(pi)(1−iw)(pit+l−1)iw
s∏
l=1
pit+l
and W relt ≡ W˜
new
t
W˜t
is the relative wage chosen
by those households that are allowed to re-optimize their wage respect to the
level of wages at time t. Wage evolution (1.20) expressed in term of relative
wage became:
(
W˜t
)− 1
λw
= (1− ζw)
(
W relt W˜t
)− 1
λw
+ ζw
[
(pi)(1−iw) (pit−1)
iw
pit
W˜t−1
]− 1
λw
(A.7)
Firms.
Firms cost minimization problem yields the following demand for capital and
labour inputs:
Rkt = αMCt
Yt
Kt
(A.8)
Wt = MCt (1− α) Yt
Nt
(A.9)
where the j index has been dropped because input prices are given for ﬁrms
and hence inputs demand is the same across all ﬁrms. Combining the two
equations above yields the input ratio (1.7). The ratio can also be expressed
in real term:
Kt
Nt
=
α
1− α
W˜t
R˜kt
(A.10)
Combining (A.8) and (A.9) together with the production function (1.4)
yields the expression for nominal marginal costs in (1.8). In real terms marginal
costs are:
M˜Ct =
1
αα (1− α)(1−α)
W˜
(1−α)
t R˜
K α
t
AtX
(1−α)
t
(A.11)
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Price setting.
Firms ﬁrst order condition for the optimal price setting problem in (1.10) is:
Et
∞∑
s=0
(ζpβ)
s
(
λt+s
λt
)
(Xt,s)
− 1+λf
λf
{[
(1 + λf ) M˜Ct+s − P relt (Xt,s)
]}
= 0
(A.12)
where Xt,s =
s∏
l=1
(pi)(1−ip)(pit+l−1)ip
s∏
l=1
pit+l
and the relative price P relt is deﬁned as P
rel
t ≡
Pnewt
Pt
, where P newt is the new price chosen by those ﬁrms able to re-optimize
their price.
Price evolution (1.11) can be rewritten in terms of relative price as:
(1− ζp)
(
P relt
)− 1
λf + ζp
(
pi
ιp
t−1pi
(1−ιp)
pit
)− 1
λf
= 1 (A.13)
Equation (A.12) and (A.13) can be combined to obtain the new-Keynesian
Phillips curve.
A.2.2 Equilibrium equations
The model equilibrium is deﬁned by equations (A.1), (A.2), (A.3), (A.4), (A.5),
(A.6), (A.7), (A.10), (A.11), (A.12), (A.13), plus the production function (1.4),
the productivity shock (1.5), the LBD accumulation process (1.6), the capital
accumulation process (1.14), the monetary policy rule (1.21), the deﬁnition
of GDP (1.22), the government spending process evolution (1.24), the goods
market clearing condition (1.25) and the deﬁnition of eﬀective capital discussed
in the main text.
66
Appendix A Appendix to chapter 1
A.2.3 Steady states
Assuming inﬂation is zero at steady state equilibrium, steady states values in
term of ﬁxed parameters are:
MC =
1
1 + λf
(A.14)
Rk =
1
β
− (1− δ) (A.15)
K
Y
= α
MC
Rk
(A.16)
I
Y
= δ
K
Y
(A.17)
C
Y
= 1− I
Y
− G
Y
(A.18)
A.2.4 Log-linearized model
Let lower-case variables with  ̂  denoting variables in log-deviation from
steady states and where appropriate expressed in real term, the log-linearized
equilibrium conditions around steady-states levels are given by:
λ̂It = Et
[
λ̂It+1
]
+ rˆt − Et [pˆit+1] (A.19)
(1− hβ) (1− h) λ̂It = −
(
1 + h2β
)
ĉt + hĉt−1 + hβEt [ĉt+1] (A.20)
(1 + β) ît = ît−1 + βEt
[̂
it+1
]
+
(
λ̂Kt − λIt
)
S ′′ (1)
(A.21)
λ̂Kt − λ̂It = [1− β (1− δ)]Et
[
r̂kt+1
]
+ β (1− δ)Et
[
λ̂Kt+1 − λ̂It+1
]
− (rˆt − Et [pˆit+1]) (A.22)
Rkr̂kt = a
′′
(u) ût (A.23)
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ŵrelt = ζwβ
{
Et
[
ŵrelt+1
]
+ Et [ŵt+1]− ŵt − iwpit + Et [pit+1]
}
+
λw (1− ζwβ)
λw + (1 + λw)ϕ
{
ϕn̂t − λ̂It − ŵt
}
(A.24)
ŵt = iwpit−1 − pit + ŵt−1 + (1− ζw)
ζw
ŵrelt (A.25)
r̂kt + k̂t = n̂t + ŵt (A.26)
m̂ct = (1− α) (ŵt − x̂t) + αr̂kt − at (A.27)
pit =
ιp
(1 + ιpβ)
pit−1 +
β
(1 + ιpβ)
Et [pit+1] +
(1− ζpβ) (1− ζp)
ζp (1 + ιpβ)
m̂ct (A.28)
ŷt = (1− α) (x̂t + n̂t) + αk̂t + ât (A.29)
ât = ρaât−1 + εat (A.30)
x̂t = ρxx̂t−1 + µnn̂t−1 (A.31)
k̂t = (1− δ) k̂t−1 + δ̂it (A.32)
r̂t = ρrr̂t−1 + (1− ρr)
[
φpipit + φgdp
(
ĝdpt − ĝdpt−1
)]
+ εrt (A.33)
ĝdpt =
C
Y
ĉt +
I
Y
ît +
G
Y
ĝt (A.34)
ĝt = ρgĝt−1 + ε
g
t (A.35)
ŷt =
C
Y
ĉt +
I
Y
ît +R
kK
Y
ût +
G
Y
ĝt (A.36)
k̂t = ût + k̂t−1 (A.37)
A.3 Learning-By-Doing and the Taylor rule
The introduction of LBD also impacts on the ability of the monetary author-
ity to control inﬂation expectations and, by implementing a Taylor rule, to
bring about an unique and stable equilibrium. In fact, the traditional wisdom,
summarized by the Taylor rule, requires that for any 1% variation in inﬂa-
tion, central bankers should change nominal interest rate by more than 1%.
However, in a model with LBD the Taylor rule no longer assures the model
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stability and, on the contrary, can lead to unstable solutions. To see this point
I consider the simpliﬁed model presented in section 1.4.2 of the main text.
Without loss of generality I also assume that government is absent and there
are no wage frictions. I also assume that monetary authority targets expected
inﬂation. This kind of model can be summarized by the following system of
equations:
ŷt = n̂t + x̂t (A.38)
ŷt = ĉt (A.39)
n̂t + ĉt = ŵt (A.40)
r̂t = φpiEt [pit+1] (A.41)
where equation (A.38) is the production function, equation (A.39) is the mar-
ket clearing condition, (A.40) states that the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and leisure must be equal to real wage and (A.41) is a
Taylor rule targeting expected inﬂation. Equations (1.26)-(1.28) complete the
model description. From (1.30) inﬂation can be stabilized controlling for the
level of marginal costs. Plugging (A.40) into (1.28) and combing (A.38) and
(A.39) marginal costs can be rewritten as:
m̂ct = 2 (ĉt − x̂t) (A.42)
Using the result showed in (1.29) equation above becomes:
m̂ct = −2Et
∞∑
s=0
(r̂t+s − pit+1+s)− 2x̂t (A.43)
Finally, plugging the monetary rule A.41 into the equation above yields:
m̂ct = −2Et
∞∑
s=0
(φpi − 1) pit+1+s − 2x̂t (A.44)
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To see how the Taylor principle works, ﬁrst consider a model without LBD,
so that the last term in the equation (A.44) disappears. Suppose the economy
is hit by a shock that increases marginal costs and inﬂation. In the attempt to
stabilize inﬂation, the central bank raises the nominal interest rate. If φpi > 1
it means that nominal interest rate increase more than inﬂation. Hence, as
far as inﬂation is above steady state, marginal costs decline (see (A.44) ). In
fact an increase in the real interest rate, by the Euler equation described in
(1.29), and considering the market clearing condition described in the equation
(A.39) leads to a reduction in the output, which in turn brings a reduction in
the marginal costs and hence, by equation (1.30), in the level of inﬂation.
Thus, the economy reverts to the steady state level. Now consider the case
with LBD. As in the previous example the economy is hit by a shock that
increase inﬂation and the monetary authority reacts by increasing the interest
rate. However, the LBD mechanism adds a new element to the story described
above. A reduction in the output, leads to fall in the hours worked and, by
the LBD process, to a decrease in the level of stock of knowledge and hence,
as described in equation (A.44) to a pressure on the level of marginal costs. If
the LBD mechanism is strong enough, the increase in the nominal interest rate
leads to an increase in the level of inﬂation. In this case, inﬂation expectation
become self-fulﬁlling. Central banker is no longer able to control inﬂation
expectation and hence the economy ﬂuctuates between booms a recessions.
A.4 Initial guess and estimated values
Since the optimization routine employed is able to ﬁnd only a local minimum,
I performed several draws to verify that my estimates are actually a global
minimum. In my exercise I randomly selected the initial guess within a range
of plausible values. I have considered 300 draws. The initial guess and the
corresponding ﬁnal estimates are reported in ﬁgures A.1-A.2. The draws are
sorted in ascending order by the value of the loss function deﬁned in equation
(1.38). As ﬁgures show, my optimization routine converges to the same values
in most cases.
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CHAPTER 2
The consumption real exchange rate puzzle:
can Learning-by-Doing be the solution?
2.1 Introduction
In the ﬁrst chapter I have discussed empirical and theoretical evidences of the
eﬀects of a government spending shock on domestic economic activity. More
recently attention has been directed to the external sector of the economy and
in particular to the consequences on the real exchange rate. The empirical
evidence of a depreciation of the real exchange rate following a positive gov-
ernment expenditure shock is hard to reconcile with standard inter-temporal
optimizing models. In these models the expected increase in taxes, needed for
the inter-temporal government budget constraint to hold, generates a strong
negative wealth eﬀect which induces households to reduce consumption and
increase labour supply. Under the assumption of international risk sharing,
these models predict a co-movement between consumption and the real ex-
change rate, measured as the price of the foreign consumption basket in units
of the home one. Thus, by predicting a decrease in private consumption they
also fail to account for the real exchange rate depreciation.
This chapter shows how introducing the Learning-by-Doing (LBD) mech-
anism à la Chang et al. (2002) presented in the ﬁrst chapter in an otherwise
standard open economy DSGEmodel, generates a response of the real exchange
rate to changes in government expenditure that is consistent with empirical
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evidences.
The ﬁrst part of the present chapter provides new evidences on the govern-
ment spending eﬀects. I use quarterly data for the U.S. for the period 1964
to 2006 to estimate a VAR model. Following Blanchard and Perotti (2002) I
identify the government spending structural shock by assuming that govern-
ment spending is predetermined within the quarter. I ﬁnd that an exogenous
increase in government spending produces several eﬀects. First output, con-
sumption and the real wage rise. Second, the real exchange rate depreciates
and the trade balance deteriorates. Third, I ﬁnd that inﬂation and the nom-
inal interest rate decrease. Finally, and most important since it is the central
motivation for considering the LBD mechanism, I ﬁnd a large and persistent
increase in total factory productivity.
The second part of the chapter introduces a LBD mechanism in a two-
country version of an otherwise standard new Keynesian DSGE model. As in
Chang et al. (2002) the level of output produced depends on the workers' skills
with the latter evolving according to a LBD mechanism, so that past work ex-
perience aﬀects the current level of skills. In contrast with the standard model,
a positive government spending shock produces an increase in consumption and
total factor productivity, as already discussed in the previous chapter, and a
depreciation of the real exchange rate.
As discussed in chapter 1, these results are derived from the fact that in
the model with LBD the increase in government spending leads to an endo-
genous increase in total factor productivity through the LBD mechanism. The
resulting decline in the long term real interest rate increases consumption and,
under the assumption of complete market, causes a depreciation of the real
exchange rate.
The theoretical literature has proposed diﬀerent explanations to solve the
consumption-real exchange rate puzzle generated by a government spending
shock.
Basu and Kollmann (2013) analyse the eﬀect of a change in productive
government spending on the real exchange rate. However, their model requires
government spending to enter in the production function directly and fail to
explain the observed increase in TFP when government spending is entirely
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wasteful.
Erceg et al. (2005) examine an open economy with Rule-of-Thumb con-
sumers proposed in Galí et al. (2007). The model generates an increase in con-
sumption but cannot replicate the real exchange rate depreciation. Because
only Ricardian households have access to ﬁnancial market, the real exchange
rate depend on their level of consumption through the risk sharing condition.
Since the consumption of Ricardian agents declines it must follow an appreci-
ation of the real exchange rate.
Monacelli and Perotti (2010) investigate the eﬀect of alternative speciﬁc-
ations of the utility function with non separability between consumption and
leisure. They conclude that the functional form presented in Linnemann (2006)
can explain the increase in private consumption and the real exchange rate de-
preciation. However, as noted in Bilbiie (2009), these results can be achieved
only if either consumption or leisure are inferior goods. By contrast, the form
of non separability introduced in Greenwood et al. (1988) can provide an ex-
planation to the consumption-real exchange rate puzzle only for implausible
values of the labour elasticity.
The deep-habit mechanism introduced in Ravn et al. (2012) enables the
model to capture the initial increase in consumption and the real exchange rate
depreciation, but it fails to reproduce the strong persistence of the depreciation.
Corsetti et al. (2012) explore the impact of spending reversals. They show
that if higher government expenditure today implies lower expenditure in the
future the model can predict the increase in consumption and the real exchange
rate depreciation.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follow. Section 2.2 presents
the empirical evidences and compares my results with the previous literat-
ure. Section 2.3 presents a two-country economy model with LBD. Section
2.4 discusses the parameterization strategy followed for the baseline model.
Section 2.5 uses a simpliﬁed model to illustrate the mechanism through which
LBD aﬀects the propagation mechanism of a government spending shock on
the external sector of the economy and analyses the impulse responses for the
complete model. Section 2.6 concludes.
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2.2 Empirical evidences
2.2.1 VAR speciﬁcation and identiﬁcation
The eﬀects of a government spending shock are estimated using a structural
VAR model of the form:
AZt = c+
p∑
j=1
BjZt−j + εt (2.1)
where Zt is a vector of observable variables, p is the lag length and εt is a vector
of structural shocks. A and Bj are matrix of coeﬃcients. My VAR model has
seven variables: government spending (consumption and investment expendit-
ure), GDP and taxes expressed in logs of real per capita terms; the nominal
interest rate (3-Month Treasury Bill rate) and inﬂation (log diﬀerences in GDP
deﬂator); a measure for capital utilization adjusted total factor productivity.1
In order to economize on the degree of freedom I consider a seventh changing
variable. For the latter I consider, in turn, private consumption (non durable
goods and service expenditure) and investment (gross domestic investment and
durable consumption) expressed in logs of real per capita terms; the log of the
real exchange rate, deﬁned so that an increase corresponds to a depreciation
of the domestic currency; the trade balance scaled by GDP; the log of the
real wage. The appendix provides more details on the data employed. The
VAR includes four lags, a constant and a linear time trend. The sample runs
from 1964:1 to 2006:4. The choice of the sample beginning is imposed by data
availability, in particular with regard to the real exchange rate.
In order to recover the government spending structural shock, restrictions
must be imposed on the matrix A. Following Blanchard and Perotti (2002),
I assume that in the row of A associated with government expenditure all
elements but the coeﬃcient of government spending are zero. Thus, the iden-
tiﬁcation strategy implies that all the variables in Zt react immediately to
government spending shocks, whereas government spending is predetermined
1The series is provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco and is based on
Fernald (2009).
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within the quarter and it is allowed to respond with one lag to structural in-
novations other than government spending. Under this assumption, the model
can be estimated recursively and the reduced form residuals from a regression
of government spending on its own lagged values and lagged values of other
endogenous variables included in the model can be interpreted as structural
shock to government spending.
2.2.2 Estimation results
Figure 2.1 displays impulse responses to government spending increase nor-
malized to 1% of GDP. The solid line corresponds to the point estimates and
the shaded area represents the 90% conﬁdence interval obtained by bootstrap
sampling based on 1,000 repetitions. The impulses responses for the ﬁrst six
variables are obtained from the VAR model that includes consumption as the
seventh variable. Time on the horizontal axes is expressed in quarters. The
responses of the nominal interest rate and inﬂation are measured as annual-
ized percentage points deviation from the pre-shock path. Trade balance is
expressed as percentage points change in the share of GDP relative to the pre-
shock path. The remaining variables are expressed in percentage deviation
from the pre-shock path.
The response of GDP, which can be interpreted as multiplier, on impact
is statistically signiﬁcant and is around 1. The level of output also displays a
persistent increase in response to the shock.
The nominal interest rate display a not statistically signiﬁcant decrease,
whereas the initial fall in inﬂation in response to the government spending
increase is signiﬁcant. The same result has also been found in Canova and
Pappa (2007), Edelberg et al. (1999), Fatás and Mihov (2001) and Mountford
and Uhlig (2009). The point estimates for both variables are steadily below
the pre-shock level.
After a non statistically signiﬁcant increase on impact, the real wage hits
its peak after about 5 periods rising by more than 1% respect to the pre-shock
period. Similar results have been documented in Pappa (2009), Galí et al.
(2007) and Perotti (2008).
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Private consumption shows a signiﬁcant, large and persistent increase and
peaks around 10 quarters after the shock at about 1% above its pre-shock level.
Similar results have been extensively documented in the literature. See, for
example, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Fatás and Mihov (2001).
Also the response of investment is in line with previous studies. However,
the VAR model does not provide an unambiguous clue of the eﬀect on private
investment of a change in government spending. The trade balance decreases
of about 0.20 points of GDP and goes back to the pre-shock period only after
5 years. There is also a large and persistent depreciation of the real exchange
rate. At its peak, around 4 years after the shock, the depreciation of the real
exchange rate is about 3%. However, my results are not statistically signiﬁcant.
Analogous responses of the real exchange rate and the trade balance have been
found in Monacelli and Perotti (2010), Ravn et al. (2012) and Corsetti et al.
(2012). By contrast, Kim and Roubini (2008) ﬁnd that the real exchange rate
depreciates but the trade balance improves.
Finally, I also ﬁnd evidence in support of a statistically signiﬁcant increase
in TFP. This result is consistent with previous contributions to the empirical
literature. Early work by Evans (1992) ﬁnds a positive correlation between
government spending and Solow residuals. Ramey and Shapiro (1998) show
that an increase in military government spending raises labour productivity.
Bachmann and Sims (2012) use a VAR approach to document the increase in
TFP and to show that the increase is larger during recession.
2.3 The model
The model is based on a standard two-country new Keynesian DSGE model.
The world economy is made up of two countries, referred to as H (Home
or domestic) and F (Foreign). Home economy accounts for a fraction n of
the global population normalized to unity. Each economy produces a country
speciﬁc intermediate goods. A ﬁxed fraction n of ﬁrms is located in Home,
and the remaining ﬁrms (n, 1] are located in Foreign. Intermediate goods are
traded across borders. Non tradable ﬁnal goods produced in each country are
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a bundle of domestically produced and imported goods and can be used for
consumption and investment.
The two economies are subjected to uncorrelated shocks but share the same
preferences, technology and market structure.
While the law of one price (LOP) holds, home bias in preference yields the
deviation from the purchasing power parity (PPP).
On the demand side, households provide labour and capital services only
within the country they reside but have access to a complete set of contin-
gent asset traded internationally. There exist frictions in both price and wage
setting so that they can be adjusted only infrequently.
Finally, in what follows variables with "F" superscripts refer to the foreign
economy, whereas variables without superscripts correspond to the domestic
economy.
2.3.1 Final goods producers
Final goods Mt are bundles of domestically produced goods Ht and imported
goods Ft. Final goods, which are not traded across borders, can be used for
both consumption Ct and investment It. The ﬁnal goods producer has the
following CES aggregate function:
Mt =
[
[1− (1− n)ω] 1σ H
σ−1
σ
t + [(1− n)ω]
1
σ F
σ−1
σ
t
] σ
σ−1
(2.2)
where σ measures the substitutability between domestic and imported goods
and ω ∈ [0, 1] deﬁnes the degree of home bias.
The bundles of domestically produced goods and imported goods are deﬁned
by:
Ht =
( 1
n
) λf
1+λf
 n
0
Ht (j)
1
1+λf dj
1+λf (2.3)
Ft =
( 1
1− n
) λf
1+λf
 1
n
Ft (j)
1
1+λf dj
1+λf (2.4)
79
Chapter 2 The consumption-real exchange rate puzzle: can LBD be the solution?
where Ht (j) and Ft (j) are intermediate goods produced respectively in coun-
try H and F ; λf measures the elasticity of substitution between intermediate
goods produced within the same country.
Minimizing total expenditure subject to (2.2) yields the optimal allocation
between domestically produced and imported goods:
Ht = (1− (1− n)ω)
(
PH,t
PCPI,t
)−σ
Mt (2.5)
Ft = (1− n)ω
(
PF,t
PCPI,t
)−σ
Mt (2.6)
where PCPI,t =
{
[1− (1− n)ω] (PH,t)(1−σ) + [(1− n)ω] (PF,t)(1−σ)
} 1
1−σ
is the
domestic consumer price index, PH,t =
[
1
n
 n
0
PH,t (j)
− 1
λf dj
]−λf
is the domest-
ically produced goods price index, PF,t =
[
1
1−n
 1
n
PF,t (j)
− 1
λf dj
]−λf
is a price
index for imported goods expressed in term of domestic currency.
Given the total expenditure on domestically produced and imported goods,
the optimal allocation within each type j ∈ [0, 1] good is:
Ht (j) =
(
1
n
)(
PH,t (j)
PH,t
)− 1+λf
λf
Ht (2.7)
Ft (j) =
(
1
1− n
)(
PF,t (j)
PF,t
)− 1+λf
λf
Ft (2.8)
To simplify the analysis, I assume that government spendingGt is composed
only of domestically produced goods.2 Under this assumption the demand for
an intermediate good domestically produced Y Dt (j) is:
Y Dt (j) = nHt (j) + (1− n)HFt (j) +Gt (j) (2.9)
where Gt (j) =
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)− 1+λf
λf Gt; H
F
t (j) =
(
1
n
) (PFH,t(j)
PFH,t
)− 1+λf
λf
HFt denotes the
demand from country F of domestically produced goods of type j; P FH,t =
2The same assumption is for example used in Corsetti et al. (2012)
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[
1
n
 n
0
P FH,t (j)
− 1
λf dj
]−λf
is a price index for goods produced in country H and
expressed in terms of country F currency.
2.3.2 Intermediate goods producers
The intermediate good j is obtained using the technology common across all
ﬁrms:
Y (j) = (Kt (j))
α (Nt(j)Xt)
(1−α) (2.10)
where 0 < α < 1, Kt (j) and Nt (j) denote the physical capital and the homo-
geneous labour services used to produce the jth good.
Xt denotes the average level of skills of labour suppliers which depends
on aggregate hours worked in the past. Following Chang et al. (2002), skill
accumulation is assumed to evolve according to:
Xt = X
ρx
t−1N
µn
t−1 (2.11)
where 0 < ρx < 1 and µn ≥ 0.
Throughout the rest of the chapter the expressions stock of knowledge and
total factor productivity are equivalently used to indicate the level of skills.
It is worth noting that the assumption that skills are embodied in workers
coupled with the fact that workers mobility is not allowed, rule out the hy-
pothesis that LBD could leak from one country to the other. Changes in the
level of productivity within each country depend only on the aggregate level
of hours worked within the country.
The nominal wage Wt and the rental cost of capital R
K
t are given for the
intermediate goods producers. Hence, cost minimization implies the same
capital-to-labour ratio for all ﬁrms
Kt
Nt
=
α
1− α
Wt
RKt
(2.12)
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The marginal cost, common to all ﬁrms, is:
MCt =
W
(1−α)
t R
K α
t
αα (1− α)(1−α)X(1−α)t
(2.13)
Following Calvo (1983) I assume that in every period a fraction of ﬁrms ζp
cannot re-optimize their prices PH,t (j). In this case ﬁrms adjust their prices
mechanically according to the rule:
PH,t (j) = (piH,t−1)
ιp (piH)
1−ιp (2.14)
where piH,t = PH,t/PH,t−1 and piH is the steady-state inﬂation rate of domest-
ically produced goods.
The fraction (1− ζp) of ﬁrms able to re-optimize their price chose the new
prices to solve:
max
PH,t(j)
new
Et

∞∑
s=0
(ζpβ)
s Ξt+sYt+s (j)×(
PH (j)
new
(
s∏
l=1
(piH,t−1+l)
ιp (piH)
1−ιp
)
−MCt+s
)
 (2.15)
subject to the demand function (2.9). The term βsΞt+s is the current value of
a future dollar expressed in consumption units.
Considering only a symmetric equilibrium where all ﬁrms choose the same
price, the law of motion for the aggregate price is:
PH,t =
[
(1− ζp)
(
P newH,t
)− 1
λf + ζp
(
(piH,t−1)
ιp (piH)
1−ιp PH,t−1
)− 1
λf
]λf
(2.16)
2.3.3 Households
The objective function for the households i ∈ [0, 1] is given by:
Et
∞∑
s=0
βs
{
log (Ct+s (i)− hCt+s−1 (i))− N
1+ϕ
t+s (i)
1 + ϕ
}
(2.17)
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where Ct (i) is consumption, Nt (i) denotes the quantity of the i
th type of labour
service supplied; h is a parameter measuring the degree of consumption's habit
and ϕ > 0 is the inverse of labour supply elasticity.
The household's budget constraint is:
PCPI,t+sCt+s (i) + PCPI,t+sIt+s (i) +Bt+s (i) ≤ Rt+s−1Bt+s−1 (i)
+Wt+s (i)Nt+s (i) +
[
RKt+sut+s (i)− PCPI,t+sa (ut+s (i))
]
Kt+s−1 (i)
+Πt+s − Tt+s (i) (2.18)
The right-hand side of the expression (2.18) corresponds to the house-
hold income net of the lump-sum taxes (or transfers) Tt (i). Total income
derives from diﬀerent sources. The return from holding a one-period gov-
ernment bond is denoted by RtBt (i). Labour income is Wt (i)Nt (i). The
term
[
RKt ut (i)− PCPI,ta (ut (i))
]
Kt−1 (i) indicates the net income from rent-
ing physical capital to intermediate ﬁrms. Following Smets and Wouters (2003)
the eﬀective capital rent to intermediate goods producer ﬁrms is Kt (i) =
ut (i)Kt−1 (i), where ut (i) is the utilization rate of installed capital chosen by
households. Households receive RKt for each unit of capital services supplied
and pay a cost of utilization a (ut (i)), expressed in term of the consumption
good. Households also receive dividends Πt from the imperfect competitive
intermediate ﬁrms. Households allocate their income to consumption Ct (i)
and investment in both physical capital It (i) and government bond Bt (i) .
As in Christiano et al. (2005) the capital accumulation evolves according
to:
Kt (i) = (1− δ)Kt−1 (i) +
[
1− S
(
It (i)
It−1 (i)
)]
It (i) (2.19)
where δ is the depreciation rate, and S (·) is the cost of adjusting investment,
with S (1) = S ′ (1) = 0 and S ′′ (1) > 0.
2.3.4 Labour contractors and wage setting
Each household is a monopolistic supplier of diﬀerentiated labour services
Nt (i) to labour contractors. Labour contractors are perfect competitive ﬁrms.
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They aggregate the diﬀerentiated labour services into an homogeneous labour
service Nt hired by intermediate goods producers. The aggregation function
is:
Nt =
[ 1
0
Nt (i)
1
1+λw di
]1+λw
(2.20)
where λw > 0 is a ﬁxed parameter.
The demand for each type of labour service is derived from labour con-
tractor proﬁt maximization:
Nt (i) =
(
Wt (i)
Wt
)− 1+λw
λw
Nt (2.21)
where Wt =
[ 1
0
Wt (i)
− 1
λw di
]−λw
is the aggregate level of wages
Households face à la Calvo-style wage setting frictions. In each period
the fraction ζw of households are unable to readjust their wage. In this case
households set their wage according to:
Wt (i) = (piCPI,t−1)
ιw (piCPI)
1−ιw Wt−1 (i) (2.22)
Those households able to re-optimize their wage solve:
max
Wnewt
Et
∞∑
s=0
ζswβ
s
{
−(Nt+s(i))
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
}
(2.23)
subject to (2.18), (2.21) and
Wt+s (i) =
s∏
l=1
(piCPI)
(1−iw) (piCPI,t+l−1)
iw W newt (2.24)
Considering a symmetric equilibrium in which all households able to set a new
wage chose the same level, wage evolution is deﬁned as:
Wt =
{
(1− ζw) (W newt )−
1
λw + ζw
[
(piCPI)
(1−iw) (piCPI,t−1)
iw Wt−1
]− 1
λw
}−λw
(2.25)
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2.3.5 The Term of Trade (TOT), the real exchange rate
and the trade balance
The eﬀective term of trade for the domestic economy is:
St =
PF,t
PH,t
(2.26)
Let ξt denote the nominal exchange rate (i.e. the price of country F 's
currency expressed in term of domestic currency). I assume that the law of
one prices holds for any good j and hence Pt (j) = ξtP
F
t (j) .
The real exchange rate is deﬁned as the ratio of the two countries' consumer
price indices both expressed in domestic currency:
Qt =
ξtP
F
CPI,t
PCPI,t
(2.27)
where P FCPI,t is the consumer price index for the country F .
Finally, net export in term of domestic output and expressed as a fraction
of steady state output are:
NXt =
(
1
Y
)(
Yt − PCPI,t
PH,t
Ct − PCPI,t
PH,t
It − PCPI,t
PH,t
a (ut)Kt−1 −Gt
)
(2.28)
2.3.6 Government policies
The central bank sets the nominal interest rate Rt according to a Taylor rule
that responds to CPI inﬂation and GDP growth:
Rt
R
=
(
Rt−1
R
)ρr [(piCPI,t
piCPI
)φpi (( GDPt
GDPt−1
)φgdp)]
(2.29)
where variables without time subscript denote steady state values. Similarly
to Christiano et al. (2010) my deﬁnition of GDPt does not consider the capital
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utilization cost and is deﬁned as:
GDPt =
(
PH,t
PCPI,t
)−σ [ (1− (1− n)ω) (Ct + It) +
(1− n)ωQσt
(
CFt + I
F
t
) ]+Gt (2.30)
Government spending is ﬁnanced either by issuing a domestic currency
denominated bond or by a lump-sum tax. Therefore, the government budget
constraint is:
PH,tGt +Rt−1Bt−1 = Tt +Bt (2.31)
Government sets the lump-sum tax following a simple feedback rule in order
to prevent an explosive government debt.
Finally, government spending is deﬁned by:
lnGt = (1− ρg) lnG+ ρglnGt−1 + εgt (2.32)
where εgt ∼ (0, 1) .
2.3.7 Goods market clearing
The aggregate index for domestically produced goods is Yt =
[ 1
0
Yt (j)
1
1+λf dj
]1+λf
.
Using the deﬁnition of the nominal exchange rate and the equilibrium condition
Yt (j) = Yt (j)
D, where demand is deﬁned in (2.9), market clearing condition
for the domestic economy is:
Yt =
(
PH,t
PCPI,t
)−σ
×[
(1− (1− n)ω) (Ct + It + a (ut)Kt−1)+
(1− n)ωQσt
(
CFt + I
F
t + a
(
uFt
)
K
F
t−1
) ]+Gt (2.33)
Country F is a mirror economy of domestic country. Hence, its economy
is described by a set of equations analogous to the equilibrium conditions
described for country H. Note that when n = 1 the model corresponds to a
closed economy model, whereas, for n = 0 the model collapses to a small open
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economy where domestic economy has no eﬀect on the foreign economy.
2.3.8 International risk sharing
Under the assumption of complete market, the risk sharing condition implies
that the marginal utility of consumption, weighted by the real exchange rate
should be equalized across countries:
ϑQtUc,t = U
F
c,t (2.34)
where ϑ is a constant which depends on the initial relative asset position. Given
the symmetry between the two economies, it can be normalized to one without
loss of generality. The intuition behind equation (2.34) is the following. Con-
sidering the RER as the relative price of a bundle of foreign consumption goods
expressed in term of domestic one, a benevolent social planner would allocate
consumption between foreign and domestic economy up to the point where
the marginal utility of consumption across country is the same. If a complete
set of state-contingent securities freely tradable across borders is available, the
same equilibrium can also be achieved in a decentralized economy, even if the
existence of some form of frictions generates a deviation from the PPP. The
condition stated in equation (2.34) establishes a strong link between consump-
tion and the RER and is the key features to understand the co-movement
between the two variables.3
2.4 Parameterization
This section illustrates the parameter values employed for the model simula-
tion. In what follows I consider a log-linearized approximation of the model
around the deterministic steady state in which inﬂation is zero. Each period
corresponds to a quarter. The responses of the trade balance is expressed as
percentage points change in the share of GDP relative to the steady state level.
3Appendix B.4 shows how departing from the assumption of complete markets does not
aﬀect qualitatively the main results reported in the present chapter.
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The responses of the nominal interest rate and inﬂation are measured as annu-
alized percentage points deviation from the steady state level. The remaining
variables are expressed in quarterly percentage deviation from the steady state
level.
For the households preference parameters I choose conventional values and
set the inverse of the elasticity of labour supply ϕ equal to 3. The discount
factor β is equal to 0.9925 and corresponds to a steady state nominal interest
of around 3% per year. The degree of habit in consumption h is equal to 0.75
as in Del Negro et al. (2007); λf and λw are both set equal to 0.05, implying
that price and wage mark-ups in steady state are equal to 5%. I set α = 0.30
to account for a labour share around 2/3. The capital depreciation rate δ is
set to 0.025 to capture the investment-output ratio of 24%.
I set ζp = 0.75 implying ﬁrms can change price on average once for year.
This value is compatible with the results documented in Nakamura and Steinsson
(2008) and in Bils and Klenow (2004). The wage stickiness parameter ζw is
equal to 0.83, implying that the average wage duration is less than six quarters.
Such degree of wage rigidity is in line with the results found in the most recent
empirical literature.4 Following Christiano et al. (2010) I assume full wage
indexation to past inﬂation (ιw = 1) and exclude price indexation (ιp = 0).
For the investment adjustment cost S ′′ (1) I rely on the value found in
Smets and Wouters (2007) and I set it equal to 5.74. The capital utilization
adjustment cost a′′ is 0.038, which implies, as in Smets and Wouters (2007),
that in response to 1% increase in the rental rate of capital the utilization rate
rises by 0.85%.
The two parameters for the Learning-By-Doing, µn and ρx, are taken from
Chang et al. (2002) and are equal to 0.111 and 0.798.
The autocorrelation coeﬃcient for the government spending ρg is set to
0.90 as in Galí et al. (2007). The steady-state share of government spending
4Barattieri et al. (2010) ﬁnd that on average the probability of a wage change is 18%
per quarter, implying an expected duration of wage contracts of about 5.6 quarters and
corresponding to ζw equal to 0.82. Gottschalk (2005) ﬁnds that the probabilities of wage
constancy diﬀer between males and females and is respectively equal to 53.7% and 46.5%
per year. This would implies a value for ζw around 0.87. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2011)
ﬁnd that the degree of downward inﬂexibility in nominal wages is around 1.
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is assumed to be 0.20 corresponding to the post-war period average. For the
speciﬁcation of monetary policy I use conventional values and set φpi = 1.5,
φgdp = 0.20 and ρr = 0.75. The share of import ω is set to 0.15 to account
for the average import share in US during the period considered around 10%.
The substitutability between domestic and imported goods σ is set to 0.66 as
in Corsetti et al. (2012). Country H's size n is set equal to 0.20 to account for
20% of world production. Table 2.1 summarizes the values employed.5
2.5 Simulation results
Before turning to model simulation, I ﬁrst illustrate the mechanisms through
which introducing LBD can bring the response of the real exchange rate to a
government spending shock closer in line with the data. As in chapter 1, to
illustrate this mechanism I consider a simpliﬁed version of the model presented
in section 2.3. The simulation results for the complete model are presented in
the second part of the present section.
2.5.1 A simpliﬁed open economy model
First, there is no capital dynamic and intermediate goods producers have a
linear production function (α = 0 in equation (2.10) ). I assume no habit in
consumption (h = 0). Those households are not able to reoptimize their wages
cannot index them to past inﬂation (ιw = 0). Finally, I assume monetary
authority targets only current inﬂation (ρr = φgdp = 0). In what follows `̂ '
5In this chapter I calibrate rather than estimate the model for the following reasons. In
a two-country medium scale DSGE model, because of the presence of the Foreign economy,
the number of structural parameters to be estimated is magniﬁed and could raise many
identiﬁcation issues. The literature has provided a solution to this problem within the
framework of a small open economy where the foreign variables are modelled as exogenous
shocks (see Adolfson et al. (2007)). However, given the relevance of the US economy it would
be problematic to apply this approach to US data. On the other side, Lubik and Schorfheide
(2006) use data for the US and the Euro area to estimate a small scale DSGE model where
the two economies share the same technology and preference structure but policies, price
setting and shocks hitting each economy are diﬀerent. Despite this parsimonious approach
oﬀers a valid solution to deal with the identiﬁcation problems, its ability to ﬁt the data is
open to question. I leave the exploration of these issues as a venue for further research.
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denotes variables expressed in log-deviation from steady state.
First, consider the dynamic of the real exchange rate. From equation (2.34)
one can obtain the following relationship between the real exchange rate and
domestic and foreign consumption expressed in log-deviation from steady state:
ĉt = ĉ
F
t + q̂t (2.35)
Hence, under the assumption of international risk sharing condition, there
exists a strong correlation between domestic consumption and the real ex-
change rate, and neglecting foreign consumption ĉFt , the same mechanism that
aﬀects the consumption dynamic also determines the real exchange rate beha-
viour.
To understand the dynamic of net exports consider that in this simpliﬁed
version equation (2.28) can be rearranged as:
n̂xt =
C
Y
(1− n)ω (2− ω) (σ − 1) ŝt (2.36)
The relationship between net export and the term of trade is not unique and
depend on the size of σ. My baseline values imply a negative correlation
between the two variables.6
Finally, consider that the term of trade is related to the real interest rate
diﬀerential by the following relationship:
ŝt = Et
∞∑
k=0
[(
r̂Ft+1 − piFF,t+k+1
)− (r̂t+1 − piH,t+k+1)] (2.37)
Figure 2.2 plots impulse responses for the simpliﬁed open economy. The
responses are very similar to those presented for the closed economy in the
ﬁrst chapter. The main results emerging from this section is that the model
replicates the real exchange rate empirical response. Furthermore, the increase
in the term of trade, determined by the reduction of the domestic inﬂation,
deteriorates the trade balance, in line with the empirical evidences.
6Mendoza (1995) documents that the correlation between the trade balance and the
term of trade for the US is equal to -0.49
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2.5.2 The complete medium size DSGE model
In this section I comment out the simulation results for the complete open
economy model presented in section 2.3. Figure 2.3 compares the impulse
responses of the full-ﬂedged model with LBD (black solid line) and without
LBD (red dashed line). The ﬁgure shows that with LBD also the fully speciﬁed
model including capital accumulation and variable capital utilization generates
a response of consumption, the real exchange rate, wages and TFP of the same
sign of the empirical evidences provided in section 2.2.7 Indeed, for the richer
model speciﬁcation, diﬀerently from the simpliﬁed version presented in the
section 2.5, these responses exhibit an higher persistence, improving the ability
of the model to reproduce results in line with the empirical evidences. For
consumption and the real exchange rate the fully speciﬁed model also captures
the humped-shaped responses characterizing the VAR model. Diﬀerently from
the simpliﬁed model, the trade balance shows a more persistent deterioration,
bringing the predictions closer in line with the empirical results. In fact, the
full-ﬂedged model predicts a higher increase in consumption which boosts the
domestic demand and generates a worsening of the trade balance. Thus, the
model oﬀers support to the "twin-deﬁcit" hypothesis. These eﬀects derives
from the larger and long-lasting decrease in the long-term real interest rate
occurring in the full-ﬂedged model, which is the key mechanism from which
the other results presented in the chapter derive.
As already discussed in chapter 1 the key feature determining these results
is the increase in TFP derived from the endogenous increase in the stock of
knowledge through the LBD mechanism. Without LBD a government spend-
ing would cause a counterfactual decrease of private consumption and through
the international risk sharing condition an appreciation of the real exchange
rate.
Compared to the the deep-habit mechanism introduced in Ravn et al.
(2012) the model in this chapter is able to replicate the persistent depreci-
7Similarly to the data employed in the VAR analysis presented in section 2.2, the deﬁn-
ition of TFP is based on a capital utilization adjusted TFP measure. Hence, the TFP level
in my model coincides with the stock of knowledge Xt as deﬁned in the equation 2.11.
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ation of the RER, whereas their model is only able to replicate the initial
response of the RER to a government spending shock but cannot mimic the
persistence of the response.
The spending reversal mechanism proposed in Corsetti et al. (2012), while
delivers results for consumption and the RER qualitatively in line with the
data, similarly to Ravn et al. (2012) cannot generate the concomitant increase
in productivity observed in the data.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter contributes by an empirical and theoretical analysis to the ongo-
ing debate on the short-run eﬀect of the ﬁscal policy stance and focus on the
impact of government spending on the real exchange rate.
The main result of the present chapter is to show that including a Learning-
By-Doing mechanism in an open economy version of an otherwise standard new
Keynesian DSGE model enables the model to replicate the real exchange rate
depreciation observed in the data. This result depends on the ability of the
model proposed to match the positive response of consumption. In fact, as
already discussed in chapter 1, the LBD mechanism makes the model able to
generate a positive response of consumption to a government spending increase.
Under the assumption of complete markets, the risk sharing condition implies
a strong correlation between consumption and real exchange rate. Hence the
increase in domestic consumption results in a depreciation of the real exchange
rate.
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Table 2.1: Parameter values used in the baseline medium-size DSGE model
Parameter Value Target/Source
ϕ inverse labour supply elasticity 3 conventional value
β discount factor 0.9925 annualized interest rate: 3%
h consumption habit 0.75 Del Negro et al. (2007)
λf price mark-up 0.05 steady state wage mark-up: 5%
λw wage mark-up 0.05 steady state wage mark-up: 5%
α capital share 0.30 Labour share: 2/3
δ capital depreciation rate 0.025 Investment output ratio: 0.24
ζp probability of price ﬁxed 0.75 Average price duration: 4 qrts
ζw probability of wage ﬁxed 0.83 Average wage duration: 6 qrts
ιw degree of wage indexation 1 full indexation to past inﬂation
ιp degree of price indexation 0 no indexation to past inﬂation
S
′′
investment adjustment cost 5.74 Smets and Wouters (2007)
a′′ capital utilization cost 0.038 Smets and Wouters (2007)
µn LBD: hours impact 0.111 Chang et al. (2002)
ρx LBD: auto-correlation 0.798 Chang et al. (2002)
ρg auto-correlation spending 0.90 Galí et al. (2007)
G
GDP
spending to GDP ratio 0.20 sample average
φpi Monetary rule: inﬂation 1.5 standard value
φgdp Monetary rule: output growth 0.20 standard value
ρr Monetary rule: smoothing 0.75 standard value
ω degree of openness 0.15 Import-output ratio: 10%
σ trade elasticity 0.66 Corsetti et al. (2012)
n H economy size 0.20 Share of U.S. GDP in world output
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APPENDIX B
Appendix to chapter 2
B.1 Data
This section describes more in details data employed in the estimation of the
VAR model presented in chapter 2.
Population: Civilian Noninstitutional Population (CNP16OV). Source: FRED,
Federal Reserve Bank of ST. Louise. Note: average of monthly ﬁgures.
GDP deﬂator: Implicit Price Deﬂator for Gross Domestic Product, Table
1.1.9. line 1. Source : Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA); Note: Index
numbers, 2009=100. Seasonally adjusted.
GDP: Gross Domestic Product, Table 1.1.5 line 1. Source : Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis (BEA); Note: Seasonally adjusted at annual rates.
Government spending: Government consumption expenditures and gross
investment, Table 1.1.5 line 21. Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA). Note: Seasonally adjusted at annual rates.
Consumption: non-durable goods +services, Table 1.1.5 lines 5 and 6. Source:
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA); Note: Seasonally adjusted at an-
nual rates.
Interest rate: 3-Month Treasury Bill: Secondary Market Rate (TB3MS).
Source: FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of ST. Louise. Note: average of
monthly ﬁgures. Not Seasonally Adjusted.
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Inﬂation: log diﬀerences in the Implicit Price Deﬂator for Gross Domestic
Product.
Taxes: Current receipts, Table 3.1. line 1, minus Current transfer payments,Table
3.1. line 17, minus Interest payments, Table 3.1. line 22. Source: Bureau
of Economic Analysis (BEA); Note: Seasonally adjusted at annual rates.
Investment: Gross private domestic investment, Table 1.1.5 line 7 plus Dur-
able goods, Table 1.1.5 line 4. Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA); Note: Seasonally adjusted at annual rates.
Real exchange rate: Eﬀective exchange rate, narrow index comprising 27
economies. Source: Bank of International Settlements. Note: Data are
converted to quarterly frequencies by averaging monthly ﬁgures. In the
original data an increase corresponds to an appreciation of the domestic
currency. In order to enhances the comparability with the DSGE model,
I convert the data so that an increase corresponds to a depreciation.
Total factor productivity: Utilization-adjusted TFP. Source: Federal Re-
serve Bank of San Francisco.
Wages: Nonfarm Business Sector: Compensation Per Hour (COMPNFB).
Source: FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of ST. Louise. Note: Index num-
bers, 2009=100. Seasonally adjusted.
B.2 Model derivation
The aim of this section is to provide some technical details on derivation of
model presented in chapter 2. In particular I illustrate the derivation of the
market clearing conditions for both countries and the ﬁrst order conditions
that describe the model equilibrium.
B.2.1 Goods Market clearing condition
In this part I illustrate how to derive the market clearing condition for both
countries. I start from deﬁning the demand for imported and domestically
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produced goods as well as the demand for each j-type good.
Country H's demand for domestically produced goods Ht and imported
goods Ft can be derived by minimizing total expenditure subject to the ﬁnal
good aggregate function (2.2):
min
Ht,Ft
PH,tHt + PF,tFt (B.1)
s.to
Mt =
[
[1− (1− n)ω] 1σ H
σ−1
σ
t + [(1− n)ω]
1
σ F
σ−1
σ
t
] σ
σ−1
(B.2)
Combining ﬁrst order conditions yields:
Ht
Ft
=
1− (1− n)ω
(1− n)ω
(
PH,t
PF,t
)−σ
(B.3)
Collecting F
σ−1
σ
t in the constraint (B.2) and using (B.3) yields:
Mt = Ft
{
[1− (1− n)ω]
[
1
(1− n)ω
]σ−1
σ
(
PH,t
PF,t
)(1−σ)
+ [(1− n)ω] 1σ
} σ
σ−1
(B.4)
By collecting
[
1
(1−n)ω
]σ−1
σ
(
1
PF,t
)(1−σ)
after some algebra expression above
becomes:
Mt = Ft
[
1
(1− n)ω
](
1
PF,t
)−σ{ [1− (1− n)ω]P (1−σ)H,t
+P
(1−σ)
F,t [(1− n)ω]
} σ
σ−1
(B.5)
Using the deﬁnition of CPI inﬂation and solving for Ft yields the aggregate
demand of imported goods corresponding to equation (2.6) in the main text:
Ft = (1− n)ω
(
PF,t
PCPI,t
)−σ
Mt (B.6)
The demand for domestically produced goods Ht, equation (2.5) in the
main text, can be obtained using equation above to substitute for Ft into
(B.3):
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Ht = (1− (1− n)ω)
(
PH,t
PCPI,t
)−σ
Mt (B.7)
The demand forHt (j), the domestically produced good of type j demanded
by country H, can be derived by minimizing the expenditure on Ht (j) subject
to the deﬁnition of the aggregate domestically produced good (2.3):
min
Ht(j)
PH,t (j)Ht (j) (B.8)
s.t
Ht =
( 1
n
) λf
1+λf
 n
0
Ht (j)
1
1+λf dj
1+λf (B.9)
Let Γ be the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the constraint in (B.9)
ﬁrst order condition is:
PH,t (j) = Γ
(
1
n
) λf
1+λf 1
1 + λf
Ht (j)
− λf
1+λf (B.10)
Solving for Ht (j) and plugging into (B.9) yields:
Ht =
[
1
n
Γ
1
λf
(
1
1 + λf
) 1
λf
 n
0
PH,t (j)
− 1
λf dj
]1+λf
(B.11)
Solving for Γ and using the domestically produced aggregate price deﬁnition
yields:
Γ = H
λf
1+λf
t (1 + λf )PH,t (B.12)
Plugging back into (B.10) and rearranging gives:
Ht (j) =
1
n
(
PH,t (j)
PH,t
)− 1+λf
λf
Ht (B.13)
which correspond to equation (2.7) in the main text.
The demand for the j-type good produced in the foreign country Ft (j) can
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be derived in a similar manner by minimizing:
min
Ft(j)
PF,t (j)Ft (j) (B.14)
s.t
Ft =
( 1
1− n
) λf
1+λf
 1
n
Ft (j)
1
1+λf dj
1+λf (B.15)
Therefore the optimal allocation for Ft (j), as in equation (2.8), is
Ft (j) =
1
1− n
(
PF,t (j)
PF,t
)− 1+λf
λf
Ft (B.16)
Under the assumption that government spending in country H is allocated
only to goods domestically produced, the government's demand for the j-type
good is:
Gt (j) =
(
PH,t (j)
PH,t
)− 1+λf
λf
Gt (B.17)
Similarly, country F 's demand for good HFt produced in country H and
for good F Ft produced in country F , can be obtained by minimizing total
expenditure subject to the deﬁnition of the bundle of ﬁnal goods for the foreign
economy equivalent to (2.2):
min
HFt ,F
F
t
P FH,tH
F
t + P
F
F,tF
F
t (B.18)
s.to
MFt =
[
(nω)
1
σ
(
HFt
)σ−1
σ + (1− nω) 1σ (F Ft )σ−1σ ] σσ−1 (B.19)
Solving the optimization problem stated above yields the demand for HFt
and F Ft :
HFt = nω
(
P FH,t
P FCPI,t
)−σ
MFt (B.20)
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F Ft = (1− nω)
(
P FF,t
P FCPI,t
)−σ
MFt (B.21)
The demand for the j-type good produced in country H can be derived
solving the expenditure problem subject to the deﬁnition of country F 's ag-
gregate demand for goods produced in country H:
min
HFt (j)
P FH,t (j)H
F
t (j) (B.22)
s.t
HFt =
( 1
n
) λf
1+λf
 n
0
HFt (j)
1
1+λf dj
1+λf (B.23)
The ﬁnal expression for the demand for good j produced in country H is
HFt (j) =
1
n
(
P FH,t (j)
P FH,t
)− 1+λf
λf
HFt (B.24)
Similarly country F 's demand for goods F Ft (j) can be derived by solving:
min
FFt (j)
P FF,t (j)F
F
t (j) (B.25)
s.t
F Ft =
( 1
1− n
) λf
1+λf
 1
n
F Ft (j)
1
1+λf dj
1+λf (B.26)
Thus, the demand of the j-type good produced in country F is:
F Ft (j) =
1
1− n
(
P FF,t (j)
P FF,t
)− 1+λf
λf
F Ft (B.27)
Assuming that government spending in country F is allocated only to goods
produced in the foreign country, country F government's demand for j-type
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good is:
GFt (j) =
(
P FF,t (j)
P FF,t
)− 1+λf
λf
GFt (B.28)
To derive the market clearing condition for country H plug (B.7), (B.13),
(B.17), (B.20) and (B.24), into (2.9):
Y Dt (j) =
(
PH,t (j)
PH,t
)− 1+λf
λf
(1− (1− n)ω)
(
PH,t
PCPI,t
)−σ
Mt
+ (1− n)ω
(
P FH,t (j)
P FH,t
)− 1+λf
λf
(
P FH,t
P FCPI,t
)−σ
MFt
+
(
PH,t (j)
PH,t
)− 1+λf
λf
Gt (B.29)
Note that from the law of one price follows that PH,t = ξtP
F
H,t. Hence,
equation above can be written as:
Y Dt (j) =
(
PH,t (j)
PH,t
)− 1+λf
λf
(1− (1− n)ω)
(
PH,t
PCPI,t
)−σ
Mt
+ (1− n)ω
(
PH,t (j)
PH,t
)− 1+λf
λf
(
PH,t
ξtP FCPI,t
)−σ
MFt
+
(
PH,t (j)
PH,t
)− 1+λf
λf
Gt (B.30)
Divide and multiply the second term on the RHS by PCPI,t and rearranging
yields:
Y Dt (j) =
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)− 1+λf
λf ×( PH,tPCPI,t)−σ
 (1− (1− n)ω)Mt
+ (1− n)ω
(
PCPI,t
ξtPFCPI,t
)−σ
MFt
+Gt
 (B.31)
103
Appendix B Appendix to chapter 2
Using the deﬁnition of the real exchange rate (2.27) the total demand for
the j-type good produced in country H is:
Y Dt (j) =
(
PH,t (j)
PH,t
)− 1+λf
λf ×{(
PH,t
PCPI,t
)−σ [ (1− (1− n)ω)Mt+
(1− n)ωQσtMFt
]
+Gt
}
(B.32)
As in the main text, deﬁne the aggregate output index for country H as:
Yt =
(
1
n
 n
0
Yt (j)
1
1+λf dj
)1+λf
(B.33)
Plugging (B.32) into equation above and simplifying yields:
Yt =
{(
PH,t
PCPI,t
)−σ
P
1+λf
λf
H,t
[
(1− (1− n)ω)Mt + (1− n)ωQσtMFt
]
+Gt
}
×[
1
n
 n
0
PH,t (j)
− 1
λf dj
]1+λf
(B.34)
Substituting the deﬁnition of aggregate domestically produced price index,
equation above simpliﬁes to:
Yt =
(
PH,t
PCPI,t
)−σ [
(1− (1− n)ω)Mt + (1− n)ωQσtMFt
]
+Gt (B.35)
Similarly, deﬁne total demand for the j-type good produced in country F
as:
Y D,Ft (j) = nFt (j) + (1− n)F Ft (j) +GFt (j) (B.36)
Plug (B.6), (B.16), (B.21), (B.27) and (B.28) into equation above:
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Y D,Ft (j) = nω
(
PF,t (j)
PF,t
)− 1+λf
λf
(
PF,t
PCPI,t
)−σ
Mt
+ (1− nω)
(
P FF,t (j)
P FF,t
)− 1+λf
λf
(
P FF,t
P FCPI,t
)−σ
MFt
+
(
P FF,t (j)
P FF,t
)− 1+λf
λf
GFt (B.37)
Applying the law of one price, using the deﬁnition of real exchange rate
and rearranging yields:
Y D,Ft (j) =
(
P FF,t (j)
P FF,t
)− 1+λf
λf
×

(
PFF,t
PFCPI,t
)−σ [
nωQ−σt Mt + (1− nω)MFt
]
+GFt
 (B.38)
Deﬁne the aggregate output index for country F as:
Y Ft =
(
1
1− n
 1
n
Y Ft (j)
1
1+λf dj
)1+λf
(B.39)
Put (B.38) into equation above:
Y Ft =
{(
PFF,t
PFCPI,t
)−σ
P FF,t
1+λf
λf
[
nωQ−σt Mt + (1− nω)MFt
]
+GFt
} 1
1+λf ×[
1
1−n
 n
0
P FF,t (j)
− 1
λf dj
]1+λf
(B.40)
Finally, using the deﬁnition of aggregate price index for goods produced in
country F yields the aggregate goods market clearing condition for country F :
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Y Ft =
(
P FF,t
P FCPI,t
)−σ [
nωQ−σt Mt + (1− nω)MFt
]
+GFt (B.41)
B.2.2 First order conditions
In this part I state the ﬁrst order conditions describing the model equilibrium.
Unless otherwise speciﬁed, the symbol  ˜ denotes variables expressed in real
term using the consumer price index PCPI . I focus on country H. A similar
approach can be easily extended to country F .
Households.
In equilibrium all households make the same decision, therefore without lost of
generality I drop the i index. Households ﬁrst order conditions respect to bond
holding Bt, consumption Ct, investment It, capital Kt and capital utilization
ut are:
λItEt [piCPI,t+1] = βEt
[
λIt+1
]
Rt (B.42)
λIt =
1
(Ct − hCt−1) −
hβ
(Et [Ct+1]− hCt) (B.43)
λIt = λ
K
t
[
1− S
(
It
It−1
)
− S ′
(
It
It−1
)
It
It−1
]
+βEt
[
λKt+1
] [
S
′
(
Et [It+1]
It
)(
Et [It+1]
It
)2]
(B.44)
λKt = βEt
[
λIt+1
] (
Et
[
R˜kt+1ut+1
]
− a (Et [ut+1])
)
+ β (1− δ)Et
[
λKt+1
]
(B.45)
R˜kt = a
′
(ut) (B.46)
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where λIt ≡ PCPI,tλ¯It and λ¯It and λKt are the multipliers associated respectively
to the budget constraint (2.18) and the capital evolution constraint (2.19).
The ﬁrst order condition for the wage setting problem, after some straight-
forward algebra, can be written as:
Et
∑∞
s=0 ζ
s
wβ
s
[(
XWt,sW
rel
t
W˜t
W˜t+s
)− 1+λw
λw
Nt+s
]
λIt+s×{
(1 + λw)
(
XWt,sW
rel
t
W˜t
W˜t+s
)− (1+λw)ϕ
λw {Nt+s}ϕ
λIt+s
−XWt,sW relt W˜t
}
= 0
(B.47)
where XWt,s ≡
s∏
l=1
(piCPI)
(1−iw)(piCPI,t+l−1)
iw
s∏
l=1
piCPI,t+l
and W relt ≡ W˜
new
t
W˜t
is the relative wage
chosen by those households that are allowed to re-optimize their wage respect
to the level of wages at time t. Wage evolution deﬁned in (2.25) can be ex-
pressed in term of relative wage:
(
W˜t
)− 1
λw
= (1− ζw)
(
W relt W˜t
)− 1
λw
+ ζw
[
(piCPI)
(1−iw) (piCPI,t−1)
iw
piCPI,t
W˜t−1
]− 1
λw
(B.48)
Firms
A ﬁrm resetting its price in period t will seek to maximize the current value
of its dividend conditional on that price being eﬀective:
max
PnewH,t+s(j)
Et
∞∑
s=0
(ζp)
s Ξt,t+s {[PH,t+s (j)−MCt+s]Yt+s(j)} (B.49)
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subject to the total demand for the j-type good produced in country H ex-
pressed in (B.32) and to the price indexation scheme:
PH,t+s (j) = P
new
H,t (j)
s∏
l=1
(piH)
(1−ιp) (piH,t+l−1)
ιp (B.50)
By plugging (B.32) and (B.50) into (B.49) and considering only a symmet-
ric equilibrium where all ﬁrm chose the same price
(
P newH,t (j) = P
new
H,t
)
the price
setting problem can be written as:
max
PH,t+s
Et
∞∑
s=0
(ζp)
s Ξt,t+s

[
P newH,t
s∏
l=1
(piH)
(1−ιp) (piH,t+l−1)
ιp −MCt+s
]
×

PnewH,t
s∏
l=1
(piH)
(1−ιp)(piH,t+l−1)
ιp
PH,t+s

− 1+λf
λf
×
{(
PH,t+s
PCPI,t+s
)−σ [ (1− (1− n)ω)Mt+s
+ (1− n)ωQσt+sMFt+s
]
+Gt+s
}

(B.51)
First order condition can be rearranged as:
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Et
∞∑
s=0
(ζp)
s Ξt,t+s


−P newH,t PH,t+s

s∏
l=1
(piH)
(1−ιp)(piH,t+l−1)
ιp
PH,t+s

− 1
λf
+
(1 + λf )MCt+s

s∏
l=1
(piH)
(1−ιp)(piH,t+l−1)
ιp
PH,t+s

− 1+λf
λf

{(
PH,t+s
PCPI,t+s
)−σ [ (1− (1− n)ω)Mt+s
+ (1− n)ωQσt+sMFt+s
]
+Gt+s
}
×

= 0
(B.52)
After some simple algebra the equation above can be written as:
Et
∞∑
s=0
(ζp)
s Ξt,t+s


−P relH,t PH,t+sPH,t

s∏
l=1
(piH)
(1−ιp)(piH,t+l−1)
ιp
PH,t+s
PH

− 1
λf
+
(1 + λf ) M¯Ct+s
PH,t+s
PH

s∏
l=1
(piA)
(1−ιp)(piH,t+l−1)
ιp
PH,t+s
PH

− 1+λf
λf

{(
PH,t+s
PCPI,t+s
)−σ [ (1− (1− n)ω)Mt+s
+ (1− n)ωQσt+sMFt+s
]
+Gt+s
}
×

= 0
(B.53)
where P relH,t ≡
PnewH,t
PH,t
is the relative price chosen by those ﬁrm able to change their
price and M¯Ct+s ≡ MCt+sPH,t+s denotes real marginal costs in term of domestically
produced goods price.
Note that:
PH,t+s
PH,t
=
PH,t+s
PH,t+s−1
× PH,t+s−1
PH,t+s−2
× PH,t+s−2
PH,t+s−3
× · · · × PH,t+1
PH,t
=
s∏
l=1
piH,t+l (B.54)
109
Appendix B Appendix to chapter 2
Let deﬁne
Xt,s =
s∏
l=1
(piH)
(1−ip) (piH,t+l−1)
ip
s∏
l=1
piH,t+l
(B.55)
Plugging (B.54) into (B.53) and using the deﬁnition in (B.55) yields:
Et
∑∞
s=0 (ζp)
s Ξt,t+s
s∏
l=1
piH,t+l (Xt,s)
− 1+λf
λf ×
[
(1 + λf ) M¯Ct+s − P relH,tXt,s
]{(
PH,t+s
PCPI,t+s
)−σ [ (1− (1− n)ω)Mt+s
+ (1− n)ωQσt+sMFt+s
]
+Gt+s
} 
= 0 (B.56)
The price evolution (2.16) in term of relative price can be rewritten as:
1 = (1− ζp)
(
P relH,t
)− 1
λf + ζp
(
pi
ιp
H,t−1pi
(1−ιp)
H
piH,t
)− 1
λf
(B.57)
Equations (B.56) and (B.57) can be combined to obtain a canonical form
of the New-Keynesian Phillips curve.
Firms cost minimization problem yields the following demand for capital
and labour inputs:
Rkt = αMCt
Yt
Kt
(B.58)
Wt = MCt (1− α) Yt
Nt
(B.59)
Combining equations above yields the production input ratio:
Nt
Kt
=
1− α
α
Rkt
Wt
(B.60)
which correspond to equation (2.12) in the main text. The cost of inputs can
also be expressed in real term. In this case the previously equation become:
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Nt
Kt
=
1− α
α
R˜kt
W˜t
(B.61)
Substitute for Yt into (B.58) from production function (2.10) and using
input ratio (B.60) yields an expression for nominal marginal costs:
MCt =
W
(1−α)
t R
K α
t
X
(1−α)
t α
α (1− α)(1−α)
(B.62)
which is the expression (2.13) in the text.
Expressing marginal cost in terms of domestic price index gives:
M¯Ct =
1
αα (1− α)(1−α)
W˜
(1−α)
t R˜
K α
t
X
(1−α)
t
PCPI,t
PH,t
(B.63)
Term of trade
Using the law of one price the term of trade (2.26) can be rewritten as:
St = ξt
P FF,t
PH,t
(B.64)
B.2.3 The model equilibrium
The equilibrium of the model is made up of the equations (B.42), (B.43),
(B.44), (B.45), (B.46), (B.47), (B.48), (B.56), (B.57), (B.61), (B.63), (B.64),
(2.10), (2.11), (2.19), (2.27), (2.28), (2.29), (2.30), (2.32), (2.33), (2.34) and the
deﬁnition of eﬀective capital and CPI inﬂation. A set of analogous equations
for the foreign economy completes the equilibrium deﬁnition.
B.2.4 Log-linearization
Let lower-case variables with ̂ denoting variables in log-deviation from steady
states and where appropriate expressed in real term. The relevant steady
state can be obtained using the same approach described in section A.2.3.
Furthermore, under the assumption that country H and country F share the
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same preferences, technology and market structure and diﬀers only by their
relative size, steady state values are the same for both countries.
The complete set of equations describing the model are:
λ̂It = Et
[
λ̂It+1
]
+ (rˆt − Et [pˆiCPI,t+1]) (B.65)
(1− hβ) (1− h) λ̂It = −
(
1 + h2β
)
ĉt + hĉt−1 + hβEt [ĉt+1] (B.66)
S
′′
(1) (1 + β) ît = S
′′
(1) ît−1 + βS
′′
(1)Et
[̂
it+1
]
+
(
λ̂Kt − λ̂It
)
(B.67)
λ̂Kt −λ̂It = β (1− δ)Et
[
λ̂Kt+1 − λ̂It+1
]
+(1− β (1− δ))Et
[
r̂kt+1
]−(rˆt − Et [pˆiCPI,t+1])
(B.68)
Rkr̂kt = a
′′
(u) ût (B.69)
ŵrelt = ζwβ
{
Et [ŵt+1]− ŵt + Et
[
ŵrelt+1
]− iwpiCPI,t + Et [piCPI,t+1]}
+
λw (1− ζwβ)
λw + (1 + λw)ϕ
{
ϕn̂t − ŵt − λ̂It
}
(B.70)
ŵt = ŵt−1 − piCPI,t + iwpiCPI,t−1 + (1− ζw)
ζw
ŵrelt (B.71)
piH,t =
β
1 + ιpβ
Et [piH,t+1] +
ιp
1 + ιpβ
piH,t−1 +
(1− ζpβ) (1− ζp)
ζp (1 + ιpβ)
mct (B.72)
r̂kt + k̂t = n̂t + ŵt (B.73)
m̂ct = (1− α) (ŵt − x̂t) + αr̂kt + (1− n)ωŝt (B.74)
ŝt − ŝt−1 =
(
piFF,t − pˆiH,t + êt − êt−1
)
(B.75)
ŷt = (1− α) (x̂t + n̂t) + αk̂t (B.76)
x̂t = ρxx̂t−1 + µnn̂t−1 (B.77)
k̂t = (1− δ) k̂t−1 + δ̂it (B.78)
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q̂t = (1− ω) ŝt (B.79)
n̂xt = (1− n)ω
[
CF
Y F
ĉFt +
IF
Y F
îFt + a
′ (uF ) KF
Y F
ûFt
]
− (1− n)ω
[
C
Y
ĉt +
I
Y
ît + a
′ (u)
K
Y
ût
]
+
(
C
Y
+
I
Y
)
(1− n)ω (σ (2− ω)− 1) ŝt (B.80)
r̂t = ρrr̂t−1 + (1− ρr)
[
φpipiCPI,t + φgdp
(
ĝdpt − ĝdpt−1
)]
(B.81)
ĝdpt = (1− (1− n)ω)
[
C
Y
ĉt +
I
Y
ît
]
+σ (1− n)ω
(
CF
Y F
+
IF
Y F
)
(2− ω) ŝt
+ (1− n)ω
[
CF
Y F
ĉFt +
IF
Y F
îFt
]
+
G
Y
ĝt (B.82)
ĝt = ρgĝt−1 + ε
g
t (B.83)
ŷt = (1− (1− n)ω)
[
C
Y
ĉt +
I
Y
ît + a
′ (u)
K
Y
ût
]
+σ (1− n)ω
(
C
F
Y F
+
IF
Y F
)
(2− ω) ŝt
+ (1− n)ω
[
CF
Y F
ĉFt +
IF
Y F
îFt + a
′ (uF ) KF
Y F
ûFt
]
+
G
Y
ĝt (B.84)
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q̂t = −λ̂t + λ̂Ft (B.85)
piCPI,t = pˆiH,t + (1− n)ω (ŝt − ŝt−1) (B.86)
k̂t = ût + k̂t−1 (B.87)
For the foreign economy the equilibrium conditions equivalent to (B.72),
(B.74), (B.82), (B.84), (B.86) are:
piFF,t =
β
1 + ιpβ
Et
[
piFF,t+1
]
+
ιp
1 + ιpβ
piFF,t−1 +
(1− ζpβ) (1− ζp)
ζp (1 + ιpβ)
m̂cFt (B.88)
m̂cFt = (1− α)
(
ŵFt − x̂Ft
)
+ αr̂k,Ft − nωŝt (B.89)
ĝdpFt = (1− nω)
(
CF
Y F
ĉFt +
IF
Y F
îFt
)
+ +
GF
Y F
gFt
−σnω
(
C
Y
+
I
Y
)
(2− ω) ŝt + nω
(
C
Y
ĉt +
I
Y
ît
)
(B.90)
yFt = (1− nω)
(
CF
Y F
ĉFt +
IF
Y F
îFt + a
′ (uF ) KF
Y F
uFt
)
−σnω
(
C
Y
+
I
Y
)
(2− ω) ŝt
+nω
(
C
Y
ĉt +
I
Y
ît + a
′ (u)
K
Y
ut
)
+
GF
Y F
gFt (B.91)
piFCPI,t = pi
F
CPI,t − nω (ŝt − ŝt−1) (B.92)
The equilibrium condition for the foreign economy is completed by a set of
equations that, apart from including foreign variables, are identical to equa-
tions (B.65), (B.66), (B.67), (B.68), (B.69), (B.70), (B.71), (B.73), (B.76),
(B.77), (B.78), (B.81), (B.83) and (B.87).
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B.3 Sensitivity analysis
In this section I illustrate the eﬀect of a government spending on consumption
and real exchange rate for diﬀerent degree of openness. Ilzetzki (2013) ﬁnds
that ﬁscal multipliers are smaller in open economies than in closed economy.
Figure B.1 plots the impulses responses to a government spending shock nor-
malized to 1% of GDP for diﬀerent levels of the domestic country's size n while
keeping all the remaining parameters at their baseline values. In particular I
compare the baseline case (n = 0.20) with two extreme cases. On one side
the closed economy model (n = 1) and on the other side the small open eco-
nomy model (n = 0). The ﬁgure shows that the response of consumption and
GDP is larger for the closed economy respect to the baseline model, which in
turn delivers an higher increase in consumption and GDP than the small open
economy. These results manly depend on the behaviour of inﬂation. In fact,
the CPI inﬂation is a weighted average of domestic and imported inﬂation.
It is worth to note that the increase in consumption in the foreign economy
(not plotted here) derives from the fall in the level of prices of domestically
produced goods. The reduction in domestic inﬂation, occurring through the
LBD mechanism, reduces the CPI inﬂation for the foreign economy, and by
the real interest rate channel, increases foreign consumption. However, since
government spending is allocated only to domestically produced goods, the
increase in aggregate demand and consequently in hours worked is smaller
than the increase in the domestic economy. Thus, for the foreign economy the
increase in TFP is smaller and hence there is a lower reduction in the expec-
ted path of foreign inﬂation. This results in a smaller reduction in the CPI
inﬂation for the domestic economy in the baseline case respect to the closed
economy alternative. Furthermore, the deterioration of the trade balance im-
plies that a fraction of the increase in domestic consumption involve foreign
goods, reducing therefore the increase in the domestic GDP.
In the small open economy version, the domestic economy has no impact
on the foreign economy variables. The foreign level of productivity and the
level of imported inﬂation is unchanged. In addition, there is no increase in the
demand of domestically produced goods by the foreign economy. Therefore,
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the small open economy records a smaller increase in hours worked and in
the level of productivity. This results in a weaker decline in the level of real
interest rate and a smaller increase in consumption and GDP.
B.4 Incomplete market
The model proposed in the chapter 2 is based on the assumption of complete
market and availability of an internationally traded asset. In this section I
analyse the eﬀect of departing from this assumption by considering the eﬀects
of incomplete markets on the international risk sharing condition. In particular
I consider the impact of introducing ﬁnancial frictions that restrict the set of
assets that can be internationally traded.1
As discussed in Chari et al. (2002) the presence of incomplete market does
not suﬃce per se to eliminate the correlation between consumption and RER.
In what follows I present a simple framework to illustrate the main intu-
ition behind this result. I consider the asset market structure proposed in
Benigno and Thoenissen (2008). Households in the Home country can trade
two nominal risk-less bonds denominated in domestic and foreign currency. To
simplify the analysis, households in the Foreign country can trade only in bond
issued in their country. Households in the Home country are required to pay a
transaction cost for holding foreign bonds. The cost is introduced to eliminate
the problem of unit root in foreign bond holding. Considering the simpliﬁed
economy presented in section 2.5.1 the budget constraint for the Home country
household becomes:
PCPI,t+sCt+s (i) +B
H
t+s (i) +
ξt+sB
F
t+s (j)
Θ
(
ξtBFt+s
PCPI,t+s
) ≤ Rt+s−1BHt+s−1 (i)
RFt+s−1ξt+sB
F
t+s−1 (i) +Wt+s (i)Nt+s (i) + Πt+s − Tt+s (i) (B.93)
where BHt+s (i) and B
F
t+s (j) denote domestic and foreign bonds hold by agent
1Another source of imperfect risk sharing has been already discussed in the literature
review in the chapter 2 when I comment the households heterogeneity considered in Erceg
et al. (2005).
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j; Θ (·) is a cost function that depends on the net foreign asset position of the
Home country economy.
Combining ﬁrst order conditions for the domestic and the foreign economy
and using the deﬁnition of the RER yields the following international risk
sharing condition:
EtUc,t+1
Uc,t
=
EtUFc,t+1
UFc,t
1
Θ
(
ξtBFt
PCPI,t
) Qt
EtQt+1
(B.94)
The equation above is the equivalent to (2.34) in the main text for the case
of incomplete market. Equation (B.94) states an important and well known
result: with incomplete markets relative consumption and RER are correlated
only in expectation and not period-by-period ex-post as when market are com-
plete. Furthermore, the assumption about ﬁnancial market structure adds a
new element given by the transaction cost function Θ (·).2
Thus, while with complete markets any change in the relative level of con-
sumption must be compensated by a period-by-period change in the RER,
when markets are incomplete, risk sharing is imperfect, hence the RER does
not have to change as much as in the case with complete markets. Furthermore,
transferring purchasing power from Home to Foreign through the RER chan-
nel requires a change in the net foreign assets position of the Home economy.3
Log-linearizing and integrating forward equation (B.94), using the result in
(1.26) and an equivalent equation for the foreign economy yields:
qˆt = −Et
∞∑
s=0
[
(r̂t+s − EtpiCPI,t+1+s)−
(
r̂Ft+s − EtpiFCPI,t+1+s
)
+ ε̂bt+s
]
(B.95)
2Following Benigno and Thoenissen (2008), the cost function is introduced to elim-
inate the otherwise arising unit root in foreign bond holdings and solve the model by log-
linearization but is not a crucial assumption to examine the correlation between consumption
and RER. Chari et al. (2002) do not consider the transaction cost and in the risk sharing
condition equivalent to (B.94) the term Θ (·) disappears.
3It is also possible to show that the change in the net foreign asset position is equal,
after considering the transaction cost, to trade balance. The intuition for this result is that
an improvement (deterioration) in the trade balance must lead to a corresponding increase
(decrease) in the net asset position.
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where ε = −Θ′ (b)Y and b̂t = Y −1
(
b̂Ft + êt
)
is the net foreign asset position
measured in real term and expressed as percent of domestic output.
If the parameter ε is suﬃciently small, also with incomplete markets, the
RER dynamics is still determined by the relative behaviour of real interest
rates as in the case of complete market. Benigno and Thoenissen (2008) set
ε = 0.001 in order to generate a 10 basis point spread (per annum) of the
domestic interest rate on foreign assets over the foreign rate.
In conclusion, introducing incomplete markets do not have large implica-
tions for the model presented in chapter 2.
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CHAPTER 3
What are the eﬀects of government spending
on house prices?
3.1 Introduction
The collapse in the housing market has played a major role in the 2008 crisis
(see, for example, Mian and Suﬁ (2010) and Hall (2011)).
The recent DSGE literature has investigated the eﬀects of ﬂuctuations in
residential investments and house prices on business cycles by introducing
credit-constrained agents that can use housing wealth (or land) as a collateral.
The main motivation that justiﬁes this extension is the growing consensus
about the fact that housing wealth could play an important role in accounting
for macroeconomics ﬂuctuations.1
These evidences have forced researchers and policy-makers to explore their
potential implications for policy analysis. Most of this literature - reviewed
below - has focused on the consequences of the presence of credit constraints on
the monetary policy transmission mechanism. By contrast, ﬁscal policy has
received considerable less attention even though, with the nominal interest
rate stuck at the zero lower bound in the aftermath of the Great Recession, re-
searchers have reassessed the eﬀectiveness of ﬁscal policy as a tool to stimulate
a troubled economy (Christiano et al. (2011)).
Indeed, the interaction between government spending and house prices
1See, e.g., Leamer (2007), Iacoviello (2010), Favilukis et al. (2010) and Carroll et al.
(2011).
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could have relevant implications. To the extent that an increase in government
spending boosts house prices, there is an additional propagation mechanism
for government expenditure shocks operating through the collateral channel.
Despite its potential relevance, very few papers have examined this mech-
anism. Afonso and Sousa (2012) provide empirical evidence that a government
spending shock yields an increase in consumption and real house prices. Khan
and Reza (2014) show that standard DSGE models with housing and collateral-
ized borrowing fail to replicate these stylized facts and only an accommodative
monetary policy allows the model to generate a, short lived, increase in house
price.
This chapter shows that a modiﬁed version of the standard DSGE models
with housing and collateralized borrowing is capable of generating a positive
response of house prices to a government spending shock. The crucial dif-
ference is the assumption that current labour supply aﬀects workers' labour
productivity, according to the learning by doing (LBD) mechanism proposed
in Chang et al. (2002) and discussed in chapter 1. Following Altig, Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Lindé (2011), the model is estimated by matching the DSGE
impulse responses with the impulse responses of a VAR model estimated us-
ing quarterly data for the U.S. over the period 1969:I to 2006:IV. In contrast
with the case without LBD, the model generates a persistent increase in house
prices in response to a government spending shock, in line with the empirical
evidence. The collateral channel ampliﬁes the positive eﬀect on consumption,
whereas the impact on the remaining variables is negligible.
The chapter is related to a growing literature highlighting the importance
of collateral constraints. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) is one of the ﬁrst work
to study the interaction between housing wealth and business cycles within
the framework of a stochastic general equilibrium model. They show that the
presence of credit constraint agents ampliﬁes the eﬀects of technology and in-
come distribution shocks. Davis and Heathcote (2005) develop a model that is
able to reproduce the higher volatility of residential investments respect to non
residential investments and consumption. Iacoviello (2005) analyses the eﬀect
of house prices shocks on consumption when agents faces credit constraints.
He shows that if the fraction of credit constraint agents is suﬃciently large
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an increase in house price can generate an increase in consumption. Iacovi-
ello and Neri (2010) extend the model by introducing the housing production
sector. Liu et al. (2011) assume that ﬁrms, instead of consumers, are credit
constrained and their collateralizable wealth is made up of land and business
capital. They ﬁnd that land price and business investment move together
and that they jointly amplify macroeconomic ﬂuctuations. Calza et al. (2013)
study the eﬀects of the structure of housing ﬁnancing on the monetary policy
transmission.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents
the model; section 3.3 illustrates the key mechanisms determining real house
prices and how these are aﬀected by the LBD; section 3.4 describes the VAR
identiﬁcation strategy employed and the approach used to estimate the DSGE
model; section 3.5 presents the main results and discuss alternative model
speciﬁcations; section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 The model
The model is based on Iacoviello and Neri (2010). On the demand side there
are two types of households, Patient (or savers) and Impatient (or borrowers),
characterized by diﬀerent discount rates. There is a continuum of measure 1
of agents in each of the two groups. The size of each type of households is
measured by its wage share.
Both households consume, work, and accumulate housing. Patient house-
holds own physical capital, choose the level of investment and the capital
utilization rate, hold government bonds and participate to ﬁrms proﬁts. Im-
perfect contract enforcement implies that the Impatient's borrowing capacity
is constrained by the value of the collateral asset, consisting of the housing
stock. Because of their high impatience their net worth consists only of their
collateral asset.
On the supply side there are two sectors. In the non housing sector a
monopolistic competitive ﬁrm use labour and capital to produce goods that
can be used for both consumption and investment.
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In the housing sector a competitive ﬁrm combines capital, labour and land
to produce new houses.
Following Iacoviello and Neri (2010), I assume prices are sticky in the non-
housing sector, whereas in the housing sector prices are ﬂexible. I assume wage
frictions in both sectors.
3.2.1 Households
Patient households
Let the P superscript denote variables referring to patient households, the
representative patient households maximizes:
U(CP , NP , HP ) = Et
∞∑
s=0
(βp)s
{
ln
(
CPt+s − hCPt−1+s
)
+ j lnHPt+s
− ψP
1+ϕ
[(
NPc,t+s
)1+ϕ
+
(
NPh,t+s
)1+ϕ]
}
(3.1)
where CPt is consumption, H
P
t is the housing stock and N
p
c,t and N
p
h,t is labour
supply respectively in the non-housing and housing sector. I assume that hours
in the two sectors are perfect substitutes; ϕ denotes the inverse of the Frisch
elasticity of labour supply; ψP is a constant determining the steady state level
of labour supply; j is the weight of housing stock into the utility function. βp
is the subjective discount rate of patient households; h denote the degree of
habit in consumption.2
The representative patient household maximizes the utility function subject
to the ﬂow of fund constraint:
2I assume that the degree of habit in consumption, the weight of housing stock into the
utility function and the Frisch elasticity of labour supply are the same for the two groups of
households.
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CPt + Ic,t + Ih,t + qt
[
HPt − (1− δh)HPt−1
]−BPt +Dt
+pl,tLt ≤ −Rt−1B
P
t−1
pit
+
Rt−1Dt−1
pit
+
W Pc,t
Pt
NPc,t
+
W Ph,t
Pt
NPh,t +
[
Rkc,t
Pt
uc,t − a (uc,t)
]
Kc,t−1
+
[
Rkh,t
Pt
uh,t − a (uh,t)
]
K
P
h,t−1 +
(
pl,t +
Rl,t
Pt
)
Lt−1 − T Pt + Ft (3.2)
Patient households choose consumption CPt , investment in physical capital in
the non-housing sector Ic,t and in the housing sector Ih,t; qt is relative price
of houses (expressed in term of consumption units); households decide the
current amount of the housing stock HPt given the level of the undepreciated
housing stock from the previous period (1− δh)HPt−1, where δh denotes the
depreciation rate of the housing stock. Loans to impatient households BPt pay
one unit of consumption goods in any state of nature in period t + 1. Thus,
the risk-less yield on one unit of loan is determined by the nominal interest
rate Rt and inﬂation pit =
Pt
Pt−1
; Dt is the amount of government debt held by
patient households. I assume that the real gross return on government debt
is the same as the return on loans to impatient households; Lt denotes land
and pl,t and Rl,t are its relative price and its nominal rental rate. I assume
that total land is ﬁxed and is owned only by patient households. W Pc,t andW
P
h,t
are nominal wages earned by the representative patient household in the two
production sectors. Patient households rent capital uc,tKc,t−1 and uh,tKh,t−1
to ﬁrms. Similarly to Smets and Wouters (2003), given the chosen level of
capital utilization uc,t and uh,t, patient households receive the nominal rental
rates of capital Rkc,t and R
k
h,t and pay the adjustment utilization cost a (uc,t)
and a (uh,t) expressed in term of consumption goods. The cost function a (•) is
an increasing function and has the property that in steady state uc = uh = 1,
a (1) = 0 and a′′ (1) > 0; Ft are dividends from intermediate ﬁrms paid to
patient households. T Pt is a non distortionary tax levied on patient agents.
3
3Since by assumption only patient agents hold government bond, capital and land, make
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Following Christiano et al. (2005), the capital accumulation process for the
non-housing and housing sector is described by:
Kc,t = (1− δkc)Kc,t−1 +
[
1− S
(
Ic,t
Ic,t−1
)]
Ic,t (3.3)
Kh,t = (1− δkh)Kh,t−1 +
[
1− S
(
Ih,t
Ih,t−1
)]
Ih,t (3.4)
where S (·) denotes the investment adjustment costs, with S (1) = S (1)′ = 0
and S (1)′′ > 0. δkc and δkh are the depreciation rates of capital in each sector.
Impatient households
Let the ”I” superscript denote variables referring to impatient households.
Assuming that impatient households have the same utility function as patient
households, the representative impatient agent maximizes:
U(CI , N I , HI) = Et
∞∑
s=0
(
βI
)s{ ln (CIt+s − hCIt−1+s)+ j lnHIt+s
− ψI
1+ϕ
[(
N Ic,t+s
)1+ϕ
+
(
N Ih,t+s
)1+ϕ]
}
(3.5)
where βI is the subjective discount factor of patient households, and by as-
sumption βI < βP .
Following Iacoviello and Neri (2010), Impatient households do not own
neither physical capital nor land. Furthermore I assume that they do not
participate to ﬁrms proﬁts and do not hold government debt. Hence their
budget constraint is:
CIt −BIt + qt
[
HIt − (1− δh)HIt−1
]
= −Rt−1B
I
t−1
pit
+
W Ic,t
Pt
N Ic,t +
W Ih,t
Pt
N Ih,t − T It (3.6)
investment decisions and receive proﬁts from ﬁrms, I drop the ”P” superscript for these
variables.
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Impatient households also faces the credit constraint:
BIt ≤ mEt
(
qt+1H
I
t pit+1
Rt
)
(3.7)
where m is the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio. Thus, the amount impatient house-
holds can borrow is limited by the fraction m of housing wealth qtH
I
t which
serves as a collateral asset.
3.2.2 Labour contractors and wage setting
Within the two groups, Patient and Impatient, each agent supply heterogen-
eous labour services i ∈ (0, 1) to a labour contractor. Each household acts as a
monopolistic suppliers of labour service of type i. There are four diﬀerent cat-
egories of labour services grouped by sector and households: NPc,t (i), N
P
h,t (i) ,
N Ic,t (i) and N
I
h,t (i). There is one contractor for each type of labour service.
Labour contractors are perfect competitive ﬁrms. They aggregate the diﬀeren-
tiated labour services into an homogeneous labour service hired by producers
in the housing and non housing sectors. For each production sector l = {c, h}
and for each type of households d = {P, I} the aggregation function is deﬁned
by:
Ndl,t =
[ 1
0
Ndl,t (i)
1
1+λw di
]1+λw
(3.8)
where λw > 0 governs the degree of substitution between the diﬀerent labour
services and determines the wage mark-up over the marginal rate of substitu-
tion between labour and consumption. I assume that the wage mark-up is the
same across households and sectors.
Labour contractors choose diﬀerentiated labour service inputs to maximize
proﬁts. The ﬁrst order condition for proﬁt maximization yields the following
labour demand for i-type labour service:
Ndl,t (i) =
(
W dl,t (i)
W dl,t
)− 1+λw
λw
Ndl,t (3.9)
126
Chapter 3 What are the eﬀects of government spending on house prices?
Households face Calvo-style wage setting frictions. In each period the frac-
tion ζl,w of households are unable to readjust their wage. In this case house-
holds set their wage according to:
W dl,t (i) = (pit−1)
ιw,l (pi)1−ιw,lW dl,t−1 (i) (3.10)
where variables without time subscript denote steady state levels. I assume
that within each sector Patient and Impatient share the same probability of
changing wages. Those households able to re-optimize their wage solve:
max
W d,newl,t
Et
∞∑
s=0
(
ζl,wβ
d
)s{−ψd (Ndl,t+s(i))1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
}
(3.11)
subject to the relevant budget constraint, to labour demand (3.9) and to wage
indexation scheme:
W dl,t+s (i) =
s∏
g=1
(pi)(1−iw,l) (pit+g−1)
iw,lW d,newl,t (i) (3.12)
Considering a symmetric equilibrium in which all households able to set a
new wage chose the same level, the following law of motion for wages can be
derived:
W dl,t =
{
(1− ζl,w)
(
W d,newl,t
)− 1
λw
+ ζl,w
[
(pi)(1−iw,l) (pit−1)
iw,lW dl,t−1
]− 1
λw
}−λw
(3.13)
3.2.3 Firms
Non-housing sector
The ﬁnal good producer in the non housing sector is a perfect competitive ﬁrm
that aggregates a continuum of intermediate goods Y (j) to obtain the ﬁnal
good Yt using the following aggregation technology:
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Yt =
[ 1
0
Yt (j)
1
1+λf dj
]1+λf
(3.14)
where λf is a ﬁxed parameter which depends on the degree of substitution
between the diﬀerent intermediate goods and regulates the price mark-up. Let
Pt (j) be the price of the intermediate good j, proﬁt maximization leads to the
following ﬁrst-order condition:
Yt (j) =
(
Pt (j)
Pt
)− 1+λf
λf
Yt (3.15)
Combing equation above with the zero proﬁt condition yields the following
deﬁnition of the aggregate price level:
Pt =
[ 1
0
Pt (j)
− 1
λf dj
]−λf
(3.16)
The monopolistic intermediate ﬁrm j ∈ (0, 1) in the non-housing sector
produces the good j according to the following production function:
Yt (j) = At
((
XPc,tN
P
c,t (j)
)γ (
XIc,tN
I
c,t (j)
)(1−γ))1−αc
Kαcc,t (j) (3.17)
where αc denotes the capital share; γ measures the relative size of patient
households in term of labour income share; Kc,t = uc,tKc,t−1 is the eﬀective
capital; At is a productivity shock that aﬀects the non housing sector and
evolves according to:
lnAt = (1− ρa) lnA+ ρa lnAt−1 + εat (3.18)
where εat ∼ (0, σ2a) .
Following Chang et al. (2002), XPc,t and X
I
c,t are the skills level of labour
suppliers in the non housing sector. The stock of knowledge depends on hours
worked in the past and evolves according to :
XPc,t =
(
XPc,t−1
)ρx (
NPc,t−1
)µn
(3.19)
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XIc,t =
(
XIc,t−1
)ρx (
N Ic,t−1
)µn
(3.20)
where 0 < ρx < 1 and µn ≥ 0.
Nominal wages W Pc,t and W
I
c,t and the rental rate of capital R
K
c,t are given
for intermediate goods producers. Let MCt denoting nominal marginal costs,
the following demand for labour and capital inputs can be derived from cost
minimization:
W Pc,t = γ (1− αc)MCt
Yt (j)
NPc,t (j)
(3.21)
W Ic,t = (1− γ) (1− αc)MCt
Yt (j)
N Ic,t (j)
(3.22)
Rkc,t = αcMCt
Yt (j)
Kc,t (j)
(3.23)
Following Calvo (1983) I assume that in every period a fraction of ﬁrm ζp
cannot re-optimize their prices Pt (j). In this case ﬁrms adjust their prices
mechanically according to the rule:
Pt (j) = (pit−1)
ιp (pi)1−ιp (3.24)
The fraction (1− ζp) of ﬁrms able to re-optimize their price chose the new
price to solve:
max
Pt(j)
new
Et

∞∑
s=0
(
ζpβ
P
)s
ΞPt+sYt+s (j)×(
P (j)new
(
s∏
g=1
(pi,t−1+g)
ιp (pi)1−ιp
)
−MCt+s
)
 (3.25)
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subject to demand of the j-type good:
Yt+s (j) =

P (j)new
(
s∏
g=1
(pit−1+g)
ιp (pi)1−ιp
)
Pt+s

− 1+λf
λf
Yt+s (3.26)
where, given the assumption that only one group of households gets proﬁt
from owing ﬁrms, the term
(
βP
)s
Ξpt+s is the today value of a future dollar for
patient households.
Finally, considering only a symmetric equilibrium where all ﬁrms choose
the same price, the law of motion for the aggregate price level is:
Pt =
[
(1− ζp) (P newt )
− 1
λf + ζp
(
(pit−1)
ιp (pi)1−ιp Pt−1
)− 1
λf
]λf
(3.27)
Housing production sector
New houses are produced by a perfect competitive ﬁrm combining labour, cap-
ital and land. The representative ﬁrm in the housing sector faces the following
production technology:
IHt =
[(
XPh,tN
P
h,t
)γ (
XIh,tN
I
h,t
)(1−γ)](1−αh−αl)
Kαhh,tL
αl
t (3.28)
where αh and αl denote capital and land shares; Kh,t = uh,tKh,t−1 is the
eﬀective capital in the housing sector; XPh,t and X
I
h,t is the stock of knowledge
of patient and impatient households in the housing sector and evolves according
to:
XPh,t =
(
XPh,t−1
)ρx (
NPh,t−1
)µn
(3.29)
XIh,t =
(
XIh,t−1
)ρx (
N Ih,t−1
)µn
(3.30)
Recalling that by assumption prices in this sector are ﬂexible the proﬁt
maximization problem yields the following demand for inputs (after land is
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normalized to one):
W Ph,t
Pt
= γ (1− αh − αl) qt IHt
NPh,t
(3.31)
W Ih,t
Pt
= (1− γ) (1− αh − αl) qt IHt
N Ih,t
(3.32)
Rkh,t
Pt
= αhqt
IHt
Kh,t
(3.33)
Rlt
Pt
= αlqtIHt (3.34)
3.2.4 Government policies
As in Iacoviello and Neri (2010), the central bank sets the nominal interest
rate Rt according to a Taylor rule that responds to inﬂation and GDP growth:
Rt
R
=
(
Rt−1
R
)ρr [(pit
pi
)φpi (( GDPt
GDPt−1
)φgdp)](1−ρr)
exp(εrt ) (3.35)
where variables without time subscript denote steady state values; εrt is an
independently and identically distributed monetary shock with standard devi-
ation σr; GDPt is deﬁned as:
GDPt = C
P
t + C
I
t + Ic,t + Ih,t + qIHt +Gt (3.36)
Government spending evolves according to the following exogenous process:
logGt = (1− ρg) logG+ ρglogGt−1 + εgt (3.37)
with εgt ∼
(
0, σ2g
)
.
The government budget constraint is of the form:
Gt +
RtDt−1
Πt
= Dt + Tt (3.38)
where Dt and Tt are respectively total government debt and lump-sum taxes
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aggregated across all households.
Finally, following Leeper, Plante and Traum (2010) ﬁscal policy rule, ex-
pressed in log-linearized form, is:
t̂t = Ψgdpĝdpt + Ψdd̂t−1 (3.39)
where lower case letters with '̂' denote variables expressed in deviation from
steady states. Ψgdp captures the automatic stabilizer component of taxes and
Ψd is the parameter regulating the speed of debt stabilization.
3.2.5 Market clearing and aggregate variables
Assuming that government spending is allocated only to non-housing sector,
market clearing condition in the non-housing sector is:
Yt = C
P
t + C
I
t + Ic,t + Ih,t + a (uc,t)Kc,t−1 + a (uh,t)Kh,t−1 +Gt (3.40)
Whereas, the housing sector equilibrium is:
IHt = H
P
t +H
I
t − (1− δh)
(
HPt−1 +H
I
t−1
)
(3.41)
Let variables without superscript denote aggregate levels, consumption and
investment are given by:
Ct = C
P
t + C
I
t (3.42)
It = Ic,t + Ih,t (3.43)
The aggregate level of wages and hours worked in the two sectors are:
Wh,t = W
P
h,t +W
I
h,t (3.44)
Wc,t = W
P
c,t +W
I
c,t (3.45)
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Nh,t = γN
P
h,t + (1− γ)N Ih,t (3.46)
Nc,t = γN
P
c,t + (1− γ)N Ic,t (3.47)
Whereas, the aggregate level of wages and hours worked in all sectors are:
Wt = Wh,t +Wc,t (3.48)
Nt = Nh,t +Nc,t (3.49)
Finally, assuming that each household pays the same per capita amount of
taxes yields:
T Pt = γTt T
I
t = (1− γ)Tt (3.50)
3.3 The LBDmechanism and the collateral chan-
nel
Before turning to model estimation, in this section I illustrate the mechanisms
through which introducing LBD can bring the response of real house prices
to a government spending shock closer in line with the data. In what follows,
`̂' denotes variables expressed in log-deviation from steady state. In order to
simplify the analysis I assume in this section no habit in consumption (h = 0).
Let denote with λ̂Bt the Lagrangian multiplier associated to the borrowing
constraint in (3.7), the Euler equation for impatient household is:
ĉIt =
βI
βP
EtĉIt+1 −
βI
βP
(r̂t − Et [pit+1])−
(
1− β
I
βP
)
λ̂Bt (3.51)
The last term on the RHS reﬂects the collateral eﬀect and measures the
consequence of the level of borrowing on the current level of consumption.
133
Chapter 3 What are the eﬀects of government spending on house prices?
Integrating forward equations (3.51) yields:
ĉIt = −
βI
βP
Et
∞∑
s=0
(
βI
βP
)s
(r̂t+s − pit+s+1)−
(
1− β
I
βP
) ∞∑
s=0
(
βI
βP
)s
Et
[
λ̂Bt+s
]
(3.52)
Equation (3.52) shows the mechanism through which the collateral channel
aﬀects consumption. As for patient households, the level of consumption for
impatient households depends on the sum of period by period real interest
rate, as well as the amount they can borrow, as indicated by the second term
on the RHS in the equation above. Given the inverse relationship between
the level of borrowing and its shadow value represented by λ̂Bt , an increase in
the level of borrowing leads to a reduction in its shadow value and hence an
increase in consumption. The borrowing constrain (3.7) immediately reveals
that the amount impatient household can borrow is a function of the expected
level of house prices.
To understand the eﬀect of including LBD on the relative house prices
consider that housing demand for patient households can be written as:
q̂t =
(
1− βP (1− δh)
) (
ĉPt − ĥPt
)
+ β (1− δh)Et [q̂t+1 − (r̂t − pit+1)] (3.53)
Equation above states that the cost of purchasing one unit of housing ex-
pressed in term of consumption good (i.e. the relative price of housing) must
be equal to its marginal beneﬁt. The latter value is made up of two elements.
First, the eﬀect of housing on the households utility, measured by the mar-
ginal rate of substitution between consumption and housing (ﬁrst term on the
RHS). Second, housing can be used as an asset to smooth consumption over
time, as alternative to lending. The second term on the RHS states that the
desired level of housing stock for the patient households depends on the diﬀer-
ence between the discounted resale value of the undepreciated housing stock
and the return on loans to impatient households (or to government).
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Similarly, the demand for housing by impatient households is given by:
q̂t =
[
1− βI (1− δh)−m
(
βP − βI)] (ĉIt − ĥIt)
+
[
βI (1− δh) +m
(
βP − βI)]Et [q̂t+1 − (r̂t − pit+1)]
+
(
βP − βI) [m− (1− δh)](λ̂Bt + ĉIt) (3.54)
Relative to equation (3.53), the demand for housing by impatient households
has an additional term which express the value of housing as collateral asset
for borrowing expressed in term of consumption good.
By integrating forward equation (3.53) yields:
q̂t =
(
1− βP (1− δh)
)
Et
∞∑
s=0
(
βP (1− δh)
)s (
ĉPt+s − ĥPt+s
)
−βP (1− δh)Et
∞∑
s=0
(
βP (1− δh)
)s
(r̂t+s − pit+1+s) (3.55)
Whereas by integrating equation (3.54) gives
q̂t =
[
1− βI (1− δh)−m
(
βP − βI)]Et ∞∑
s=0
Ξs
(
ĉIt+s − ĥIt+s
)
− [βI (1− δh) +m (βP − βI)]Et ∞∑
s=0
Ξs (r̂t+s − pit+1+s)
+
(
βP − βI) {m− (1− δh)}Et ∞∑
s=0
Ξs
(
λ̂Bt+s + ĉ
I
t+s
)
(3.56)
where Ξ ≡ [βI (1− δh) +m (βP − βI)]
Thus, the relative house price depends on the sum of marginal rate of sub-
stitution between consumption and housing, and (negatively) on the sum of
real interest rate and the value of housing as collateral for impatient house-
holds. Therefore, the same mechanism highlighted in the ﬁrst chapter, by
reducing the real interest rate, increases the relative price of housing. In ad-
dition, the LBD mechanism has an indirect impact on the relative price of
house through two additional channels. First, by equation (3.52) the decrease
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of the real interest rate increases consumption and, through the eﬀect on the
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and housing, strengthens
the positive eﬀect on the relative price of houses.
Second, the increase in house price incentives impatient households to in-
crease their level of housing in order to increment the amount they can borrow.
The increased demand for housing further increases house prices. This last ef-
fect is absent if there is no collateral channel.
3.4 Econometric methodology
The model is estimated using the econometric methodology described in the
chapter 1.
The structural VAR model is of the form:
AZt = c+
p∑
j=1
BjZt−j + εt (3.57)
where Zt is a vector of observable variables, p is the lag length and εt is a
vector of structural shocks. A and Bj are matrix of coeﬃcients. My VAR
model has 10 variables, which appear in this order: government spending,
GDP per hours, inﬂation, real houses price, GDP, government debt, private
consumption, wages, residential investment and nominal interest rate. Where
appropriate, variables are expressed in logs of real per capital terms. More
details about data are provided in the appendix to this chapter. Three shocks
are considered: a government spending, a monetary policy and a productivity
shock. The identiﬁcation strategy follows the approach used in chapter 1.
The VAR includes four lags, a constant and a linear time trend. The sample
runs from 1966:1 to 2006:4. The beginning of the sample is dictated by data
availability, in particularly with regard to the data on government debt, while
the end date falls before the 2008 recession.
The estimated parameters are chosen to minimize the distance between
the VAR-based impulse response functions of variables in the VAR to the
three shocks considered and the corresponding DSGE response functions in
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order to minimize the objective function in 1.38. The impact responses of the
DSGE model are restricted to account for the restrictions imposed by the VAR
estimation strategy.
I estimate the baseline model and two alternative models in which in turn
either LBD or the collateral channel is switched oﬀ (respectively setting µn =
ρx = 0 and γ = 1).
3.5 Results
In this section I brieﬂy discuss the model parameterization before turning to
the simulation.
3.5.1 Parameters set a priori
Table 3.1 reports the value of the parameters set outside the model.
For the households preference parameters I choose conventional values and I
set the inverse of the elasticity of labour supply ϕ equal to 3, a standard value
used in the literature. For the discount factors I use the values adopted in
Iacoviello and Neri (2010): the patient households discount factor βP is equal
to 0.9925 and corresponds to a steady state nominal interest rate around 3%
per year; the impatient households discount factor βI is equal to 0.97.
The housing stock depreciation rate δh is set to 0.008 a value in line with
Iacoviello and Neri (2010). The weights on housing in the utility function j is
set equal to 0.18. These values imply a residential investment to GDP ratio
equal to 4.7% and a value of housing wealth respect to GDP equal to 1.46.
The depreciation rates on capital δkc and δkh are set to 0.025 in both sectors.
The capital share αc and αh are both set to 0.30. Land share αl is assumed to
be 0.10 as in Iacoviello and Neri (2010). I ﬁx λw and λf equal to 0.05 implying
wage and price mark-ups equal to 5%. The implied business investment to
GDP ratio is about 21%. The LTV ratio m is set to 0.75, a value in line with
the average LTV ratio over the period considered.4 The government spending
to GDP ratio corresponds to its sample average of 0.20.
4For a discussion on this point see Iacoviello and Neri (2010).
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Finally, I set the wage indexation coeﬃcient for the housing sector to
ιw,h = 0, and the capital utilization adjustment cost to u
′′ = 0.01 because
when I tried to estimate these parameters my algorithm pushed those estim-
ates close to zero. Furthermore, I also opted to ﬁx the response of monetary
policy to inﬂation and the investment adjustment cost. I chose to ﬁx these
parameters because my estimation algorithm drove those parameters toward
implausible large values. Therefore I set φpi = 1.50, which is a quite standard
value employed in the literature and S ′′ (1) = 5.74 as in Smets and Wouters
(2007).
3.5.2 Estimated parameters
The value of the estimates and the corresponding standard errors for the
baseline model are listed in the ﬁrst column of tables 3.2 and 3.3. All es-
timates are statistically signiﬁcant and are consistent with previous studies.
The fraction of patient households γ is equal to 0.72. The value is in line with
the evidences reported in the previous literature.5
The parameters regulating the LBD mechanism µn and ρx are respectively
equal to 0.45 and 0.57. My estimate implies an higher initial impact and a
faster return to the steady state level respect to the estimates reported in
Chang et al. (2002).
The degree of wage stickiness for the non housing sector ζc,w is larger than
the corresponding value for the housing sector ζh,w and are respectively equal
to 0.60 and 0.46. These values implies that the average wage duration is 2.5
quarters in the non housing sector and 1.8 quarters in the housing sector. The
degree of stickiness in prices ζp is equal to 0.63 corresponding to an average
price duration of 2.7 quarters. These parameters are within the range of values
found in previous studies.6 The level of habit in consumption h is 0.61. The
estimates of the monetary and ﬁscal policy rules are in line with previous
5Jappelli (1990) using the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances found the fraction of
unconstrained household to be equal to 0.80; Iacoviello (2005), using an estimation strategy
similar to the approach employed in this paper estimates a fraction of patient households
equal to 0.65. In Iacoviello and Neri (2010) the parameter is equal to 0.79.
6See section 2.4
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evidence, as well as the shocks auto-regression coeﬃcients.
Regarding the two alternative speciﬁcations, the model without collateral
channel delivers estimates very similar to the values found for the baseline
model.
Instead, for the model without LBD the estimates diverges from the values
reported for the baseline model. The most notable diﬀerences are the degree
of price stickiness, much larger for the model without LBD, and the share of
patient households near to one. This value implies that the weight of credit
constrained agents in the economy is extremely small. The model virtually
collapses to the case where there is no collateral channel. Thus, it is diﬃcult
to isolate the eﬀects deriving from switching oﬀ the LBD channel from the
eﬀects derived as a result that the collateral channel is almost absent.
Table 3.4 reports steady state properties of the model evaluated at the
estimated parameters for the baseline model.
3.5.3 Impulse responses
I now consider the capacity of the DSGE model presented in section 3.2 to
replicate the VAR estimates of the dynamic response of the economy to the
three shocks considered.
Figures 3.1-3.3 compare the baseline DSGE (solid line) with the VAR-
based responses (dashed line). Light grey area denotes VAR 95% conﬁdence
interval. I consider a log-linearized approximation of the model around a de-
terministic steady state in which inﬂation is zero. The responses of interest
rates and inﬂation are measured as annualized percentage points deviation
from the corresponding steady state level. The remaining variables are ex-
pressed in quarterly percentage deviation from their own steady state levels.
Time on the x-axis is measured in quarters.
Overall, the model is pretty successful at reproducing the VAR responses
and in general delivers impulses response within the VAR conﬁdence intervals.
Figure 3.1 displays the response to a government spending shock equal to
one standard deviation innovation. The model is able to capture the main
features revealed in the data: the persistent increase in consumption, house
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prices and output to hours ratio. However, specially for the real house prices,
the response generated by the model is sensibly smaller than the corresponding
VAR point estimate.
Figure 3.2 shows the response to an around 50 basis point monetary policy
shock. It is worth highlighting that the model is able to capture the "price
puzzle" phenomenon, according to which in response to a contractionary mon-
etary policy shock inﬂation initially increases. In fact, in a model featuring
LBD, an increase in the nominal interest rate reduces the output to hours
ratio, which leads to an increase in marginal costs and in turn to an initial
increase in inﬂation.
Finally, ﬁgure 3.3 reports the response to a natural technology shock. Also
in this case the model responses are in general close to the VAR generated
responses and within the conﬁdence intervals.
In order to disentangle the diﬀerent propagation mechanisms included in
my model, ﬁgures 3.4-3.6 plot the responses to one unit standard innovation
to the three shocks considered. I report the impulse responses for the baseline
model and for the two alternative speciﬁcations, together with the VAR-based
responses and conﬁdence intervals.
The LBD mechanism appears to be a crucial feature in order to match
VAR based impulse response functions.
Figure 3.4 illustrates that the LBD mechanism is crucial to generate a re-
sponse of consumption and house prices to a government spending shock of
the same sign as the VAR model. Absent this channel, the response of con-
sumption and house prices to a government spending shock would be negative
rather than positive and the level of productivity, measured by the output per
hour ratio, would be unaﬀected. As a result, without LBD the model also fails
to mimic the decline in inﬂation and interest rate.
Figure 3.5 shows that LBD is also decisive to capture the initial increase
in inﬂation in response to a positive monetary policy shock. Furthermore, the
model with LBD delivers ampliﬁed responses for several variables making it
more successful at reproducing the VAR responses.
Finally, ﬁgure 3.6 suggests that, absent LBD, variables are in general quite
unresponsive to technology shocks. However, such unresponsiveness is more
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likely produced by the large degree of price stickiness rather than the absence
of skills accumulation.
By contrast, the collateral channel has a minor role. For the govern-
ment spending shock the collateral channel is quantitatively, but not qual-
itatively, important to generate a response of consumption in line with the
data. Without the collateral channel the response of consumption to a gov-
ernment spending shock is still positive but signiﬁcantly smaller than in the
baseline case. In fact, the increase in house prices raises the collateral capacity
of constrained households, and yields a larger increase in aggregate consump-
tion. For the remaining variables the responses are similar and the collateral
channel does not appear to play a signiﬁcant role. Similarly, the collateral
channel ampliﬁes the fall of consumption in response to a positive monetary
policy shock respect to the case when the collateral channel is switched oﬀ.
Finally, the responses to a technology shock remain virtually unaﬀected when
the collateral channel is switched oﬀ.
3.5.4 The main sources of ﬂuctuation
Figure 3.7 displays the forecast error variance decomposition of GDP, consump-
tion, real house price, inﬂation and nominal interest rate at various horizons.
Because of the restrictions imposed on the DSGE based impulse responses to
account for the restrictions required by the VAR identiﬁcation strategy, on
impact the monetary shock has eﬀect only on the nominal interest rate.
Government spending account for much of the movement in GDP while
monetary and technology shocks plays only a minor role.
On impact movements of consumption are manly driven by technology
shocks. In the following periods government spending and monetary shocks
provide a larger contribution.
On impact real house price is quite unresponsive to government spending
shocks and its variation is mostly explained by technology shocks. After one
year, government spending and monetary shocks explains respectively about
25% and 12% of house price total variance. In the long-run the government
spending shock account for about two-thirds of the total variance of house
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prices.
Inﬂation is manly driven by technology shocks and only in the long-run
government spending shocks contribute signiﬁcantly to changes in inﬂation.
By contrast the monetary policy has a very limited role and in the long-run
account for about 1.5% of total variance of inﬂation.7
Finally, much of the change in nominal interest rate is explained on impact
by monetary shocks, whereas in the following periods the technology shock
is the main driving force, probably because of the relative contribution of
technology shock in explaining variation in the inﬂation rate.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter investigate the eﬀects of government spending shocks on real
house prices. The main result of the present chapter is to show that including
a Learning-By-Doing mechanism in a standard new Keynesian DSGE model
with housing production and collateralized borrowing enables the model to
reproduce the increase in real house prices observed in the data. This result
mainly derives from the reduction in the long-term real interest rate generated
by the LBD as discussed in chapter 1. I show that in my model collateral
eﬀects can bring a larger increase in consumption in response to a govern-
ment spending shock, whereas the eﬀect on the other variables considered is
negligible.
7In Smets and Wouters (2007) monetary policy shocks in the long-run explain less than
5% of the total variance of inﬂation.
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Table 3.1: Fixed parameters
Parameter Description Value
ϕ inverse of labour supply elasticity 3
βP patient discount factor 0.9925
βI impatient discount factor 0.97
δh housing depreciation rate 0.008
j weight of housing into the utility function 0.18
δkh, δkc capital depreciation rate 0.025
αc, αh capital share 0.30
αl land share 0.10
λw steady state wage mark-up 0.05
λf steady state price mark-up 0.05
m loan-to-value (LTV) 0.75
G
GDP
government spending to GDP ratio 0.20
ιw,h wage indexation to past inﬂation: housing sector 0
u′′ capital utilization cost 0.01
φpi monetary rule: response to inﬂation 1.50
S
′′
investment adjustment cost 5.74
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Table 3.2: Estimated parameters and standard errors: shocks process
Model
Parameter Baseline Without
LBD
Without
collateral
channel
σr monetary shock: standard
deviation
0.16
(0.012)
0.13
(0.016)
0.16
(0.013)
σa productivity shock: standard
deviation
0.46
(0.026)
0.47
(0.025)
0.45
(0.026)
σg government shock: standard
deviation
0.66
(0.030)
0.70
(0.032)
0.65
(0.030)
ρg government spending:
autocorrelation
0.96
(0.008)
0.92
(0.011)
0.96
(0.008)
ρa productivity shock:
autocorrelation
0.63
(0.046)
0.65
(0.037)
0.60
(0.046)
144
Chapter 3 What are the eﬀects of government spending on house prices?
Table 3.3: Estimated parameters and standard errors: structural parameters
Model
Parameter Baseline Without
LBD
Without
collateral
channel
ρr monetary rule: interest
smoothing
0.72
(0.013)
0.88
(0.013)
0.73
(0.012)
φgdp monetary rule: GDP growth 0.47
(0.045)
0.83
(0.114)
0.50
(0.046)
ζc,w probability of wage ﬁxed: non
housing sector
0.60
(0.017)
0.58
(0.026)
0.58
(0.019)
ζh,w probability of wage ﬁxed:
housing sector
0.46
(0.025)
0.85
(0.039)
0.44
(0.025)
ιw,c wage indexation: non-housing
sector
0.58
(0.065)
0.99
(0.718)
0.58
(0.057)
ιp price indexation to past inﬂation 0.40
(0.141)
0.99
(0.055)
0.37
(0.136)
ζp probability of price ﬁxed 0.63
(0.026)
0.96
(0.004)
0.60
(0.026)
h consumption habit 0.61
(0.045)
0.72
(0.040)
0.47
(0.047)
µn Learning-By-Doing (response to
past hours)
0.45
(0.041)
- 0.50
(0.043)
ρx Learning-By-Doing
(autocorrelation)
0.57
(0.042)
- 0.54
(0.043)
Ψd ﬁscal policy rule: government
debt
0.26
(0.028)
0.32
(0.038)
0.24
(0.028)
Ψgdp ﬁscal policy rule: GDP 0.69
(0.064)
0.43
(0.073)
0.67
(0.061)
γ share of patient households 0.72
(0.061)
0.99
(0.052)
-
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Table 3.4: Steady-state ratios
Parameter Description Value
4×R-1 annualized nominal interest rate 3%
C/GDP consumption share 54 %
I/GDP non-residential investment share 21%
qIH/GDP residential investment share 4.7 %
Kc/(4×GDP ) capital to GDP ratio: non-housing sector 2.09
Kh/(4×GDP ) capital to GDP ratio: housing sector 0.04
qH/(4×GDP ) housing wealth 1.46
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APPENDIX C
Appendix to chapter 3
C.1 Data
This section describes more in details data employed in the estimation of the
VAR model presented in section 3.4.
Residential investment: Residential investment. Table 1.1.5 line 12. Source:
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA); Note: Seasonally adjusted at an-
nual rates.
Real House prices: Median Sales Price for New Houses Sold in the United
States (MSPNHSUS). Source: FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of ST. Louise.
Prices are converted in real term using the GDP price index.
The description of the remaining variables and the relevant transformations
are reported in the appendix to chapter 1.
C.2 Model derivation
In this section I deﬁne the set of equations describing the model, I brieﬂy
discuss how to derive the relevant steady states, and I provide the complete
set of log-linearized equations. In what follow the symbol ˜ denotes variables
expressed in real term.
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C.2.1 First order conditions
Households
Let λI,Pt denote the marginal utility of consumption for Patient households
and λKht denote the value of installed capital. First order conditions for patient
households with respect to consumption CPt , lending B
P
t (or equivalently bond
holding Dt), housing H
P
t , investment Ih,t and Ic,t, capital Kh,t and Kc,t and
capital utilization uh,t and uc,t in both sectors are:
λI,Pt =
[
1(
CPt − hCPt−1
) − βPh(
Et
[
CPt+1
]− hCPt )
]
(C.1)
λI,Pt = β
PEt
[
λI,Pt+1
Rt
pit+1
]
(C.2)
λI,Pt qt =
j
HPt
+ βP (1− δh)Et
[
λI,Pt+1qt+1
]
(C.3)
λI,Pt = λ
Kh
t
{
1− Sh
(
Ih,t
Ih,t−1
)
− S ′h
(
Ih,t
Ih,t−1
)
Ih,t
Ih,t−1
}
+βPEt
[
λKht+1S
′
h
(
Ih,t+1
Ih,t
)(
Ih,t+1
Ih,t
)2]
(C.4)
λI,Pt = λ
Kc
t
{
1− Sc
(
Ic,t
Ic,t−1
)
− S ′c
(
Ic,t
Ic,t
)
Ic,t
Ic,t
}
+βPEt
[
λKct+1S
′
c
(
Ic,t+1
Ic,t
)(
Ic,t+1
Ic,t
)2]
(C.5)
λKht = β
PEtλI,Pt+1
[
R˜kh,t+1uh,t+1 − ah (uh,t+1)
]
+ βP (1− δkh)Et
[
λKht+1
]
(C.6)
λKct = β
PEtλI,Pt+1
[
R˜kc,t+1uc,t+1 − ac (uc,t+1)
]
+ βP (1− δkc)Et
[
λKct+1
]
(C.7)
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R˜kh,t = a
′ (uh,t) (C.8)
R˜kc,t = a
′ (uc,t) (C.9)
Similarly, for impatient households ﬁrst order conditions with respect to
consumption CIt , borrowing B
I
t and housing H
I
t are:
λI,It =
[
1(
CIt − hICIt−1
) − βIhI(
Et
[
CIt+1
]− hCIt )
]
(C.10)
λI,It = λ
B
t + β
IEt
[
λI,It+1
Rt
pit+1
]
(C.11)
λI,It qt =
j
HIt
+ βI (1− δh)Et
(
λI,It+1qt+1
)
+ λBt mEt
(
qt+1
pit+1
Rt
)
(C.12)
where λBt is the Lagrangian multiplier associated to the borrowing constraint
(3.7).
The part of the model describing the representative impatient households
is completed by the budget constraint (3.6) and the borrowing constraint (3.7).
Expressing variables in real term and under the assumption that in equilibrium
the latter constraint holds with equality yields:
CIt −BIt + qt
[
HIt − (1− δh)HIt−1
]
+ T It = −
Rt−1
pit
BIt−1 + W˜
I
c,tN
I
c,t + W˜
I
h,tN
I
h,t
(C.13)
BIt = mEt
(
qt+1H
I
t
pit+1
Rt
)
(C.14)
Wage setting
For each production sector l = {c, h} and for each type of households d =
{P, I}, the ﬁrst order condition for the wage setting problem deﬁned in equa-
tion (3.11), after some straightforward algebra, can be written as:
156
Appendix C Appendix to chapter 3
Et
∞∑
s=0
(
ζl,wβ
d
)s (XWt,sW d,rell,t W˜ dl,t
W˜ dl,t+s
)− 1+λw
λw
Ndl,t+s
λI,dt+s ×{
(1 + λw)
(
XWt,sW
d,rel
l,t
W˜ dl,t
W˜ dl,t+s
)− (1+λw)ϕ
λw
ψd
(Ndl,t+s)
ϕ
λI,dt+s
−XWt,sW d,rell,t W˜ dl,t
}
= 0(C.15)
where XWt,s ≡
s∏
g=1
(pi)(1−iw,l)(pit+g−1)iw,l
s∏
g=1
pit+g
and W d,rell,t ≡ W
d,new
t
W dl,t
is the relative wage
chosen by those households that are allowed to re-optimize their wage respect
to the level of wages at time t. Wage evolution (3.13) expressed in term of
relative wage is:
(
W˜ dl,t
)− 1
λw
= (1− ζw)
(
W d,rell,t W˜
d
l,t
)− 1
λw
+ ζl,w
[
(pi)(1−iw,l) (pit−1)
iw,l
pit
W˜ dl,t−1
]− 1
λw
(C.16)
Firms
The input demand from the non-housing sector ﬁrms (3.21)-(3.23) can be
written in real term as:
W˜ Pc,t = γ (1− αc) M˜Ct
Yt
Nc,t
(C.17)
W˜ Ic,t = (1− γ) (1− αc) M˜Ct
Yt
N ′c,t
(C.18)
R˜kc,t = αcM˜Ct
Yt
Kc,t
(C.19)
Similarly the input demand from the housing sector (3.31)-(3.34) in real
157
Appendix C Appendix to chapter 3
term are:
W˜ Ph,t = γ (1− αh − αl) qt
IHt
Nh,t
(C.20)
W˜ Ih,t = (1− γ) (1− αh − αl) qt
IHt
N ′h,t
(C.21)
R˜kh,t = αh
qtIHt
Kh,t
(C.22)
R˜lt = αlqtIHt (C.23)
Price setting
Non-housing ﬁrms maximization condition for the optimal price setting prob-
lem (3.25) is:
Et
∞∑
s=0
(
ζpβ
P
)s(λI,Pt+s
λI,Pt
)
(Xt,s)
− 1+λf
λf
{[
−P relt (Xt,s) + (1 + λf ) M˜Ct+s
]}
= 0
(C.24)
where Xt,s =
s∏
g=1
(pi)(1−ip)(pit+g−1)ip
s∏
g=1
pit+g
and the relative price P relt is deﬁned as P
rel
t =
Pnewt
Pt
, where P newt is the new price chosen by those ﬁrms able to re-optimize
their price.
Price evolution (3.27) can be rewritten in terms of relative price as:
(1− ζp)
(
P relt
)− 1
λf + ζp
(
pi
ιp
t−1pi
(1−ιp)
pit
)− 1
λf
= 1 (C.25)
C.2.2 Equilibrium conditions
The model equilibrium is described by the set of equations (C.1)-(C.25), (3.3),
(3.4), (3.17)-(3.20), (3.28)-(3.30), and (3.35)-(3.50) and the deﬁnition of eﬀect-
ive capital for both sectors provided in the section 3.2.3 of the main text.
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C.2.3 Steady states
Combining (C.4) and (C.5) gives:
λKc = λI,P = λKh (C.26)
From (C.6) and using (C.26) and the fact that a (uh) = 0 and uh = 1 yields
an expression for the rental rate of capital in the housing sector:
Rkh =
1
βP
− (1− δkh) (C.27)
Similarly from (C.7) the rental rate of capital in the non housing sector is:
Rkc =
1
βP
− (1− δkc) (C.28)
From (C.1):
λI,P =
(
1− βPh)
CP (1− h) (C.29)
Assuming at steady state inﬂation is zero, the steady state level of the
nominal interest rate can be derived from (C.2)
R =
1
βP
(C.30)
Equation (C.3), after substituting for λI,P using (C.29), implies that the
steady state value of housing wealth for patient households is:
qHP =
j (1− h)
[1− βP (1− δh)] (1− βPh)C
P ≡ A1CP (C.31)
Equations (C.8) and (C.9) yields:
a′ (uc) = Rkc (C.32)
a′ (uh) = Rkh (C.33)
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Under the assumption of full capital utilization at steady state the eﬀective
capital coincides with the stock of capital:
Kc = Kc (C.34)
Kh = Kh (C.35)
From (3.3), using Sc (1) = 0 and combining with (C.34) gives the steady
state level of business investment in the non housing sector:
Ic = δkcKc (C.36)
Similarly from (3.4) the steady state level of business investment in the
housing sector is:
Ih = δkhKh (C.37)
From (C.10)
λI,I =
(
1− βIh)
CI (1− h) (C.38)
From (C.11) and using (C.30) to substitute for R, the steady state level of
the shadow value of borrowing is:
λB =
(
1− β
I
β
)
λI,I (C.39)
From (C.12) and using (C.30), (C.38) and (C.39) the housing wealth value
for impatient households is:
qHI =
j
(
1− hI)
{1− βI (1− δh)− (βP − βI)m} (1− βIh)C
I ≡ A2CI (C.40)
From the impatient budget constraint (C.13)
CI + qHIδh + T
I =
(
1− 1
βP
)
BI +W IcN
I
c +W
I
hN
I
h (C.41)
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From impatient borrowing constraint (C.14) combined with (C.30), the
value of borrowing at steady state is
BI = mβqHI (C.42)
Multiplying the housing market clearing condition (3.41) by the steady
state level of real houses price q and using (C.31) and (C.40), follows that the
aggregate value of residential investment is:
qIH = δh
(
A1C
P + A2C
I
)
(C.43)
From (3.40) follows that the steady state level of output in the non-housing
sector is:
Y = CP + CI + Ic + Ih +G (C.44)
Whereas, given the deﬁnition of GDP in (3.36), the GDP steady state value
is:
GDP = CP + CI + Ic + Ih + qIH +G (C.45)
Using the input demand from ﬁrms in the non-housing sector (C.17) and
(C.18) is possible to derive the steady state wage bill for both households:
N IcW
I
c = MC (1− γ) (1− αc)Y (C.46)
W Pc N
P
c = MCγ (1− αc)Y (C.47)
Similar, for the housing sector, using (C.20) and (C.21) combined with
(C.43) yields:
W
I
hN
I
h = (1− γ) (1− αh − αl) δh
(
A1C
P + A2C
I
)
(C.48)
W Ph N
P
h = γ (1− αh − αl) δh
(
A1C
P + A2C
I
)
(C.49)
Plugging (C.43) into (C.22) yields the steady state value of capital in the
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housing sector:
Kh =
αh
Rkh
δh
(
A1C
P + A2C
I
)
(C.50)
Plugging the equation above into (C.37) gives the steady state level of business
investment in the housing sector:
Ih = δkh
αh
Rkh
δh (A1C + A2C
′) (C.51)
From (C.19) the steady state level of capital in the non-housing sector is:
Kc = αc
MC
Rkc
Y (C.52)
Substitute into (C.36) gives the steady state level of business investment
in the non-housing sector.
Ic = αcδkc
MC
Rkc
Y (C.53)
In order to derive an expression for the steady state level of consumption
for patient and impatient households combine the budget constraint (C.41)
and the market clearing condition (C.44). Put (C.42), (C.46) and (C.48) into
(C.41) and using (C.40) yields:
{1 +m (1− β)A2 + δhA2 − (1− γ) (1− αh − αl) δhA2} C
I
Y
= (C.54)
+MC (1− γ) (1− αc) + (1− γ) (1− αh − αl) δhA1C
P
Y
− T
I
Y
Put (C.51) and (C.53) into (C.44), divide by Y and solving for C
P
Y
yields:
CP
Y
=
{
1 + A1δkh
αh
Rkh
δh
}−1{
1−
{
1 + δkh
αh
Rkh
δhA2
}
CI
Y
− αcδkcMC
Rkc
− G
Y
}
(C.55)
Plug into (C.54) and rearranging gives:
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CI
Y
= PP4MC (1− γ) (1− αc)
+PP4PP1A1 {1 + A1PP2}−1
{
1− αcδkcMC
Rkc
− G
Y
}
− PP4T
I
Y
(C.56)
where:
PP4 =
[
1 +m (1− β)A2 + δhA2 − PP1A2
+PP1A1 {1 + A1PP2}−1 {1 + PP2A2}
]−1
PP1 = (1− γ) (1− αh − αl) δh
PP2 = δkh
αh
Rkh
δh .
From (3.38) and using (C.30) follows:
T
Y
=
(
1
β
− 1
)
D
Y
+
G
Y
(C.57)
Assuming both households pay the same amount of tax, in aggregate level
must be:
T I
Y
= (1− γ) T
Y
(C.58)
Equilibrium condition (C.15) for patient households labour supply in the
non-housing sector implies:
W Pc = (1 + λw)ψ
P N
Pϕ
c,t
λI,P
(C.59)
Plug into (C.47) and use (C.29) to substitute for λI,P :
NPc =
[
MCγ (1− αc)
(1 + λw)ψP
(
1− βPh)
CP
Y
(1− h)
] 1
1+ϕ
(C.60)
Similarly for housing sector plugging labour supply condition in (C.49) and
simplifying using (C.29) yields:
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NPh =
γ (1− αh − αl) δh
(
A1
CP
Y
+ A2
CI
Y
)
(1 + λw)ψP
(
1− βPh)
CP
Y
(1− h)

1
1+ϕ
(C.61)
Thus, the aggregate level of hours NP for patient agent is:
NP = NPh +N
P
c =
γ (1− αh − αl) δh
(
A1
CP
Y
+ A2
CI
Y
)
(1 + λw)ψP
(
1− βPh)
CP
Y
(1− h)

1
1+ϕ
+
[
MCγ (1− αc)
(1 + λw)ψP
(
1− βPh)
CP
Y
(1− h)
] 1
1+ϕ
(C.62)
One can always chose ψP such that the aggregate level of hours worked NP
is equal to 1/3. Solving equation above for ψPyields:
ψP =
[ (
1− βPh) γ
CP
Y
(1− h) (1 + λw)
]
×3
 [(1− αh − αl) δh (A1CPY + A2CIY )] 11+ϕ
+ [MC (1− αc)]
1
1+ϕ

1+ϕ
(C.63)
Similarly, for impatient households
ψI =
[ (
1− βIh) (1− γ)
CI
Y
(1− h) (1 + λw)
]
×3
 [(1− αh − αl) δh (A1CPY + A2CIY )] 11+ϕ
+ [MC (1− αc)]
1
1+ϕ

1+ϕ
(C.64)
Finally, use (C.46), (C.47), (C.48) and (C.49) to derive an expression for
wages steady state levels:
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W Ic
Y
=
MC (1− γ) (1− αc)
N Ic
(C.65)
W Pc
Y
=
MCγ (1− αc)
NPc
(C.66)
W Ih
Y
=
(1− γ) (1− αh − αl) δh
(
A1
CP
Y
+ A2
CI
Y
)
N Ih
(C.67)
W Ph
Y
=
γ (1− αh − αl) δh
(
A1
CP
Y
+ A2
CI
Y
)
NPh
(C.68)
C.2.4 Log-linearized equilibrium
The log-linearized equilibrium conditions around the steady state, assuming
inﬂation is zero and where appropriate expressing variable in real terms, are:
(1− h) (1− βPh) λ̂I,Pt = − (1 + βPh2) ĉPt + hĉPt−1 + βPhEtĉPt+1 (C.69)
λ̂I,Pt = Etλ̂
I,P
t+1 + r̂t − Etpit+1 (C.70)
q̂t = −
[
1− βP (1− δh)
] (
ĥPt − λ̂I,Pt
)
− βP (1− δh) (r̂t − Etpit+1)
+ βP (1− δh)Etq̂t+1 (C.71)
(
1 + βP
)
îh,t =
(
λ̂Kht − λ̂I,Pt
)
S
′′
h (1)
+ îh,t−1 + βPEt̂ih,t+1 (C.72)
(
1 + βP
)
îc,t =
(
λ̂Kct − λ̂I,Pt
)
S ′′c (1)
+ îc,t−1 + βPEt̂ic,t+1 (C.73)
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λ̂Kht − λ̂I,Pt = − (r̂t − Etpit+1) +
(
1− βP (1− δkh)
)
Etr̂kh,t+1
+βP (1− δkh)
(
Etλ̂Kht+1 − Etλ̂I,Pt+1
)
(C.74)
λ̂Kct − λ̂I,Pt = − (r̂t − Etpˆit+1) +
(
1− βP (1− δkc)
)
Etr̂kc,t+1
+βP (1− δkc)
(
Etλ̂Kct+1 − Etλ̂I,Pt+1
)
(C.75)
Rkc r̂
k
c,t = a
′′ (1) ûc,t (C.76)
Rkhr̂
k
h,t = a
′′ (1) ûh,t (C.77)
(
1− βIh) (1− h) λ̂I,It = − (1 + βIh2) ĉIt + hĉIt−1 + βIhEtĉ′t+1 (C.78)
λ̂I,It =
(
1− β
I
βP
)
λ̂Bt +
βI
βP
Et
[
λ̂I,It+1 + r̂t − pit+1
]
(C.79)
λ̂I,It + q̂t = −
{
1− βI (1− δh)−
(
βP − βI)m} ĥIt
+ βI (1− δh)
(
λ̂I,It+1 + q̂t+1
)
+
(
βP − βI)mEt [λ̂Bt + q̂t+1 + pit+1 − r̂t] (C.80)
CI
Y
ĉIt −mβPA2
CI
Y
b̂It + A2
CI
Y
δhq̂t + A2
CI
Y
[
ĥIt − (1− δh) ĥIt−1
]
+
T I
Y
t̂It =
−mA2C
I
Y
(
r̂t−1 − pit + b̂It−1
)
+MC (1− γ) (1− αc)
(
ŵIc,t + n̂
I
c,t
)
+ (1− γ) (1− αh − αl) δh
(
A1
CP
Y
+ A2
CI
Y
)(
ŵIh,t + n̂
I
h,t
)
(C.81)
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b̂It = Et
(
q̂t+1 + ĥ
I
t + pit+1 − r̂t
)
(C.82)
ŵd,rell,t = ζl,wβ
dEt
{
ŵd,rell,t+1 + ŵ
d
l,t+1 − ŵdl,t − iw,lpit + pit+1
}
+
λw
(
1− ζl,wβd
)
λw + (1 + λw)ϕ
{
ϕn̂dl,t − λ̂I,dt − ŵdl,t
}
(C.83)
ŵdl,t = iw,lpit−1 − pit + ŵdl,t−1 +
(1− ζl,w)
ζl,w
ŵd,rell,t (C.84)
ŵPc,t = m̂ct + ŷt − n̂Pc,t (C.85)
ŵIc,t = m̂ct + ŷt − n̂Ic,t (C.86)
r̂kc,t = m̂ct + ŷt − k̂c,t (C.87)
q̂t + îht − n̂Ph,t = ŵPh,t (C.88)
ŵIh,t = q̂t + îht − n̂Ih,t (C.89)
r̂kh,t = q̂t + îht − n̂h,t (C.90)
r̂lt = q̂t + îht (C.91)
pit =
ιp
(1 + ιpβ)
pit−1 +
βP
(1 + ιpβP )
Et [pit+1] +
(
1− ζpβP
)
(1− ζp)
ζp (1 + ιpβP )
m̂ct (C.92)
k̂c,t = (1− δkc) k̂c,t−1 + δkcÎc,t (C.93)
k̂h,t = (1− δkh) k̂h,t−1 + δkhÎh,t (C.94)
yt = ât + (1− αc)
[
γ
(
x̂Pc,t + n̂
P
c,t
)
+ (1− γ) (x̂Ic,t + n̂Ic,t)]+ αck̂c,t (C.95)
ât = ρaât−1 + εat (C.96)
x̂Pc,t = ρxx̂
P
c,t−1 + µnn̂
P
c,t−1 (C.97)
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x̂Ic,t = ρxx̂
I
c,t−1 + µnn̂
I
c,t−1 (C.98)
îht = (1− αh − αl)
[
γ
(
x̂Ph,t + n
P
h,t
)
+ (1− γ) (x̂Ih,t + n̂Ih,t)]+ αhk̂h,t (C.99)
x̂Ph,t = ρxx̂
P
h,t−1 + µnn̂
P
h,t−1 (C.100)
x̂Ih,t = ρxx̂
I
h,t−1 + µnn̂
I
h,t−1 (C.101)
r̂t = ρrr̂t−1 + (1− ρr)
[
φpipit + φgdp
(
ĝdpt − ĝdpt−1
)]
+ εrt (C.102)
GDP
Y
ĝdpt =
CP
Y
ĉPt +
CI
Y
ĉIt +
Ic
Y
îc,t +
Ih
Y
îh,t
+δh
(
A1
CP
Y
+ A2
CI
Y
)
îht +
G
Y
ĝt (C.103)
ĝt = ρaĝt−1 + ε
g
t (C.104)
G
Y
ĝt +
1
β
D
Y
(
r̂t−1 + d̂t−1 − pit
)
=
T
Y
t̂t +
D
Y
d̂t (C.105)
t̂t = Ψgdpĝdpt + Ψdd̂t−1 (C.106)
ŷt =
CP
Y
ĉPt +
CI
Y
ĉIt +
Ic
Y
îc,t +
Ih
Y
îh,t +
Kc
Y
Rkc ûc,t +
Kh
Y
Rkh,tûh,t +
Ĝ
Y
ĝt (C.107)
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δh
(
A1
CP
Y
+ A2
CI
Y
)
îht = A1
CP
Y
[
ĥPt − (1− δh) ĥPt−1
]
+A2
CI
Y
[
ĥIt − (1− δh) ĥIt−1
]
(C.108)
(
CP + CI
)
ĉt = C
P ĉPt + C
I ĉIt (C.109)
(Ic + Ih) ĉt = Iĉic,t + Iĥih,t (C.110)
(
W Ph +W
I
h
)
ŵh,t = W
P
h ŵ
P
h,t +W
I
h ŵ
I
h,t (C.111)(
W Pc +W
I
c
)
ŵc,t = W
P
c ŵ
P
c,t +W
I
c ŵ
I
c,t (C.112)
(
NPh +N
I
h
)
n̂h,t = γN
P
h n̂
P
h,t + (1− γ)N Ih n̂Ih,t (C.113)(
NPc +N
I
c
)
n̂c,t = γN
P
c n̂
P
c,t + (1− γ)N Ic n̂Ic,t (C.114)
(Wh +Wc) ŵt = Whŵh,t +Wcŵc,t (C.115)
(Nh +Nc) n̂t = Nhn̂h,t +Ncn̂c,t (C.116)
t̂Pt = γt̂t (C.117)
t̂It = (1− γ) t̂t (C.118)
k̂c,t = ûc,t + k̂c,t−1 (C.119)
k̂h,t = ûh,t + k̂h,t−1 (C.120)
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C.3 Initial guess and estimated values
As already discussed in the appendix A.4, the optimization routine employed
is able to ﬁnd only a local minimum. I performed 300 draws to verify that my
estimates are actually a global minimum. For about 30% of them the initial
guess is a local minimum. However, the value of loss function as deﬁned in
equation (1.38) is extremely large compared to the value of loss function for
the parameter reported in section 3.5. I therefore discard these estimates since
they do not appear to be a local minimum. For the remaining cases, the initial
guess and the corresponding ﬁnal estimates are reported in ﬁgures C.1-C.3.
The draws are sorted in ascending order by the value of the loss function. As
ﬁgures show, my optimization routine converges to the same values in most
cases.
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Conclusions
This thesis contributes to the ongoing debate on the eﬀects and propagation
mechanisms of government spending shocks on economic activity. I investigate
the theoretical and empirical relevance of a propagation mechanism for gov-
ernment spending shocks based on skill accumulation of workers through past
work experience or Learning-by-Doing (LBD). LBD is perceived as external
by households and ﬁrms.
The main results found in the thesis are the following.
First, in chapter 1, I conduct a structural vector auto-regression (VAR)
analysis using US data to illustrate that an expansionary government spend-
ing shock increases private consumption, productivity and real wages and is
associated with a fall in inﬂation and interest rates. I show that a New Keyne-
sian DSGE model with LBD can account for all these facts, whereas without
LBD the model delivers results at odds with the data. The DSGE model is
estimated by minimising the distance between the DSGE and VAR impulse
response functions. After the model has been estimated, I investigate whether
it is capable of accounting for some of the facts regarding the behaviour of
GDP and other variables over the business cycle in the United States.
Second, in chapter 2, I demonstrate the capability of LBD to explain the
persistent depreciation of the real exchange rate in response to an expansionary
government spending shock. The international risk sharing condition yields a
strong correlation between domestic consumption and the real exchange rate.
The decline in the real interest rate, due to the increase in productivity, gen-
erates a persistent real exchange rate depreciation, whereas the DSGE model
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without LBD leads to a counterfactual appreciation of the real exchange rate.
Finally, in chapter 3, I study the eﬀect of a government spending shock
on the housing market. VAR evidences for the US show that a positive gov-
ernment spending shock increases real house prices. In the presence of credit
constrained agents that can borrow against the value of their housing wealth,
the increase in house price introduces an additional propagation mechanism
for a government spending shock. The increase in the collateral's value raises
the amount credit constrained agents can borrow to ﬁnance their consumption
expenditure. I show that, introducing LBD, the reduction in the real interest
rate yields a rise in house prices. The collateral channel ampliﬁes the response
of consumption to a government shock. Absent LBD, the model cannot mimic
the observed increase in real house price and consumption in response to an
expansionary government spending shock. The model is estimated using the
VAR/DSGE impulse responses matching approach.
The introduction of LBD is a promising solution in explaining the sign
of the response to a government spending shock for the variables considered.
However, its quantitative relevance is open to question.
In many cases the variables in the DSGE model are less responsive to shocks
than the corresponding variables in the VAR model. As result, the baseline
DSGE model is not able to account for the ﬂuctuations in the economic activity
and it is able to explain only a fraction of the volatility observed in the data.
These limitations ask for further research to explore the implications of LBD.
The analysis performed in the thesis could consider diﬀerent periods of
time and be extended to other countries to verify whether there exist relevant
diﬀerences across time and space.
In this thesis I have considered LBD as a pure externality. It would be
interesting to investigate the implications for the model when the accumulation
of skills is internalized in the ﬁrms as organizational capital.
A further improvement of the model could be achieved by incorporat-
ing labour market frictions within the search and matching framework à la
Mortensen and Pissarides. The introduction of this feature could make the
model able to distinguish between hours vary on the extensive and intensive
margin, since only the latter is relevant for the LBD. Furthermore, search and
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matching frictions would allow to consider workers job-speciﬁc skills.
Finally, it would be useful to consider alternative econometric strategies
to identify the VAR model and estimate the DSGE model. The methodology
employed to estimate the DSGE structural parameters is based on the assump-
tion that the VAR model is correctly identiﬁed. Further analysis should be
carried out to verify the robustness of this assumption.
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